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The D i a l e c t i c s  of  P o l i t i c a l  Choice:
The Model o f  R.G. Col l ingwood's  New Leviathan.
— Genevieve Miles
To the  i n s p i r a t i o n  o f  S i s t e r  J u l i a n n a .  
To the  l o y a l t y  o f  my s i s t e r ,  Evelyn.
PREFACE
A d i a l e c t i c  o f  cho ice ,  when based upon the  work o f  R.G. Col l i n g -  
wood, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  The New L ev ia than , i s  involved in p o l i t i c a l  
phi losophy.  The s u b je c t  o f  choice  cannot  be d e a l t  with u n t i l  the  
framework f o r  i t s  e x p lo r a t i o n  emerges.  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  the  idea o f  
the  d i a l e c t i c .  Second, t h e r e  i s  the  p h i lo soph ica l  framework which i n ­
volves:  a phi losophy o f  mind, o f  s o c i e t y ,  and o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  each 
o f  which i s  concerned with cho ice .  T h i rd ,  t h e r e  i s  the  c r i t i q u e  o f  
th e  modern dilemma o f  cho ice .
Several problems have p re se n ted  themselves in a t t empt ing  to 
say something upon t h i s  s u b j e c t .  There i s  t h e  complexity  o f  C o l l in g ­
wood's work jwing to  the  f a c t  t h a t  no work p r e s e n t s  the  e n t i r e  f a c e t  
o f  unders tanding  o r  a complete r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  the  whole o f  h i s  thought .  
The New Levia than,  t o  be unders tood ,  must be put  w i th in  the  c o n te x t  o f  
a l l  of  Col l ingwood's  ph i losophy o r  t h e  importance of  choice  w i th in  a 
d i a l e c t i c  and as a c r i t i q u e  o f  the  modern world c o l l a p s e s  because i t  
i s  not  comprehended o r  i f  i t  i s ,  i t  i s  too sha l low f o r  de fense .  A 
r e l a t e d  problem i s  t h a t  such a compendious whole i s  not  favoured r ea d ­
ing in t o d a y ' s  world.  In s tead  o f  t ak ing  a theme and d r iv in g  i t  home, 
t he  theme must emerge.
The format  o f  The New Leviathan c l o s e l y  fol lows t h a t  o f  Hobbes's 
Lev ia than . The r ea d e r  may r e c a l l  t h a t ,  t o  Hobbes, i t  was impor tan t  to 
f i n d  ou t  why man a c t s  o r  chooses  to  a c t  as he does. Chapter  I ,  "A 
Phi losophy o f  Mind," dea ls  with t h e  same problem. Hobbes saw man no t  
as an i s o l a t e d  a c t o r  but  as one who i s  ac ted  upon by h i s  community, 
hi s  s o c i e t y ,  and h i s  c u l t u r e  o r  c i v i l i z a t i o n  and responded. The term,
-1-
c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by b e l i e f ,  a p o i n t  which Hobbes was a t  
some pa ins  to  emphasize.  I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r t i n e n t  today to  look 
a t  frameworks o f  b e l i e f  in t h i s  manner because cho ice  may not  appear  
to  be,  on the  one hand, so c a p r i c io u s  nor ,  on the  o t h e r ,  so l i m i t e d .  
Thus, the  framework f o r  any concept  o f  cho ice  as emergent  from a c t ion  
based upon b e l i e f  i s  both broad and complex.
What i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  and even e x c i t i n g  about  t h i s  
approach i s  t h a t  i t  p r e s e n t s  an overview,  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and a c r i t i q u e .  
I t  may no t  be necessa ry  t o  "buy" t h e  e n t i r e  idea  in o r d e r  to  f in d  
choice a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The ques t ion  about  overv iew,  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and 
choice  prompts t h e  r e j o i n d e r :  How? The overview i s  p rov id ed ,  in the  
case o f  The New Levia than ,  by an examinat ion o f  t h e  European mind as 
r e l a t e d  to  man's mind, h i s  community, hi s  s o c i e t y ,  and h i s  c u l t u r e .  
A l t e r n a t i v e s  emerge acco rd ing ly  as t h i s  overview i s  accepted  o r  r e ­
j e c t e d .  I t  i s  a wa^ o f  t h ink ing  which is  demanded and,  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  
i t  adumbrates severa l  movements appear ing  as s e p a r a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  in 
t o d a y ' s  world. I t  i s ,  t h e re b y ,  a l s o  a c r i t i q u e  o f  b e l i e f  o r  a c t i o n  
emergent  from uncovered p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  which have no t  been thoroughly  
examined. The c r i t i q u e  emerges in  man's s ea rch  f o r  community, a 
ca tego ry  s t r a n g e l y  l o s t  and one f o r  which we now se a rc h .  I t  emerges 
in  a c r i t i q u e  o f  the  va r ious  premises o f  l i b e r a l i s m .  I t  emerges in a 
c r i t i q u e  o f  the  c u r r e n t  concept  o f  "non-being ."  I t  emerges in  t h e  end­
l e s s  deba te  as to  how to  o rgan ize  mass s o c i e t y  - -  aga in  a m a t t e r  o f  
c ho ice .  I t  emerges in f u r t h e r  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ,  again  accep ted  but  not
- 1 1 -
examined, as to  how n a tu r e ,  man, and sc ience  s tand in r e l a t i o n  to 
each o the r .
The whole o f  Col l ingwood's  work goes beyond a c r i t i q u e  in to  
sugges t ive  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  re-examinat ion o f  cho ice .  This con­
cerns  the  idea o f  p rogress ,  o f  e t h i c s ,  o f  w i l l ,  and f i n a l l y ,  moves 
i n to  an arena with hermeneut ics and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m .  I t  r e q u i r e s  c r i ­
t i c a l  and r e f l e c t i v e  th in k in g .  I t  i s  not  only a d i a l e c t i c s  o f  choice;  
i t  i s  a dialogue  about  choice .
1
Hobbes r e b e l l e d  a g a in s t  a ph i lo soph ica l  t r a d i t i o n  and a r e l i g i o u s  
t r a d i t i o n .  He r e j e c t e d  the p a s t  as p r e s e n t ,  as able  to  e x e rc i s e  
a d e c i s iv e  i n f lu e n ce  on h i s  own t ime.  Maureen Henry has suggested 
in "Trad i t ion  and Rebel l ion" t h a t  a s tudy  o f  the  " s t r u c t u r a l  and 
f unc t iona l  changes in  the  Western t r a d i t i o n "  r e s u l t e d  from the  r e ­
b e l l i o n  o f  Thomas Hobbes. This a l s o  supports  the  idea  o f  the  d i a ­
l e c t i c  s ince  phi losophy i s  a con t inu ing  dialogue between those who 
l i v e  in the  p r e s e n t  and those  who have l a i d  down Western thought  
in h i s t o r y  — a not ion  contained  in most o f  the  works o f  Collingwood. 
A good p a r t  o f  the  r e b e l l i o n  o f  Hobbes stems from his  d e s i r e  f o r  c e r ­
t a i n t y ;  in o rde r  t o  a t t a i n  t h i s ,  some o f  the  v i t a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
t r a d i t i o n  had to  exc ised .  See P a r t  I ,  Chapter  I I  o f  the  Lev ia than . 
(Henry 's  work i s  to  be found in The Southern Review, Volume 12, 
(Winter ,  1976).
- I l l -
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Three c e n tu r i e s  s e p a r a t e  The L e v ia tha n , w r i t t e n  by Thomas 
Hobbes, and The New L ev ia than , w r i t t e n  by Robin George Collingwood.
Yet both these  au thors  a re  now the  o b j e c t  o f  renewed i n t e r e s t  by 
s c h o la r s  in  two f i e l d s ,  t h a t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s c ie nc e  and t h a t  o f  phi losophy.  
The p e r t i n e n c e  o r  contemporanei ty  o f  Hobbes and Collingwood l i e s  in  the  
ques t i ons  they  posed ,  in  t h e i r  unique e x p e r i e n c e s ,  and in t h e  e p i s t e -  
Hiological,  metaphysical systems each espoused.  The i n t e r e s t s  o f  each 
a re  broad and n e i t h e r  was p r im a r i ly  a p o l i t i c a l  ph i lo sopher  a lthough 
each l i v e d  in t imes o f  c r i s e s ,  t h a t  o f  a c u r r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  and 
t h a t  o f  ep is tem olog ica l  c r i s i s .  Hobbes a n t i c i p a t e d  some importan t  con­
temporary problems; indeed ,  some ave r  t h a t  h e ,  r a t h e r  than  Locke, i s
1
t he  a r c h i t e c t  o f  American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t hough t .  The ques t ion  i s :
Why did Coll ingwood, a tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry  Waynflete p ro fe s s o r  of  meta­
phys ics  a t  Oxford,  d e s i r e  to  emulate Hobbes? The next  ques t ion  may be: 
What was Coll ingwood's  view o f  Hobbes's Leviathan?
Collingwood s t a t e d  t h a t  he used Hobbes as a model because he 
" s e t  ou t  t o  deal  with the  same groups o f  problems in t h e  same o r d e r ; "
t h u s ,  he c a l l e d  the  fou r  p a r t s  o f  h i s  New L e v ia tha n , 'Man' ,  ' S o c i e t y ' ,
2
' C i v i l i z a t i o n ' ,  and 'B a rba r i sm ' .  Po in t ing  ou t  two schools  o f  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  work o f  Hobbes, Collingwood d ec la red  h i s  purpose in 
emulat ing Hobbes could be taken  e i t h e r  way:
I f  he i s  one o f  those  who t h in k  o f  Hobbes's 
Leviathan as the  c l a s s i c a l  e x p o s i t io n  of  a 
c l a s s i c a l  type of  despot ism,  namely seven­
te e n t h -c e n tu r y  abso lu t i sm ,  t h e  p o r t r a i t  and 
anatomy o f  ' t h a t  g r e a t  Leviathan c a l l e d  a 
Common-wealth, or  S t a t e  ( in  l a t i n e  Ci v i t a s )
which i s  bu t  an A r t i f i c i a l  Man; though o f  
g r e a t e r  s t a t u r e  and s t r e n g th  than  the  Natural]  
he may t ake  i t  t o  mean t h a t  I have s e t  ou t  in 
t h i s  ' New L e v ia th a n ' t o  p o r t r a y  and anatomize 
t h e  new abso lu t i sm  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e th - c e n t u r y ,  
based on t h e  w i l l  o f  a people  who in thus  s e t ­
t i n g  up a popular  t y r a n t  gave i n t o  h i s  hands 
every r i g h t  any one o f  them has h i t h e r t o  pos­
se s s e d .  For the  immediate aim o f  t h i s  book i s  
t o  s tudy  t h e  new abso lu t i sm  and in q u i r e  i n to  
i t s  n a t u r e ,  c a u se s ,  and p rospec t s  o f  success  
o r  f a i l u r e ;  . . .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand.
I f  he t h inks  o f  t h e  Leviathan as a book which 
i s  unique in dea l ing  with the  e n t i r e  body o f  
p o l i t i c a l  sc ie nc e  and approaches i t s  co lo s s a l  
s u b j e c t  from f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  from 
an examinat ion o f  man, h i s  f a c u l t i e s  and i n ­
t e r e s t s ,  h i s  v i r t u e s  and v i c e s ;  a book dea l ing  
f i r s t  w ith man as such ,  then wi th  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  as such,  then wi th  a w e l l -o rd e re d  p o l i ­
t i c a l  l i f e  . . . and l a s t l y  with an i l l - o r d e r e d  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  . . . then he may t ake  by t i t l e  
t o  mean . . . t h a t  in  t h i s  book I have s e t  ou t  
to  deal with t h e  same groups o f  problems in  the  
same o r d e r  . . .4
Collingwood f e l t  t h a t  t h e  second purpose was more h i s  aim. War, he de­
c l a r e d ,  had " ta u g h t  some o f  us t h a t  t h e r e  was more in  Hobbes than we
had supposed . . .  to  see p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  as i t  r e a l l y  i s ,  we must blow
away th e  m is t s  o f  s en t im en ta l i sm  which have concealed i t s  f e a t u r e s  from
5
us e v e r  s in c e  t h e  beginning o f  t h e  e ig h t e e n th  c e n tu ry . "
His work was "an a t t em pt  t o  br ing the  Leviathan up to  d a te  "due
to  t h e  advances made in t h e  i n te r im  in " h i s t o r y ,  psychology,  and an-  
6
t h ropo logy ."
The second q u e s t i o n ,  What was Coll ingwood's  view o f  Hobbes's
Leviathan? i s  more d i f f i c u l t .
_9_
Undoubtedly,  Collingwood saw Hobbes as t h e  ph i lo s o p h ica l  a n t e ­
cedent  t o  a l l  modern moral and p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y ,  t h e  f i r s t  ph i lo sophe r  
to  have at tempted  to  g ive a competent account  o f  human n a tu r e  grounded 
upon na tu r a l  ph i lo sophy .  Secondly,  in  view o f  Col l ingwood's  commit­
ment t o  a d i a l e c t i c a l  I n q u i r y ,  Hobbes must be seen as a unique p o l i t i ­
cal  r e a l i s t  who founded h i s  system upon a d i a l e c t i c a l  concep t ion  o f  
human n a t u r e .  This  d i a l e c t i c  o f  Hobbes 's  phi losophy o f  human n a tu re  
leads  t o  conc lu s ions  beyond t h e  p o l i t i c a l ,  t o  t h a t  o f  the  C a r te s i a n  
view of  r a t i o n a l i t y  and r e a l i t y  in  o r d e r  t o  make humankind th e  mas te r  
and posses so r  o f  n a tu r e  i t s e l f .  Humanity 's needs a r e  p r i o r  to  the  
c i v i l  s i t u a t i o n .  F u r th e r ,  humans a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  in t h a t  they  must
remember p a s t  expe r iences  in o r d e r  t o  ge n e ra te  a f u t u r e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y
8
one which i s  independent  o f  n a t u r e ,  t h e  b r u t e  r e s i s t o r .  Th is  s e p a r a ­
t i o n  o r  a l i e n a t i o n  o f  man and n a tu r e  i s  psycho log ical  a t  t h e  l eve l  o f  
conscious  d e s i r e .  Humans d e s i r e  both p r e s e r v a t i o n  and s a t i s f a c t i o n  
y e t  they  a re  d r iven  by f e a r  and a n x ie t y  t o  seek s h e l t e r  in c i v i l  e x ­
i s t e n c e  which,  in t u r n ,  p l ac e s  them a t  war no t  only wi th  n a tu r e  but  
with  o t h e r s  o f  h i s  own kind.  In regard  t o  o t h e r s ,  Hobbes's  account  o f  
human e f f o r t  i s  d i a l e c t i c a l l y  complex. A p u r s u i t  o f  p l e a s u r e  i s  s e l f ­
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  because ,  in t h e  d e s i r e  to  p re se rve  and to  augment h i s
9
needs and s e c u r i t y ,  humans seek to  compensate and to  a n t i c i p a t e .
Fear  and d e s i r e  a r e  the  f a b r i c  o f  e x i s t e n c e  f o r  s e l f - c o n c e rn e d  human 
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be ings .  In o r d e r  to  p re se rve  both p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  good, humans 
then mediate  via  t h e  c i v i l  a u t h o r i t y .  Humanity becomes th e  measure 
and a u t h o r i t y  f o r  a l l  t h ings  because the  image o f  man i s  reshaped by
h i s  own win.  The premise o f  Hobbesian p o l i t i c a l  theo ry  was t h e  not ion 
o f  consen t .  He agreed with v i r t u a l l y  a l l  previous p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i s t s  
t h a t  speech was the  c h i e f  q u a l i t y  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  men from o th e r  a n i ­
mals .  Speech and reasoning depend upon s e l f - w i l l e d  a c t i o n .  Hobbes 
a s s e r t e d ;
There i s  no o t h e r  a c t  o f  man's mind, t h a t  1 can 
remember, n a t u r a l l y  p lan te d  in  him, so ,  as to  
need no o th e r  t h in g ,  to  the  e x e r c i s e  o f  i t ,  but  
to  be born a man, and l i v e  with the  use o f  h i s  
f i v e  s enses .  Those o t h e r  f a c u l t i e s ,  o f  which I 
s h a l l  speak by and by, and which seem proper  to  
man on ly ,  a re  acqu ir ed ,  and inc reased  by s tudy  
and i n d u s t r y ;  and o f  most men l ea rned  by i n s t r u c ­
t i o n ,  and d i s c i p l i n e ;  and proceed a l l  from th e  
i n v e n t io n  o f  words and speech. For bes id es  sense ,  
and though t ,  and the  t r a i n  o f  though ts ,  the  mind 
o f  man has no o th e r  motion;  though by the  help 
o f  speech and method, t h e  same f a c u l t i e s  may be 
improved to  such a h e i g h t ,  as to  d i s t i n g u i s h  men 
from a l l  o t h e r  l i v i n g  c r e a t u r e s . ' ?
Man's mind, Hobbes con t inued,  i s  r e g u l a t e d  o r  guided by t r a i n s
o f  thought  o f  thought  such as "when o n e ' s  thought s  a re  s a id  t o  wander 
13
The t r a i n  o f  r eg u la te d  thought  can be o f  two kinds;  f i r s t .II
when we seek t o  reproduce causes  and,  second,  when we Imagine anything 
14
whatsoever .  Regulated thoughts a r i s e  from d e s i r e  which leads  to  
memory r e s u l t i n g  from experience .  The f i r s t  use o f  names i s  p a r t  o f  
t h e  r e g i s t e r i n g  o f  t r a i n s  o f  thought  so t h a t  we may r e c a l l  o r  communi­
c a t e  them. D e f in i t io n s  a re  the  process  o f  making sure  t h a t  the  r e g i s ­
t e r i n g  o f  such t r a i n s  o f  thought  proceeds a c c u r a t e l y  or  o f  " s e t t l i n g
15
the  s i g n i f i c a t i o n s  o f  p e op le ' s  words."  Apparent ly ,  Hobbes saw naming 
as  one way humans come to  g r ip s  with f a c t s .  Hobbes then proceeded to  
o u t l i n e  t h re e  s t e p s  as a c o r r e c t  s c i e n t i f i c  procedure .  I t  i s  not
_a_
important  to  go in to  th es e  s te p s  here  but  i t  i s  important  f o r  C o l l in g ­
wood because he undoubtedly a s s o c i a te d  Hobbes with the  emergence of  
the  bas ic  s c i e n t i f i c  paradigm underlying assumptions which had, by the  
t ime o f  Col lingwood,  proved t o  be d i a l e c t i c a l l y  e rroneous .  For C o l l i n g ­
wood, a l s o ,  Hobbes 's  c o n s id e r a t io n  of  j u s t  versus  u n ju s t  must have been 
impor tan t .  That  i s ,  we cannot  d i scove r  whether humans a re  j u s t  o r  un­
j u s t  by any c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  word meanings. We must r e f e r  to  experi ence
to  know the  e x tens ions  o f  the  terms used and to  know t h a t  " u n ju s t  is
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the  name o f  the  f a r  g r e a t e r  p a r t  of  men." Thus, we have two kinds 
o f  knowledge: t h a t  which i s  o r ig i n a l  sense and the  o t h e r  s c ience  or  
knowledge o f  the  t r u t h  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s .
Hoobes appears  to  have sa id  t h a t  the  s oc ia l  c o n t r a c t  r e p r e s e n t s  
man's r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  with an i n a b i l i t y  o f  reason to  l e g i s l a t e  man's 
pa s s ions .  He was concerned with the  problem o f  a u t h o r i t y .  As Hobbes 
has fo rmulated  a u t h o r i t y  in  The Lev ia than , he made a d i s t i n c t i o n  be­
tween the  reasons  which mot ivate  mankind to  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  a p o l i ­
t i c a l  system and the  sanc t ions  which provide f o r  i t s  maintenance once 
i t  i s  in e x i s t e n c e .  Hobbes accounted f o r  the i n ce n t iv e s  to  c o n t r a c t  
in  terms o f  Reason and R e l ig ion ,  The idea of  co rpo ra t ion  enab les  a 
group o f  people  t o  enjoy c o l l e c t i v e l y  the  lega l  r i g h t s  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ;  
i t  i s  a l s o  an a r t i f i c i a l  person in law because i t  may sue and be sued.
In t u r n ,  i t  must conduct  i t s  bus iness  through the agency o f  a r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e  whose powers a re  ves ted  in the  o f f i c e .  A body p o l i t i c  as a
c o rpo ra t ion  has two d i s t i n c t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  i t  i s  permanent and i t  
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i s  sovere ign .
-5-
Hobbes a l s o  appears  t o  have sa id  t h a t  r e l i g i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  an i n ­
a b i l i t y  o f  reason to  grasp  and l e g i s l a t e  f o r  an unresponsive un ive r se .  
Collingwood may have argued t h a t  Hobbes meant t h a t  the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  
the  argument f o r  God as a f i r s t  cause i s  founded upon the  i n e v i t a b ­
i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t e d  power o f  man wi l l  not  be a b le  to  s u s t a i n  an i n ­
f i n i t e  endeavour . The proof  o f  God's e x i s t e n c e  r e s t s  on the  f i n i t u d e  
o f  man (and f o r  Hobbes, upon man's e x h a u s t i b l e  human c u r i o u s i t y ) .  The 
p u r s u i t  o f  good o r  o f  ' f e l i c i t y '  l e a d s ,  in  Hoboes, to  the  g ene ra t ion  
o f  new knowledge so t h a t  man can t ranscend  the  l i m i t s  o f  n a tu r e .  Such 
a l i b e r a t i o n  can be accomplished only when man r e a l i z e s  t h a t  t h e  p r i n ­
c i p l e s  o f  o r d e r  a r e  found only  w i th in  h im se l f  which leads  t o  phi losophy 
as t h e  l i b e r a t i n g  d i s c i p l i n e .
The s e r i e s  o f  c r i s e s  which occurred  in the  West dur ing C o l l i n g ­
wood's l i f e  as he viewed them have been recorded  in h i s  Autobiography. 
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was the  c o l l a p s e  o f  some b a s ic  democrat ic  p r i n c i p l e s  on 
which the Engl ish l i b e r a l  t r a d i t i o n  r e s t s .  Second, a p o s s ib l e  cause 
o f  t h e  grave s i t u a t i o n  in Western l i b e r a l i s m  was poss ib ly  due to  modern 
methods and p r i n c i p l e s  o f  s tu dy .  Th i rd ,  t h e r e  was the  r i v a l  school to  
th e  Lockean no t io ns  as found in Marxian Soc ia l ism .  All o f  t h e s e  events
plus  the  two World Wars, Collingwood r e p o r t e d ,  "broke up my pose o f  a
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detached p r o fe s s io n a l  t h i n k e r . "
Collingwood revea led  t h a t  he had been a democrat ic  l i b e r a l  r e ­
ga rd ing h imse lf  as  a c i t i z e n  w i th in  a p o l i t i c a l  system g r a n t in g  f r a n ­
c h i s e  with a concomitant  duty to  v o te ,  with f u r t h e r  f r a n c h i s e s  o f  f r e e  
speech,  f r e e  p r e s s ,  r ed re s s  f o r  g r i e v a n c e s ,  a p o l i t i c a l  system r e s t i n g
upon a p o l i t i c a l l y  educated pu b l i c  o p in ion ,  a m er i to r io u s  system worth 
de fending.  While the  system was n o t  f r e e  from f a u l t s ,  t h a t  was the  
fun c t io n  of  government. A s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g  system, i t  remained a b u l ­
wark so long as  the  m a jo r i t y  remained we l l - in fo rmed and p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d .  
D i s i l lu s ionm e n t  with t h e s e  n o t i o n s ,  f o r  Collingwood, s e t  in during the  
1890s when the  Dai ly  Mail l o s t  the  "meaning o f  f a c t s  which a reade r
ought  t o  know i f  he was to  vo te  i n t e l l i g e n t l y ,  and acqu ir ed  the  new
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meaning o f  f a c t s ,  o r  f i c t i o n s ,  which i t  might  amuse him to r ead ."
T h i s ,  however, no lo n g e r  t a u g h t  him to  vo te  but  not  t o  vo te ;  p o l i t i c s
became mere s p e c t a c l e .  "Mr. Lloyd George became to  me a landmark . . .
in  t h e  c o r r u p t io n  of  the  e l e c t o r a t e .  . . During the  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f
th e  p r e s e n t  c e n tu ry ,  each o f  t h e s e  c o r r u p t in g  in f lu e n ce s  underwent enor-  
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mous development ."
Events r epo r ted  in  t h e  Engl ish  p res s  be fore  t h e  outbreak of  the
Spanish c i v i l  war confirmed t h a t  e i t h e r  j o u r n a l i s t s  were i l l  informed
o r  t h a t  j o u r n a l i s t i c  ignorance  was a c t i n g  under  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  deceive 
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i t s  r e a d e r s .  When th e  war began, t h e  B r i t i s h  'N a t io n a l '  government
adopted a p o l i c y  o f  ' n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  a l though ,  charged Collingwood,
i t  d id  i n t e r v e n e  a c t i v e l y  on th e  s id e  o f  t h e  r e b e l s .  As such p o l i c i e s
were q u e s t io n e d ,  the  governmental answer was: "Trust  us ;  we know what
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we a re  do ing;  we have given you p eace . "  Yet no evidence was produced
t h a t  o t h e r  a c t i o n s  by the  government would have th re a te n e d  peace.
But though nothing  was s a i d ,  much was done.
F a i l i n g  any s ta t em en t  o f  t h e  'N a t io n a l '  gov­
e rnm ent ' s  p o l i c y ,  I found myse l f  ob l iged  to  
i n f e r  t h e i r  p o l i c y  from the  evidence o f  t h e i r  
a c t i o n s .  . . [which] admit t ed only one ex­
p l a n a t io n .  They wanted th e  r e b e l s  t o  win,  
and wanted to  conceal  t h a t  f a c t  from the 
e l e c t o r a t e .
Why were they  so anxious f o r  the  r e b e l s '  success?
. . .  The B r i t i s h  government,  behind a l l  i t s  d i s ­
g u i s e s ,  had d e c la re d  i t s e l f  a p a r t i s a n  o f  F a s c i s t  
d i c t a t o r s h i p .
An open d e f i a nce  o f  t h e  " r u l e s  o f  pa r l i am e n ta ry  p r i v i l e g e "  
was seen in t h e  y e a r  o f  1938 when c a b in e t  members suppressed p a r l i a -  
.ment a ry c r i t i c i s m .  The t h i r d  be t r a ya l  o f  l i b e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  by the  
Engl ish government occur red when Czechoslovakia  was s a c r i f i c e d  in  the  
same manner as were Abyss in ia  and Spain.  The methods used to  accom­
p l i s h  such p o l i c y  was a " c a r e f u l l y  eng ineered  w a r - s c a re  in  the  country
a t  l a r g e " ;  t h e  "Engl i sh  prime m i n i s t e r  did i t  by p lay ing  on s h e e r ,
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s t a r k  t e r r o r . "
World War I had a l r e a d y  proved t h a t  i n  modern war t h e r e  could
be no v i c t o r s ;  t h e r e  was ano the r  d e f e a t  in  modern war ,  t h a t  o f  p a r t i e s
and s ta tesmen who could no t  r i s e  to  the  o c c as io n .  While the  war was
a "triumph f o r  n a tu r a l  s c ience"  as power and l e d  to  "improvements in
t r a n s p o r t , "  s a n i t a t i o n ,  s u rg e r y ,  medic ine ,  p s y c h i a t r y ,  commerce, and
i n d u s t r y ,  i t  was a l s o  "an unprecedented d i s g r a c e  to  t h e  human i n t e l l e c t "
s in c e  i t  showed " th e  c o n t r a s t  between th e  success  o f  modern European
minds in  c o n t r o l l i n g  almost  any s i t u a t i o n  in which t h e  elements  a re
phys ica l  bodies  and the  f o r c e s  phys ica l  f o r c e s ,  and t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  to
c on t ro l  s i t u a t i o n s  in  which t h e  elements  a r e  human beings and the
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fo rc e s  mental f o rc e s  . . . "  This was r evea led  in  t h e  " sheer  i n ­
e p t i t u d e "  o f  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  t r e a t y .  In f a c t ,  t h e  c o n t ro l  o f  the  fo rces  
o f  n a tu r e  which had been proceeding f o r  a t h r e e  hundred y e a r  i n v e s t i g a ­
t i v e  pe r iod  showed t h a t  men were y e t  in  t h e  Middle Ages who meant well
but  who needed "more unders tand ing of  human a f f a i r s  and more knowledge
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of  how to handle them."
The answer to  t h e s e  needs appeared to  be forthcoming in psy­
chology;  to  Col lingwood, as he perused William James 's  V a r i e t i e s  o f  
Rel ig ious Expe r ience , the  claim o f  psychology to  throw l i g h t  upon a 
knowledge of  human a f f a i r s  was a ' f r a u d ' .  F i r s t ,  psychology was not  
a young sc ience  but  one " d e l i b e r a t e l y  c r e a te d " .
I t  marched on th e  one hand with phys io logy ,  
and on the  o t h e r  wi th  the  sc iences  o f  mind 
p roper ,  l o g ic  and e t h i c s ,  the  sc iences  of  
reason and w i l l .  And i t  showed no d e s i r e  
to  encroach on i t s  ne ighbours '  t e r r i t o r i e s  
u n i t l ,  e a r l y  in the  n ine te en th  c en tu ry ,  the  
dogma got  about  t h a t  reason and wi l l  were 
only conc re t ions  o f  sense and a p p e t i t e .  I f  
t h a t  was so,  i t  followed t h a t  l o g ic  and 
e t h i c s  could d i s a p p e a r ,  and t h a t  t h e i r  
f unc t ions  could be taken over  by psychology.
For t h e r e  was no such th ing  as  'm in d ' ;  what 
had been so c a l l e d  was only ' p s y c h e ' . 27
Any claim,  t h eo r i ze d  Collingwood has i m p l ic a t i o n s .  In the  case  o f  psy­
chology, the  im p l ic a t i o n s  a re  t h a t  i t  must a bo l i sh  " d i s t i n c t i o n s  which, 
being v a l id  f o r  reason and wi l l  but  not  f o r  s e nsa t ion  and a p p e t i t e ,  
c o n s t i t u t e  the  spec ia l  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  o f  lo g ic  and e t h i c s ;  d i s t i n c t i o n s  
l i k e  t h a t  between t r u t h  and e r r o r ,  knowledge and ignorance,  sc ience
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and s o p h i s t r y ,  r i g h t  and wrong, good and bad, exped ien t  and in ex p e d ien t . "  
His conc lus ion ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  was t h a t  psychology i s  no t  only not  a sc ience  
but  i s  what " 'p h reno logy '  was in the e a r l y  n ine teen th  c en tu ry ,  and a s ­
t ro lo g y  and alchemy in t h e  Middle Ages and the  s i x t e e n th  cen tu ry :  the
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fash ionab le  s c i e n t i f i c  f raud  o f  the  age ."  There was s t i l l  a v a l id  
area o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  f o r  psychology in the  area of  s e n s a t io n ,  a p p e t i t e ,  
and emotions.
~R~
How, pondered Collingwood, could humankind come to understand
human a f f a i r s  b e t t e r ?  Could a s tudy o f  h i s t o r y ,  v a s t l y  improved over
t h a t  done b e fo re ,  become a l i v i n g  p a s t  so t h a t  events  become process
so t h a t  the  p a s t  i s  seen to  l i v e  in the  p re se n t?  Is  i t  p o s s ib l e  t h a t
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h i s t o r y  could "be a school o f  moral and p o l i t i c a l  wisdom?" H is to ry ,
he mused, could br ing " to  moral and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  . . . a  t r a i n e d  eye
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f o r  the  s i t u a t i o n  in which one has to  a c t . "  The bankruptcy o f  n a tu ra l  
sc ience  lay  " in  i t s  passion  f o r  ready-made r u l e s "  so t h a t  i t  n eg lec ted  
to  develop an i n s i g h t  as to  which r u l e s  apply in var ious s i t u a t i o n s .
At t im es ,  r u le s  a r e n ' t  needed so much as an a b i l i t y  to  see what the  
s i t u a t i o n  i s .  This l a t t e r  case  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  o f  moral and p o l i ­
t i c a l  l i f e .  A person i s  an a c t o r  and the  a c t  he chooses in dea l ing  
wi th  a s i t u a t i o n  i s  no t  so much dependent upon the  s i t u a t i o n  as h i s  
b e l i e f  concerning i t .  Our a c t i o n s  a r e  o f t e n  success fu l  because a g r e a t  
p a r t  of  them a re  ac ted  according to  r u le s  wherein s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  viewed 
as o f  c e r t a i n  s tandard  types .  There a r e ,  however, two types o f  occas ­
ions when an a c t o r  must a c t  w i thou t  r u l e s :  (l)when the  s tandard  type
o f  s i t u a t i o n  i s  unrecognized,  and (2)when you f in d  the  s tandard  type 
s i t u a t i o n  and r e fu se  t o  deal with i t  in the  r u l e - im p l i e d  way. The 
f i r s t  case i s  o f te n  dependent  upon the  a g e n t ' s  inexper ience  o r  ig n o r ­
ance o f  l i f e .  The second case  a r i s e s  when a s i t u a t i o n  i s  taken too 
s e r i o u s l y  t h a t  no t  even d e s i r e  o r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  p r e v a i l .  A major 
problem to  so lve ,  according to  Col lingwood,  was to  r a i s e  a c t i o n  to  a
h igher  p o t e n t i a l .  This  implied t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  must be seen more
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c l e a r l y  and t h a t  i t s  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  f u t u r e  should be understood.
A t h i r d  c r i s i s  oc c u r r ing  during h i s  l i f e t i m e ,  as Collingwood
saw i t ,  was t h a t  o f  t h e  ' r e a l i s t '  o r  ' p o s i t i v i s t '  school o f  ph i losophers
who inh ab i te d  Oxford from the  e a r l y  n ine t e en th  cen tu ry  onwards. This
phi losophy u t i l i z e d  c r i t i c a l  methods f o r  an a t t a c k  upon th e  t h e o r i e s
o f  knowledge. They de s troyed  not  on ly  ' i d e a l i s m '  bu t  ' r e a l i s m  i t s e l f  •
with complete s c e p t i c i s m .
The Oxford ' r e a l i s t s ’ t a lk e d  as i f  knowing 
were a s imple ' i n t u i t i n g '  o r  a s imple ' a p p re ­
hending '  o f  some ' r e a l i t y '  . . . What a l l  
t h e s e  ' r e a l i s t s '  were say ing ,  I th o u g h t ,  was 
t h a t  t h e  c o nd i t ion  of  a knowing mind i s  not  
indeed a p a s s ive  c o n d i t io n ,  f o r  i t  i s  a c t i v e l y  
engaged in knowing; but  a ' s im p le '  c o n d i t i o n ,  
one in which t h e r e  a re  no complex i t ie s  o r  
d i v e r s i t i e s ,  no th ing  except  t h e  knowing.33
Collingwood expressed  th e  idea  t h a t  the  end o f  t h e  ' r e a l i s t '  movement
would never  be w r i t t e n  as h i s t o r y  al though i t  i s ,  in h i s  words,  a
s tumbling "from one temporary and patchwork phi losophy to  ano the r  in
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a kind o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  nigh tmare ."
Another problem of  t h e  modern world was s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ;  in
such a s o c i e t y ,  agents  o f  a b s t r a c t  sp e c i a l i s m  can u t i l i z e  language in
s p e c i a l i s m ' s  s e r v i c e  to  produce an inver s ion  o f  t h e  moral o r d e r  and a
subversion o f  the  f a b r i c  o f  a r a t i o n a l i s t  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  The d i sease
o f  hi s  t ime,  Collingwood i d e n t i f i e d  as " the  coe x is t enc e  o f  overpro -
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duc t ion on th e  one s ide  with u n s a t i s f i e d  demand on the  o t h e r . "
On the  one hand, t h e r e  i s  an u n s a t i s f i e d  demand 
f o r  a r t ,  r e l i g i o n ,  and ph i losophy .  On th e  o t h e r ,  
t h e r e  i s  a crowd o f  a r t i s t s ,  p h i lo s o p h e r s ,  and 
m i n i s t e r s  o f  r e l i g i o n  who can f in d  no market  f o r  
t h e i r  wares .  Every s t r e e t  and every v i l l a g e  in 
the  count ry  c on ta in s  people who a re  hungering f o r  
beau ty ,  f o r  f a i t h ,  f o r  knowledge, and cannot  f i n d
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th ese  t h in g s .  And th o se  who have them are  
s t a r v in g  f o r  mere b read ,  because no one wi l l  
buy. The producers  and consumers o f  s p i r i t ­
ual weal th  a r e  ou t  o f  touch;  the  br idge  be­
tween them i s  broken and only a dar ing s p i r i t  
here  and t h e r e  can l eap  th e  g u l f . 36
When, contended Coll ingwood, ph i losophy  a t tempts  to  so lve  problems,  i t
n e c e s s a r i l y  s e l e c t s  f o r  i t s  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r ,  t he  problems o f  the  age;
th e  modern age has been b u i l t  on the  premises  o f  phi losophy developed
in the  seven teen th  ce n tu ry  where the  b e l i e f  t h a t  na tu re  as a s in g l e
system o f  essences and c o n t r o l l e d  by a s in g l e  system o f  laws was adopted.
Thus, t h e  promise o f  the  "new sc ience"  ushered f o r t h  the  modern world.
We have t h r e e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  core  problems o f  the  t ime:  the  problem o f
overproduct ion and u n s a t i s f i e d  demand and the  loss  o f  b e l i e f  in reason .
To detach experi ence  forms from one ano the r  makes "fragments  o f  men"
because l i f e  l i e s  in the  "whole man" who i s  nothing wi thou t  h i s  f e l low
men.
Collingwood has had many c r i t i c s ,  some sympathet ic  and o th e r s  
a lmost  h o s t i l e .  Since t h e  mid-1950s, h i s  work has been i n c r e a s i n g ly  
noted  with t h r e e  f a i r l y  impor tan t  books devoted to  h i s  thought  s in c e  
1962, an i n c r e d ib l e  achievement  f o r  a man who died in 1943 and l e f t  
l i t t l e  in  the  way o f  fo l low e r s  o r  c r i t i c s  u n t i l  the  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  t h e  
tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry .  The au th o rs  o f  t h e  mentioned t h r e e  books,  Louis 0 .  
Mink, Lionel Rubinoff ,  and Alan Donagan, have had problems wi th  the  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Col l ingwood's  work. Many o t h e r  c r i t i c s  have taken 
an i n c r e a s in g  n o t i c e  o f  the  e f f o r t s  o f  Collingwood in academic j o u r n a l s .  
The work o f  Mink and t h a t  o f  Rubinoff  a r e ,  according to  Mink, "so r e ­
markably s i m i l a r  . . .  in o u t l i n e  and d e t a i l  as to  convince me t h a t  we
must both be r i g h t  — no doubt  because ,  u n l ik e  any prev ious  c r i t i c s ,
we have both s imply undertaken to  unde rs tand  Coll ingwood's  thought  as
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exempl ifying  h i s  own concep t ion o f  d i a l e c t i c a l  ph i lo sophy ."  Rubinoff
appears  t o  argue somewhat o th e rw i s e :
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  r e c e n t  work o f  Louis 
0 .  Mink who argues in  f avour  o f  viewing 
Collingwood as a " sy s t e m a t ic  ph i lo s o p h e r  o f  
s o r t s "  whose books " to  an unusual degree 
complement and e x p la in  each o t h e r . "38
What i s  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  problem in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  o r  unders tand ing  R.G.
Coll ingwood? Again,  t u rn i n g  to  Mink, he no tes  t h a t  " i t  i s  e a s i e r  t o
account  f o r  t h e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  Collingwood by h i s  p h i lo soph ica l  c o l l -
39
eagues than  f o r  the  con t inued i n t e r e s t  in  him by a wider  aud ience ."
Due to  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  independence o f  Col l ingwood's  t hough t .  Mink con­
tends  t h a t  "he never  reached a conc lus ion  on an i s s u e  merely by de­
ducing what he ought  t o  t h in k  about  i t  from genera l  p r i n c i p l e s  a l r eady  
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formed."  T h e re fo re ,  h i s  work does no t  make up a system nor  a " s e r i e s
41
o f  ana ly ses  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  prob lems."  Ra the r ,  Collingwood h imse lf
went through th e  process  o f  d i a l e c t i c a l  development  in h i s  thought
a l though he was no t  aware o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s .  Rubinof f  p o in t s  t o  the  work
o f  Alan Donagan and F.H. Heinemann in suppor t  o f  h i s  theo ry  t h a t  they
a re  " r a d i c a l  convers ion hypo thes i s"  exponents o f  t h e  work o f  Collingwood.
What Rubinof f  means by th e  term,  " r a d i c a l  convers ion  h y p o th e s i s " ,  i s
t h a t  Collingwood depart ed  somewhat r a d i c a l l y  from his  e a r l y  idea l ism
and h i s  l a t e r  h i s t o r i c i s m  t o  ph i losophy as a d i s t i n c t  form of  thought
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in the  New L ev ia than . D issen t  from reviewers  who accep t  t h i s  po in t  
o f  view i s  to  be found al though no t  in many numbers; reviewers  who are
sympathet ic  to  a development o f  a l i n e  o f  s y s tem at ic  th ink ing  in the
work o f  Collingwood i s  i n c l u s iv e  of :  E.W.F. Tomlin, W.J. Emblom, Louis
0. Mink, and H.S. h a r r i s .  Those who f in d  a t h a t  Collingwood r a d i c a l l y
departed  from e a r l i e r  ideas  a r e :  Alan Donagan, E.E. H a r r i s ,  R.H. Heine-
mann, T.M. Knox, H.B. Acton. Leo S t r a u s s  di sm isses  the  thought  o f
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Collingwood as one co r rup ted  by h i s t o r i c i s m .  Other sympathe t i c ,  
a lthough both lauda to ry  and c r i t i c a l ,  reviewers  who have w r i t t e n  a r ­
t i c l e s  upon Collingwood which a re  worth perus ing  include  the  fol lowing 
Incomplete l i s t :  Sherman M. Stanage,  A.J.M. Milne,  Leon J .  G olds te in ,  
and Stephen Toulmin. A d i sc u s s io n  o f  th es e  d i v i s i o n s  l i e s  beyond the  
scope of  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n .  However, due t o  t h e  na tu re  o f  Col l ingwood's  
thought ,  an a s p ec t  o f  c r i t i c a l  reviews which i s  i n c r e a s i n g ly  apparent  
to  any r eade r  perusing a number of  them i s  the  f a c t  t h a t  when one a s ­
pec t  o f  the  thought  o f  Collingwood i s  e xp lo re d ,  g r e a t  ca re  must be 
taken to  l i n k  I t  with o t h e r  f a c e t s  s c a t t e r e d  throughout  h i s  w r i t i n g s  
o r  g r e a t  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  what he sa id  i s  the  r e s u l t .
Some of  the  causes  f o r  the  n e g le c t  o f  Collingwood u n t i l  the  l a s t  
decade, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  r e s p e c t  to  The New L ev ia than , have been due to :  
( l ) t h e  excess ive  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  The New Leviathan and to  the  use o f  poor 
examples to  i l l u s t r a t e  p o in t s  in some o f  hi s  o t h e r  w r i t i n g s ,  ( 2 ) th e  com­
plex problem of  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  o ld  Leviathan ( t h a t  of  
Hobbes) and t h a t  o f  Coll ingwood's  own work. The New Levia than , as well 
as the  con troversy  y e t  raging over the  meaning o f  Hobbes, ( 3 ) the  f a c t  
t h a t  Collingwood made l i t t l e  e f f o r t  t o  l i n k  h i s  works t o g e t h e r  and, 
more or  l e s s ,  assumed t h a t  the  r ea de r  knew each success ive  work. Harold
Laski has expressed the  i n h e re n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  The New Lev ia than :
P r o fe s s o r  Collingwood has made hi s  book ex­
t r a o r d i n a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the r e a d e r  to  un­
d e rs t and  by th e  method i t  fo l lows .  I t  reads 
r a t h e r  l i k e  a formidable  arrangement  o f  a g r e a t  
p i l e  o f  no tes  than a c l e a r  and coheren t  account  
o f  i t s  s u b j e c t  . . . One i s  doubtful  i f  one 
grasps the  argument which l i e s  behind the  whole .44
While the  complaint  o f  Laski i s  undoubtedly v a l i d ,  George Ga t l in  h in t s
t h a t  the  e f f o r t  may be worthwhile:
Some c r i t i c s  have expressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with 
the  extreme formalism o f  P ro fe s so r  Col l ingwood's  
s t y l e .  There a r e ,  however, here  g r e a t  models,  
both o f  Hobbes h im s e l f  and Spinoza;  and t h i s  
formalism,  more geometr i co ,  may be s t i m u la t i n g  
so f a r  as i t  p ro v id e s ,  as i t  p r e t e n d s ,  a gua r ­
an tee  o f  exac t  t h o u g h t . 45
R.G. Collingwood has been c a l l e d  a " lone ly"  t h i n k e r  because of
his  i s o l a t i o n  from the  c l im a te  o f  thought  p r e v a i l i n g  in h i s  l i f e t i m e .
I n t e l l e c t u a l  c onv ic t ions  which se pa ra te d  him from h is  co l l eagues  during
h is  l i f e - s p a n  (1889-1943) have been l i s t e d  by Wil liam H. Johnson as
h i s  b e l i e f  in the  freedom o f  the  w i l l ,  the  r i s e  of  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  in
academic d i s c i p l i n e s ,  and f i n a l l y ,  Col l ingwood's  i n s i s t e n c e  upon doing
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both h i s t o r y  and ph i losophy .  His i n t e l l e c t u a l  independence has been
a t t r i b u t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  in p a r t ,  to  h i s  e a r l y  e duc a t ion ,  h i s  range of
achievements ,  h i s  b read th  o f  l e a r n i n g ,  and th e  very l a r g e  scope of  
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h is  a c t i v i t i e s .  Unti l  he was t h i r t e e n  yea rs  o f  age, R.G. Collingwood 
was t u to r e d  by h i s  f a t h e r  and mother a t  home. His f a t h e r ,  W.G. C o l l i n g ­
wood, was p r i v a t e  s e c r e t a r y  and b iographer  o f  John Ruskin, Oxford Uni­
v e r s i t y ' s  Slade P r o fe s s o r  o f  ARt, in t h e  l a t e  n in e t e e n th  cen tu ry .  Both 
men e xe r t ed  g r e a t  i n f lu e n ce  upon R.G. Collingwood who was the  r e c i p i e n t
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of  an educat ion few have the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  have. In 1902, he en te red  
Rugby and in  1908, he en te red  Oxford U n iv e r s i ty  Col lege which he never  
l e f t  the  remainder of  h i s  l i f e .  Although Collingwood cons idered p h i l ­
osophy t o  be h i s  voca t ion ,  a t  Oxford, he s tu d i e d  under F . J .  H a v e r f i e ld ,  
Romano-Bri tish a r c h a e o l o g i s t ,  who in f luenced  h i s  work.
E.W.F. Tomlin has commented upon Coll ingwood's  Essay on Meta­
phys ics  and The New Lev ia than :
. . , [ t h e s e ]  were a t t e m p t s ,  somewhat h a s t i l y  
conceived by a man aware o f  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
as a p ro fe s s io n a l  t h i n k e r ,  to  meet on the  leve l  
o f  thought  and the  f o rc e s  making f o r  d i s i n t e g r a ­
t i o n  in the  world o f  f a c t .  That  metaphysics  
and p o l i t i c s  should u n i t e  in  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t h i s  
t a s k  may appear  s t r a n g e ;  bu t  the  f i n a l  d i r e c t i o n  
taken  by Coll ingwood's  thought  e xp la in s  a twin 
preoccupat ion o f  long s tn a d in g .  The i d e n t i f i ­
c a t i o n  o f  phi losophy and h i s t o r y  was in e f f e c t  an 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e o r y  and p r a c t i c e . 48
The o t h e r  works a l s o  r e l a t e d  to  t h e s e  volumes inc lude :  Speculum 
Mentis (1924) ,  Re l ig ion and Phi losophy (1916) and two volumes publ ished 
posthumously.  The Idea o f  Nature and The Idea of  H i s t o r y . Tomlin ex­
p l a i n s  t h a t  The New Leviathan i s  a l i f e t i m e ' s  " r e f l e c t i o n  upon p o l i t i c a l
theo ry"  while  The Essay on Ph i losoph ica l  Method, upon the  sc ience  of
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metaphysics  i s  i t s  "prolegomenon." Making a comparison o f  C o l l i n g ­
wood with hi s  con tempora r ie s ,  Tomlin concludes t h a t  perhaps Erns t  
C a s s i r e r  i s  the  c l o s e s t  to  him in thought  and words. In a unique 
t r i b u t e  t o  Collingwood, Tomlin f i n i s h e d  h i s  small volume upon R.G, 
Collingwood:
In d i sc u s s io n  the  n a tu r e  and purpose o f  
a r t ,  r e l i g i o n ,  s c i e n c e ,  and h i s t o r y ,  C o l l i n g ­
wood i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  producing d i f f e r e n t  
o r  more impressive  s o l u t i o n s  to  the  problems
-16-
r a i s e d  by these  e n q u i r i e s ;  but  a t  l e a s t  he 
i s  aiming to  produce s o l u t i o n s  where some 
o t h e r s ,  with t h e i r  r educ t ion  o f  a l l  exper ­
ience to  the  sensuous o r  the  e m p i r i c a l ,  main­
t a i n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  nothing to  s o lv e .  To r e ­
t u rn  t o  our  s t a r t i n g :  i t  i s  no t  an a c c ide n t  
t h a t  the  man j u s t l y  desc r ibed  as  t h e  most 
o r ig i n a l  mind in B r i t i s h  phi losophy s in ce  
Bradley should sha re  wi th  t h a t  t h i n k e r  the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  being a mas te r  o f  Eng l ish ,  
the reby  leav ing  behind him not  on ly  a founda­
t i o n  o f  though t  upon which h i s  succes so rs  may 
u s e f u l l y  b u i l d ,  but  a l s o  a l a s t i n g  c o n t r i b u ­
t i o n  to  what a no the r  Engl ish ph i lo s o p h e r ,  
e q u a l ly  s k i l l e d  in the  a r t s  o f  expre ss ion  and 
no l e s s  an enemy o f  departmenta l i sm ,  descr ibed  
as the  'Republ ic  o f  L e t t e r s ' . 5 0
The t e n t a t i v e  suggest ion  p r o fe r r e d  here  i s  t h a t  in t h i s  e x p lo r a ­
t i o n  of  the  d i a l e c t i c  o f  c ho ic e ,  we must develop a theory  o f  knowledge 
h o l i s t i c  enough to  in co rp o ra t e  a l a r g e r  dimension than has h e re to fo r e  
been the  case in  o r d e r  t o  meet the  needs o f  the  world in i t s  demand 
f o r  what Gustave Lagos has termed to  be a " r e v o l u t i o n - o f - b e i  ng ." Both 
Collingwood and Heidegger  main ta ined  t h a t  t r u t h  i s  h i s t o r i c a l .  Georg 
Gadamer has p o s t u l a t e d  t h a t  Being i t s e l f  i s  t ime.  This means t h a t  the  
p a s t  must grasped in  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n te x t  and,  more r a d i c a l l y ,  
t h a t  the  h i s t o r i c a l  co n te x t  i s  i n c l u s i v e  o f  t h e  i n t e r p r e t e r  due to  the  
f a c t  t h a t  v e rs t ehen  must gr asp the  t o t a l i t y  o f  human world exper ience .  
Then no t ions  o f  t r u t h  and o b j e c t i v i t y  must be re-examined because 
c u l t u r a l  unders tand ing emerges d i a l e c t i c a l l y  from the  p r e s e n t  t o  the  
p a s t  in  d i a logue .  For Col lingwood,  " c i v i l i z a t i o n  i s  a c o n d i t io n  o f  
communities" and both a r e  " th ings  o f  the  mind" as i s  e t h i c s  and p o l i ­
t i c a l  theo ry .  To ach ieve freedom whereby a j u s t  p o l i t y  can emerge, 
humankind must a r r i v e  a t  a f a i r l y  advanced s t a g e  o f  mental development
i n  o r d e r  t o  l i b e r a t e  t h e  s e l f  so t h a t  d e c i s ions  can be made s ince  
cho ice  i s  the  essence  o f  freedom.
-1 8 .
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CHAPTER II  
MAN
Coll ingwood's  approach to  a phi losophy o f  mind was phenomeno­
l o g i c a l .  Absolute  mind, he a v e r r e d ,  i s  pure a c t .  The mind, as pure 
a c t ,  comprises a conscious se lf -m aking  a c t i v i t y ;  i t s  essence  is  change 
d i scove red  through i n s i g h t  i n t o  i t s  own e r r o r s .  A phi losophy o f  mind, 
acco rd ing  to  Col l ingwood,  i nc ludes  a " c r i t i c a l  review of  t h e  c h ie f
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forms o f  human e x p e r i e n c e , "  an idea he exp lo red  in  Speculum Mentis .
In t h i s  volume, he o rgan ized  th e  va r ious  forms o f  experience  i n to  a 
d i a l e c t i c a l  s c a l e  o f  forms. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e s e  va r ious  forms 
o f  e xpe r ienc e ,  each o f  which i s  an a c t i v i t y  o f  mind forming a l i f e  
w or ld ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  a d i a l e c t i c a l  h i s t o r y  o f  e r r o r s .  A phenomenology 
o f  expe r ience  c r e a t e s  i n s i g h t  i n to  the  s t r u c t u r e  of  being as a con­
c r e t e  s e t  o f  a c t i v i t i e s .  Phenomenology i s  an a n a l y s i s  o f  mind as a 
system o f  c a t e g o r i e s  such as  " h a b i t s , "  " im ag ina t ion , "  " f a i t h , "  "under­
s t a n d i n g , "  and " re a son ."  These c a t e g o r i e s ,  as exempl if ied  in Speculum 
Ment i s ,  become a r t ,  r e l i g i o n ,  s c i e n c e ,  h i s t o r y ,  and ph i losophy ,  as 
modes o f  expe r ience  o f  t h e  mind. These modes a re  both t ranscenden ta l  
and h i s t o r i c a l .  Consciousness  proceeds in  a s e r i e s :  l eve l  one assumes 
t h e r e  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between a s u b j e c t  and i t s  o b j e c t ;  l eve l  two y e t  
assumes th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  but  pe rc e ive s  t h i s  exper ience  now as bu t  one 
among many; l eve l  t h r e e  pe rc e ive s  the  u n i ty  o f  s u b j e c t  and o b je c t  as 
e xpe r ience  i s  recognized as overl app ing  in  i t s  modes. This i s  a f e e d ­
back th e o r y ,  an e x i s t e n t i a l  a t t i t u d e ,  i l l u s t r a t i n g  the  behaviour  o f  
mind and i t s  a l t e r a t i o n ,  conc om i ta n t ly ,  o f  i t s e l f .
Denying both extremes in  t h e o r i e s  o f  p l u ra l i s m  and monism,
Collingwood wanted to  know where the  s e l f - i d e n t i t y  o f  the  person lay
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in c o n t r a s t  to  t h e  bond which makes s o c i e t y  one. I t  was h i s  b e l i e f
-?T.
t h a t  s t a r t i n g  with p e r s o n a l i t y  would not  answer the  ques t ion  nor  could 
i t  be e x a c t ly  s t a t e d  t h a t  two persons could sha re  t h e  same knowledge.
We f ind  modern mind exempl if ied in Western c i v i l i z a t i o n  in t h e  twen­
t i e t h  cen tu ry .  The primary ques t ion  i s :  How does mind appear  to  i t ­
s e l f ?  Collingwood, throughout  a l l  o f  h i s  work, contended t h a t  c i v i -
4
l i z a t i o n ,  community, and the  ind iv idua l  were a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  mind.
His h o l i s t i c  approach t o  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophy may be seen in  h i s  query,  
5
what i s  l i f e ?  " I t  i s  what p h y s io l o g i s t s  i n v e s t i g a t e "  while  m a t t e r
(man's body) i s  t h a t  which i s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  by p h y s i c i s t s  and chemists .
6
Yet, " s c i e n c e ' s  s u b je c t  m a t t e r  has no d e f i n i t i o n  a t  a l l . "  C o l l in g ­
wood meant t h a t  the  whole o f  man i s  e i t h e r  body o r  mind according to
Whether se lf-knowledge i s  approached by the  methods o f  n a tu ra l  s c ience
7
o r  by "expanding and c l a r i f y i n g  p e r c e p t i o n . "  I f  t h i s  c on ten t ion  i s
a c c u r a te ,  then sc ience  must e v e n tu a l ly  give way to  phi losophy as the
most complete mode o f  se lf -knowledge .
The t r u t h  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no r e l a t i o n  
between body and mind. That  i s ,  no 
d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n ;  f o r  t h e r e  i s  an i n ­
d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n .  'The problem o f  the  
r e l a t i o n  between body and mind' i s  a 
bogus problem which cannot  be s t a t e d  
without  making a f a l s e  assumption.
What i s  assumed i s  t h a t  man i s  p a r t l y  
body and p a r t l y  mind. On t h i s  assump­
t i o n  ques t ions  a r i s e  about  the  r e l a t i o n s  
between th e  two p a r t s ;  and t h e s e  prove 
unanswerable.  For man's  body and man's 
mind a re  not  two d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s .  They 
are  one and th e  same t h i n g ,  man h im s e l f ,  
as known in two d i f f e r e n t  ways .8
Not a l l  coimon usages o f  the  term 'body'  a r e  concerned with 
m a t t e r ;  some must be a l l i e d  with f e e l i n g .  In the  w r i t i n g s  o f  P l a to ,
-2 2 -
A r i s t o t l e ,  and even in the  New Tes tament , the  term,  ' b o d i l y ' ,  i s
employed so t h a t  bodi ly  a p p e t i t e  such as hunger i s  t h e  outgrowth of
f e e l i n g s  and s e n sa t io n s .  The phrase ,  ' b o d i ly  p l e a s u r e ' ,  a r i s e s  from
f e e l i n g s  and may r e f e r  t o  mental s e n s a t i o n s .  'Bodi ly  e x e r t i o n '  r e f e r s
9
to  t h e  consciousness  o f  e f f o r t  as found in  motor s e n s a t i o n s .  Mental
s e n s a t io n s  o r  bod i ly  p l ea s u res  r e f e r  to  t h e  "psyche" dimension,
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n e i t h e r  body nor  mind. Fee l ing  belongs to  mind as an apanage a l ­
i i
though the  e s s e n t i a l  " c o n s t i t u e n t  o f  mind i s  c o n s c iousne ss . "  An
apanage in the  form o f  f e e l i n g  i s  s imple consc iousness ;  i t  i s  ready-
12
made. Fee l ing i s  e i t h e r  sensuous o r  i t  i s  an emotional charge.
Fee l ing  " . . .  has t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a foundat ion  upon which the
13
r a t i o n a l  p a r t  o f  our  n a tu re  i s  b u i l t ;  . . . " Thus, man's mind con­
s i s t s  o f  consciousness  roo ted  in i t s  s im p les t  form,  in f e e l i n g .  
Knowledge i s  consciousness  r e f l e c t e d  upon which i s  second-o rder  cons­
c io u s n e s s .  A f e e l i n g  i s  a "here-and-now" a f f a i r  having a foca l  reg ion
o f  g r e a t e s t  i n t e n s i t y  and a penumbral reg ion o f  the  fad ing  away of  
14
f e e l i n g .  Feel ing p rovides  t h e  s t r e n g th  t o  the  foundat ion  o f  know­
ledge .  That  i s ,  by the  Law o f  P r im i t i v e  S u r v iv a l s ,  f e e l i n g s  con­
s t i t u t e  the  b a s ic  m a t e r i a l s  through which knowledge i s  r e c e iv e d ,  i . e . ,
each leve l  o f  a d i a l e c t i c a l  s e r i e s  of  thought  r e t a i n s  something o f  
15
i t s  former s t a t e .  In o r d e r  to  avoid the  t h r e a t  o f  s o l ip s i s m  on the
p a r t  o f  Collingwood, then ,  i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  understand h i s  theory  of  
pe rcep t ion  and i t s  r o l e  in the  experi ence  o f  f e e l i n g .  The e s s e n t i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  f e e l i n g  i s  the  givenness  o f  sense  da ta .  Fee l ing i s  
s i m p l i s t i c  o r  given whereas thought  involves  d i s t i n c t i o n s  such as 
doing a good o r  bad job of  something.  Fee l ings  a re  more p r i v a t e  than
thought  in t h a t  they can be sensed by no o th e r  person in  e x a c t ly  the 
same way. Thoughts can agree  o r  d i s a g r e e ,  not  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
f e e l i n g .  F u r th e r ,  f e e l i n g  i s  t r a n s i e n t  as c o n t r a s t e d  with the  r e l a ­
t i v e  permanence o f  though t .
Fee l ing has two e lemen ts ,  a sensua l  element  and an emotional 
e lement  a l though  s e n s a t io n  t akes  precedence over emotion. Sensa t ion 
end emotion a re  e lements  p r e s e n t  in  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  any psychical  ex­
pe r i e nce .  The precedence o f  the  s e n s a t io n a l  over  t h e  emotional  element  
can be seen only upon r e f l e c t i o n  s in c e  experi ence  i s  always complete 
and t h e r e b y ,  cannot  a c t u a l l y  be s e p a ra te d  in to  p a r t i c u l a r s  o r  p a r t s .
The a c t i v i t i e s  o f  s e n sa t io n  such as s e e i n g ,  hea r ing ,  and smell ing  a re  
apanages which a re  f e e l i n g s  and i t s  forms. This i s  simple consciousness ,  
Because f e e l i n g s  a re  sensuous and emot io na l ,  f e e l i n g  has no o b je c t s  but  
has i n s t e a d  modes. This  i s  f i r s t  o r d e r  consciousness  but  i t  i s  not  
knowledge. What i s  given in t h i s  'here-and-now'  s t a t e  i s  d i f f u s e d  by 
second-order  consc iousness .  In f i r s t - o r d e r  consc iousness ,  immediate 
expe r ience  i s  too sensuous o r  emotional  t o  be knowledge. When some 
f e e l in g s  a r e  s e l e c t i v e l y  blocked and o th e r s  a re  a t tended  t o ,  as in 
s econd-o rder  consc iousness ,  d i s t i n c t i o n s  begin to  be made. People 
do no t  f ee l  something u n t i l  i t  i s  r e f l e c t e d  upon even though the  p ro ­
cess  may be unconscious o r  l a t e n t .  I f  an at tempt  i s  made to  s tudy 
pure f e e l i n g  o r  psychica l  e x p e r i en c e ,  then consciousness  must be
analyzed to  d i sc ove r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  " to  a more elementary kind of
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experi ence  which i t  p resupposes ."  A consciousness  of  f e e l i n g  does
not  occur  u n t i l  t h e  exper ience  i s  named; t h a t  i s ,  i t  occurs in lang-
17
uage, an h i s t o r i c a l  v e h ic l e  o f  the  expre ss ions  o f  experi ence .
-24-
That  i s ,  in Col lingwood's  framework, vocabulary i s  emotion when i t  i s
expressed.  Language i s  the  express io n  o f  emotion o r  f e e l i n g .  This
no t ion i s  r e l a t e d  t o  h i s  o t h e r  idea t h a t  q ue s t ions  can be answered 
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only when asked.  Another f a c e t  o f  f e e l i n g s  i s  t h a t  they  a re  evan-
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e sce n t  o r  they  "begin t o  p e r i s h  as soon as they  begin t o  e x i s t . "  
Fee l ings cannot  be remembered al though  a p r o p o s i t io n  about  f e e l i n g s  
can be remembered. I f  no form o f  consciousness  i s  brought  in to  ex­
i s t e n c e  by f e e l i n g ,  then what i s  i t  t h a t  produces consciousness?
Like Hobbes, Collingwood d e c la red  t h a t  reason i s  t h e  fun c t io n  of  
Inaguage and t h a t  mind i t s e l f  i s  dependent  upon language.  Language 
inco rpo ra te s  "not  only speech" bu t  a l s o  "any system o f  bod i ly  mover-
ments ,"  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  v o c a l ,  whereby the  persons who make them
20
mean o r  s i g n i f y  something.  Hugh Walpole has e x p l i c a t e d  Coll ingwood's  
idea of  language:
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  from Hobbes down, t h e  c a r t  
has been put  be fo re  t h e  ho rse ,  and lang ­
uage has been regarded as a medium of
communication . . .  The speech and ges ­
t u r e s  o f  each of  us c o n s t i t u t e  a r t  . . .
"The New Leviathan" devotes  i t s  l i n g u i s t i c  
i n t e r e s t  t o  symbols -  -  bu t  to  t h a t  p e c u l i a r  
c l a s s  o f  symbols used in " the human s c i e n c e s . "
As c o n t r a s t e d  with the  phys ica l  and b i o ­
l o g ic a l  sc iences  Collingwood sees  a s e p a r ­
a t e  group which he c a l l s  the  " sc iences  o f  
mind;"2i
According to  Walpole, Col l ingwood's  coherent  "view o f  the  connect ions
between language and though t ,  imply t h a t  language comes f i r s t  and
22
t h a t  thought  i s  the  consciousness  o f  having named something."  "We 
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th in k  in words." Consciousness  a l t e r s  f e e l i n g s  i n to  emotions; the  
essence  of  language i s  emotive e x p re s s io n .  Fee l ings  a re  r e t a in e d  as
-25-
ideas  in imagina t ion .  This i s  the  source from which f e e l i n g s  are  
evoked. When both t h e  a c t  o f  s e l e c t i v e  a t t e n t i o n  and the  a c t  of 
e v o c a t iv e  t h in k i n g  o c c u rs ,  then  t h e  mind has a r r i v e d  a t  conceptual 
t h in k i n g ,  a s t a g e  to  be exp la ined  somewhat l a t e r  in t h i s  s e c t i o n .
In Coll ingwood 's  th eo ry  o f  mind, mind opera tes  as an e n t i t y  
through a s e t  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  o r  fu n c t io n s  ope ra t ing  a t  var ious l e v e l s  
o f  consc iousness .  The lowest  l eve l  has been descr ibed  as consc ious ­
ness  o f  the  sensuous-emotional  s t a t e .  Awareness o f  f i r s t  l eve l  cons­
c io usness  i s  m a n i f e s t  in a p p e t i t e  which i s  o f  two types :  the  p r a c t i ­
cal  type  o f  hunger  and th e  imagina t ive  type  express iv e  in language.  
Consciousness  o f  a p p e t i t e ,  however, l eads  to  the t h i r d  leve l  o f  
p r a c t i c a l  consc io u s n e ss ,  d e s i r e ;  t h e  t h i r d  leve l  of  t h e o r e t i c a l  cons­
c iousness  i s  imagina t ion  o r  p e rc e p t io n .  An awareness o f  d e s i r e  leads 
t o  t h e  f o u r th  l ev e l  o f  p r a c t i c a l  consciousness  in w i l l ;  pe rcep t ion  is  
the  f o u r t h  l eve l  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  consc iousness .  In t h i s  p r oce s s ,  the  
mind has gone through a t r a n s fo r m a t io n .  The e n t i r e  ope ra t ion  can be 
t r a n s l a t e d  as a d i a l e c t i c s  o f  consc iousness .
To be aware o f  a p p e t i t e ,  through th e  a c t  o f  s e l e c t i v e  a t t e n -
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t i o n ,  consciousness  i s  focused upon f e e l i n g .  A ppe t i t e  is  the  name
given to  an " in h e r e n t  r e s t l e s s n e s s  of  the  mind" so t h a t  "choice,
25
r ea son ,  and goa l"  can be found as  produc ts  of  a p p e t i t e .  Physio­
l o g ic a l  a p p e t i t e  r e f e r s  t o  hunger while  psychological  a p p e t i t e  r e f e r s  
t o  love .  A p p e t i t e  i s  movement from an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  f e e l i n g  s t a t e  
towards a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s t a t e .  Hunger, in  both ca se s ,  i s  the  a p p e t i t e  
f o r  an omnipotent  s e l f  in  the  a b s t r a c t .  These two f e e l i n g  s t a t e s
-26-
can be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  as the  ac tu a l  s e l f  ve rsu s  t h e  idea l  s e l f .  Hunger,
as a p p e t i t e  f o r  the  omnipotent s e l f ,  can n e i t h e r  f in d  nor  c r e a t e  i t ­
s e l f  whereas love i s  the  a p p e t i t e  f o r  a s e l f  t h a t  has e s t a b l i s h e d  a
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with something o t h e r  than i t s e l f  o r  a " r e l a t i o n  with an
27
o b j e c t  i t  can does c r e a t e . "  Collingwood b e l i e ved  t h i s  to  be a
very importan t  p a r t  o f  mental development:
How does love come in to  e x i s t e n c e ?  . . .
Love i s  a m od i f ic a t ion  o f  hunger;  i t  i s  the 
ques t  f o r  a s a t i s f a c t i o n  d e r ived  from r e ­
l a t i o n  to  a n o t - s e l f .  . . A hungry man wants
to  become omnipotent .  That  i s  im poss ib le ;  he
cannot  become omnipotent  w i thou t  ceas ing  to 
be h im se l f .  He cannot  come t o  know t h i s  ex­
cep t  a t  a l eve l  of  mental development  f a r  be­
yond what we have reached;  . . . What he can 
do is  t o  s u f f e r  r epea ted  d i sappoin tments  in 
h i s  ques t  f o r  omnipotence u n t i l  b l i n d  appe­
t i t e  d e s p a i r s  o f  t h a t  q ue s t  and embarks upon 
ano ther  . . .28
Psychological  hunger d e s i r e s  s t r e n g th  r e s u l t i n g  from d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
with a weak s e l f .  Psychological  love i s  t h e  d e s i r e  to  be a t t a c h e d .
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In bo th ,  we f in d  the  movement from the  s e l f  to  t h e  n o t - s e l f .  Human
love i s  r e l a t e d  to r e l i g i o n  in  f e e l i n g s  of  dependence.  Hunger is
d i r e c t e d  towards the  r e s t o r a t i o n  of  energy .  To s a t i s f y  e i t h e r  r e -
30
q u i r e s  the removal of  the weakness.  Both hunger and love ,  as a c ­
t i v i t i e s ,  a r e  su b je c t  to  f r u s t r a t i o n ;  the  forms o f  t h e i r  f r u s t r a t i o n
are  the  p a s s ions .  To thwar t  hunger induces f e a r ;  to  thwart  love r e -
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s u i t s  in  s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n  through ange r .  Thus, a p p e t i t e  i s  b l i n d .  
A ppe t i t e  i s  a d r ive  toward a goal through i t s  t r a n s fo rm a t ion  i n to  de ­
s i r e .  I t  i s  the  second leve l  o f  p r a c t i c a l  consciousness  c r  the  leve l  
o f  f e e l i n g .  From f e e l i n g ,  language,  a p p e t i t e ,  and d e s i r e  (Hobbes's 
p a s s i o n s ) ,  we move in The New Leviathan to  t h e  l eve l  o f  choice and
w i l l ,  the  leve l  o f  e t h i c s  involving  r u l e  and p r i n c i p l e  o r  the  a c t i v i t y  
o f  choice .
Desire  involves  p r e p o s i t i o n a l  t h in k i n g ;  "a p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  an
32
answer to  a ques t i o n ;  and a ques t ion  o f f e r s  a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  Thus,
a p p e t i t e  o r  i t s  absence i s  converted in to  an o b j e c t  o f  knowledge by
asking and answering the  que s t ion :  'Which do I want , a o r  b? '  . . .
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which [ then become r e s p e c t i v e l y ]  d e s i r e  and a v e r s i o n . "  Sub ject s  and 
p re d i c a t e s  o f  p r o p o s i t io n s  a r e  never  f i r s t - o r d e r  o b j e c t s .  C o l l in g ­
wood made t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  because the  o b j e c t  o f  a p p e t i t e  i s  not  known; 
a p p e t i t e ,  l i k e  love ,  only knows t h a t  i t  i s  thwarted and thus seeks an
o b j e c t .  Likewise,  t h e  " p re d i c a t e  of  a p r o p o s i t io n  . . .  i s  never  a
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f i r s t - o r d e r  o b j e c t  but  always a concep t ."  Pure f e e l i n g  has both 
sensuous and emotional a s p e c t s .  At t h e  second l eve l  o f  consc iousness ,  
a p p e t i t e ,  s e n s a t i o n ,  and emotion can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from each o t h e r ;  
wi th in  sensa t ion  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  amongst d i f f e r e n t  sense d a t a .
The two primary emotions o f  hunger and love correspond t o  such organ ic  
processes  as n u t r i t i o n  and r e p roduc t ion .  Both seek possess ion  o r  a t t a c h ­
ment tn  something but  the  concept  o f  a s e l f  is  no t  y e t  r e a l i z e d .  Pro-
p o s i t i o n a l  th ink ing  occurs  as t h e  a c t i v i t y  of  t h i r d - l e v e l  consc iousness .
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A p ropos i t ion  may be t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  On the p r a c t i c a l  l eve l  o f  ex­
pe r i ence ,  answers may be e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  On the  t h e o r e t i c a l  l eve l  
o f  consciousness ,  concepts o f  t r u t h  and f a l s i t y  emerge.
The importance o f  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
t r u e  d e s i r e s  and f a l s e  d e s i r e s  becomes e v i ­
dent  as soon as one r e f l e c t s  on th e  impor­
t ance  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  l i f e  of  'knowing 
what you w an t ' . 3 °
Collingwood was observing t h a t  men do not  know what they want ; t r i a l
-28-
and e r r o r  a r e  u t i l i z e d  to  f i n d  ou t .  "With the  conversion o f  a p p e t i t e
i n t o  d e s i r e ,  beauty i s  converted i n t o  goodness.  The d i f f e r e n c e  i s
37
t h a t  d e s i r e  may be t r u e  o r  f a l s e . "  What Collingwood meant by t h i s
was t h a t  men, in  g e n e r a l ,  d e s i r e  t h e  same th ings  and t h a t  what they
d e s i r e  i s  c a l l e d  "good". Not always i s  t h a t  which i s  d e s i r e d  a c t u a l l y
p r e f e r r e d  because the  o b j e c t  o f  d e s i r e  i s  a b s t r a c t e d  from the  a c t  of
d e s i r i n g .  Des ire  is  always c o n d i t i o n a l ;  t h a t  i s ,  i t  i s  dependent upon
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  good, bad,  o r  even shame a r i s i n g  from d e s i r e .  What
i s  proved i s  t h a t  "goodness i s  a th in g  o f  the  mind; a t h in g  bestowed
upon whatever  possesses  i t  by mind 's  p r a c t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  in  the  form of
d e s i r e ;  and then d iscovered  . . .  by mind ' s  r e f l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  which
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now f o r  the  f i r s t  t ime assumes t h e  form o f  knowledge." Des ire  i s  a 
s p e c i f i c  form o f  consc iousness ;  i t  i s  p r e p o s i t i o n a l  t h in k i n g .  This 
kind o f  t h in k in g  r e q u i r e s  two forms o f  language and two forms o f  sen­
t en c e s :  t h e  ques t ion  and th e  i n d i c a t i v e  sen tence .  What has been des ­
c r ib e d  i s  a s e r i e s  of  l e v e l s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  and t h e o r e t i c a l  consciousness  
extending to  a s e r i e s  o f  l o g ic a l  d i a l e c t i c a l  l e v e l s  as found in  o b j ec t s  
o f  knowledge which i s  Col l ingwood 's  phi losophy of  mind. Refer  to  
Appendices A and B.
According t o  Col lingwood,  a p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  always an answer to
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a q u e s t io n ;  t h i s  i s  the  " lo g i c  o f  ques t ion  and answer."  This aspec t  
o f  Col l ingwood's  p h i lo soph ica l  thought  has caused much disagreement  
amongst the  rev iewers  o f  h i s  work, a f a c t  r e f e r r e d  t o  p rev io u s ly  and 
one which w i l l  be taken up aga in in  a l a t e r  c ha p te r .  The " lo g i c  of  
ques t ion  and answer" was p resen ted  by Collingwood in h i s  Essay on 
Metaphysics; i t  i s  a two-pronged no t ion  involv ing  a l o g i c  o f  ques t ion
-29.7,
and answer and a theory  o f  metaphysics  invo lv ing  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s .  The
" lo g i c  o f  que s t ion  and answer" i s  t h a t  "every s ta t e m e n t  t h a t  anybody
ev e r  makes i s  made to  answer a q u e s t i o n . "  The mind, sea rch ing  f o r
answers ,  asks q u e s t i o n s .  "The power o f  causing a q u e s t io n  to  a r i s e "
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i s  i t s  " lo g i c a l  e f f i c a c y . "  This " lo g i c a l  e f f i c a c y "  o f  a supp o s i ­
t i o n  does not  depend upon the  t r u t h  o f  what i s  supposed o r  even upon
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i t s  being thought  t o  be t r u e ,  bu t  on ly  i t s  being supposed ."  Ques­
t i o n s  and t h e i r  answers a re  always c o r r e l a t i v e .  Two p ro p o s i t io n s  
cannot  c o n t r a d i c t  each o t h e r  un les s  they  a re  answers t o  the  same 
q u e s t i o n .  This  argument,  thus f a r ,  i s  no t  d e f e n s i b l e .  However,
Louis 0. Mink, in d i sc u s s in g  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  the  thought  o f  C o l l i n g ­
wood, has suggested  t h a t  " the  l o g i c  o f  q ue s t ion  and answer . . .  a
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th eo ry  o f  t h e  process  o f  inqu i ry  . . .  a r e f l e c t i o n  on l o g i c . "
. . .  the  asking o f  a q u e s t i o n  . . . l o g i c a l l y  
invo lves  t h e  p re s u p p o s i t i o n  o f  one and only 
one p r o p o s i t i o n ,  from which the  ques t ion  
" a r i s e s " ;  and one, a g a in ,  may not  be aware 
t h a t  one i s  making a s p e c i f i c  p re s u p p o s i t i o n  
but  must recover  i t  a n a l y t i c a l l y .  . . The 
c a p a c i ty  o f  a s u ppos i t ion  to  cause a q ue s t ion  
t o  a r i s e  . . .  [ i s  c a l l e d ]  i t s  " lo g i c a l  e f f i c a c y ' ;  
and t h i s  e f f i c a c y  depends n e i t h e r  on i t s  being 
t r u e  nor  on i t s  being supposed o r  being e n t e r ­
t a i n e d  . . .43
C r i t i c s ,  such as Donagan o r  Dykst ra ,  have been taken  to  t a s k  by John
Freder ick  Pos t :
Col l ingwood's  theory  o f  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  has 
never  been taken very s e r i o u s l y .  But c r i t i c s  
have completely overlooked i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  as 
a theory  o r  model o f  in q u i r y  i n t i m a t e l y  t i e d  
to  c e r t a i n  aspec t s  o f  d i s c o u r s e  in a co n te x t  
o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  Viewed t h i s  way, C o l l i n g -  
wood's theo ry  i s  on ve ry  s t rong  ground,  
e s p e c i a l l y  when i t  i s  r e c o n s t r u c t e d  with the
a id  o f  a formal language. . . The recons ­
t r u c t i o n  a l s o  provides  a general frame­
work w i th in  which r ec e n t  d i scuss ion '  of  p r e ­
sup p o s i t io n s  can be u n i t e d . 44
Collingwood claimed t h i s  l o g i c  wherein p ropo s i t io n s  a re  n e i t h e r  t rue
nor  f a l s e  t o  be r e v o l u t i o n a r y ;  Mink supports  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  bu t  adds
t h a t  what Collingwood framed " is  not  a theory  o f  l o g i c  a t  a l l  , . .
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i t  i s  a he rm eneu t ics ."  Mink i s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  the
thought  o f  Collingwood i s  extremely complex, one p a r t  r e l a t i n g  to
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a nother  so t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f u c u l t  t o  p re s e n t  i t s  many f a c e te d  n a tu r e .  
The importance o f  t h e  " lo g i c  o f  ques t ion  and answer" can be seen in  
Col l ingwood's  l e v e l s  o f  c onsc iousness ;  every s p e c i f i c  form of  cons­
c io usness  i s  "done [ i n ]  a co rresponding ly  s p e c i f i c  form o f  language ."  
Walpole,  in  h i s  d i sc u s s io n  o f  Col lingwood's concept  o f  language,  
supports  t h e  c o n te n t ion  o f  both Mink and Post :
His " th o u g h t , "  " d e s i r e , "  " w i l l , "  and o t h e r  
terms do no t  have to  be cons idered as r e ­
p r e s e n t in g  any kinds o f  psychological  
mechanisms o r  f a c i l i t i e s .  They a r e  words, 
t h a t ,  through s teady  use in the  community, 
have become s e t t l e d .  When spoken by p e r ­
sons who have not  p roper ly  a s s im i l a t e d  
t h e i r  use they  a r e  s i g n s ,  o r  echo-words,  
r a t h e r  than symbols.  A word i s  no t  used 
a p p r o p r i a t e ly  u n t i l  i t  has been earned in
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1 - Îi v in g  experience 48
Thus,  i f  d e s i r e  i s  the  f i r s t  r e f l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  o f  the  mind as i t  
approaches knowledge and d e s i r e ' s  o b j e c t  i s  good, then good, named 
"happ iness ,"  i s  t h e  o b j e c t  of  d e s i r e .  Happiness is  a combination o f  
e x te rn a l  and i n t e r n a l  w e l l - b e in g ,  power and v i r t u e  concepts  secured 
from th e  mind ' s  r e f l e c t i o n  upon d e s i r e ,  a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  o f  a d e s i r ­
a b le  cond i t ion  o f  the  s e l f  and the n o t - s e l f .  D e s i r e ' s  s t a r t i n g
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po in t  i s  passion .  Pas s ion ,  "the power o f  the  n o t - s e l f "  has two ba s ic
forms: f e a r  and anger .  Love becomes f e a r  when a person pe rce ives  the
n o t - s e l f .  Fear ,  confusing to  the  i n d iv idua l  as a c o n t r a s t  between the
s e l f  and the  n o t - s e l f ,  r e s t s  in t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  Rebe l l ion  a g a in s t
f e a r  promotes anger  o r  a v e r s i o n ,  a l though both a r e  based upon love .
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Anger i s  war a g a in s t  the  n o t - s e l f ;  i t s  r e n unc ia t ion  i s  shame. Shame,
a c r i t i c a l  po in t  in  t h e  development o f  mind s in c e  i t  b r idges  the  lower
l e v e l s  of  consciousness  g o i n t  to  those  o f  the  h i g h e r ,  c a l l s  f o r t h  de-
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s i r e  as a wish, not  as a want.  The mind has moved from p ro p o s i t io n a l  
th in k ing  to  r a t i o n a l  t h i n k i n g .  In t h e  case  the  mind does not  pe rce iv e  
i t s  own e r r o r ,  i t  behaves abnormally ,  which on th e  r a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  be­
comes a form o f  c o r r u p t  dogmatism, t h e  product  o f  a c o r r u p t  c onsc ious ­
nes s ,  i . e .  the  r e f u s a l  of  the  mind to  move to  t h e  second and t h i r d  
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o n to log ica l  l e v e l s .
What a man wishes f o r  i s  u s u a l l y  termed happ iness .  Both
happiness  and unhappiness  a re  second-order  o b j e c t s ,  the  terminal  
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p o in t s  of  d e s i r e .  "In r e l a t i o n  to  h im s e l f ,  happiness  f o r  a given
man means goodness:  freedom from every s t a t e  o f  h imse lf  from which
he wishes t o  be f r e e ;  . . .  In r e l a t i o n  to  what i s  no t  h im se l f ,  i t
means power" so t h a t  "unhappiness  i s  a nega t ive  ideal  . . .  the  name
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f o r  what we d e s i r e  t o  g e t  r i d  of  . . ." These a re  not  t h e  concepts
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o f  consciousness  but  a b s t r a c t i o n s  "from the  consciousness  o f  d e s i r e . "
I f  we look a t  what the  mind a b s t r a c t s  from happiness  and unhappiness ,  
we f i n d  f a m i l i a r  themes in the  h i s t o r y  o f  the  West; happiness  i s  an 
idea l  whi le  unhappiness  i s  a f a c t  due to  c i r cum s tances ,  a lack of
-32.
power, to  a weakness o f  c h a r a c t e r ,  t o  the  no t ion ,  o r  in the  t w e n t i e th
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cen tu ry ,  t o  the  concept  o f  n a tu re  as a machine. The not ion  of  un­
happiness  as gene ra ted  in  the  n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry  was man's power over  
t h e  n a tu r a l  wor ld .  In the  t w e n t i e th  c e n tu r y ,  t h a t  no t io n  ge ne ra te s
f e a r  over  t h e  powerlessness  o f  man "in the  g i a n t  g r i p  of  economic
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and s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s . "  The Levia than ,  however, i s  a .
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" c r e a tu r e  formed by the  a r t  o f  man . . . "
Coll ingwood's  theory  o f  mind as exposed in The New Leviathan
mediates  between h i s  d i a l e c t i c  o f  experi ence  and t h a t  of  t h e  d i a l e c t i c s
o f  concep ts .  I t  i s  a f i n a l  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  h i s  moral phi losophy
from th e  persona l  and c u l t u r a l  f i e l d s  u t i l i z i n g  the  d i a l e c t i c  of  forms
as p resen ted  in Speculum Mentis and th e  d i a l e c t i c  o f  concepts  as p r e -
60
sen ted  in Essay on Ph i losoph ica l  Method. Collingwood has moved in 
t he  development o f  a theo ry  o f  mind from s e n sa t io n  to  though t ,  p a s s i o n ,  
and d e s i r e .  The connect ion between language and reason emerges in 
happiness  and unhappiness  as a b s t r a c t i o n s  from d e s i r e  to  t h e i r  r e ­
appearance in  moral t e rm s ,  good and e v i l ,  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  d e s i r e  o r  
a v e r s io n .  This could a l so  be expre ssed  as  the  mind 's  movement from 
s ense ,  imag in a t io n ,  speech ,  the  p a s s i o n s ,  and the  v i r t u e s .
Before embarking upon th e  mind 's  a c t i v i t y  in  cho ice ,  C o l l i n g ­
wood de f ined  cho ice  as a choosing amongst open a l t e r n a t i v e s  in con­
t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  to  p re fe re nc e  which i s  d e s i r e  involv ing a l t e r n a t i v e s  
t h a t  a re  no t  open. N a t u r a l l y ,  t h i s  p r e s e n t s  the  problem o f  freedom 
of  the  w i l l .  To Collingwood, most o f  the  arguments upon f r e e  w i l l  
were misplaced because a person cannot  become f r e e  by mere choosing;
-33-
he becomes f r e e  through an ac t  o f  s e l f - l i b e r a t i o n  wherein dec is ions
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a re  f r e e  from d e s i r e .  Collingwood exp la ined  t h a t  t h e  idea  o f  f r e e ­
dom has a p o s i t i v e  and a nega t ive  e f f e c t .  Freedom implie s  the
a b i l i t y  " to  do something o f  a s pe c ia l  k ind ;"  " n e g a t iv e l y ,  i t  i s  f r e e -  
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dom from d e s i r e . "
The freedom o f  the  wi l l  i s ,  p o s i t i v e l y ,  
freedom t o  choose;  freedom to  e x e r c i s e  a 
w i l l ;  and n e g a t i v e l y ,  freedom from d e s i r e  
. . . This s t a t e  o f  freedom i s  achieved 
by an a c t  o f  which we know t h a t  i t  i s  
( i ) i n v o l u n t a r y ,  ( i i ) d o n e  by the  same p e r ­
son whom i t  l i b e r a t e s  . . . N ega t iv e ly ,  
i t  i s  t h e  a c t  o f  r e f u s in g  t o  l e t  o n e s e l f  
be d i c t a t e d  t o  by des i r e . 63
Such a p roces s ,  r a t h e r  than p o r t r a y in g  movement from u n s a t i s f i e d  
a p p e t i t e  to  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  shows i n s t e a d  movement from th e  "unhappi­
ness  o f  u n g r a t i f i e d  d e s i r e  to  t h e  happiness  o f  g r a t i f i e d  d e s i r e , "
64
which i s ,  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  t h e  accep tance  o f  unhappiness .  Through t h i s
p r o c e s s ,  a person can move in to  a "consciousness  o f  being f r e e " ;  he
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can move i n t o  s e l f - r e s p e c t .
The man who denies  h im se l f  and ga ins  
s e l f - r e s p e c t  i s  r i c h l y  rewarded; but  
t h a t  i s  no t  why he does i t .  His a c t  
o f  s e l f - d e n i a l ,  not  being a vo lun ta ry  
a c t ,  cannot  be a u t i l i t a r i a n  a c t ,  t he  
exchange o f  one th in g  f o r  something 
more v a lu a b l e .  And i f  he knew what he 
s tands  t o  g a in ,  he would no t  va lue  i t .
What charm has s e l f - r e s p e c t  f o r  a man 
whose d e s i r e s  a r e  con c en t ra t e d  on
happiness?66
Here,  Collingwood was po in t in g  ou t  t h a t  p syc ho log i s t s  and u t i l i t a r -
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ians  "cannot  have i t  both ways."  The a c t  can ,  p o s s i b l y ,  be ex­
p la ined  by inven t ing  "psychologica l  fo rc e s  c a l l e d  i n s t i n c t s , "  and
■ J L
t h i s  does appear  t o  be the  way men o f t e n  a c t ;  however, some persons
a re  no t  so motivated  and " in  consequence make th e  s t r a n g e  di scovery  
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of  f reedom." How, t hen ,  does man l i b e r a t e  h im s e l f  from d e s i r e ?
The compelling f o rc e  o f  language as  i t  f rames th ough t  and from which
thought  t akes  on meaning ap p e a r s ;  l i b e r a t i o n  from d e s i r e  begins  by
naming i t .  To form an idea  means to  t h in k  and " th ink ing  i s  done in 
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words."  Once th e  le s son  i s  l e a r n e d ,  t h e  a c t  can be performed
aga in .  Collingwood noted  t h a t  t h e  " technique  o f  s e l f - l i b e r a t i o n , "
th e  " d o c t r in e  t h a t  a man a c q u i r e s  f r e e  wi l l "  and the reby  conquers
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h i s  pass ions  i s  fundamental  to  p o s s ib l y  f o u r  major  r e l i g i o n s .  To
deny t h i s  f a c t  and t o  a t t r i b u t e  i t s  denia l  to  paganism i s  " in essence
a proposal  t o  abandon freedom . . .  in  t h e  shape o f  a s c i e n t i f i c
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l i f e  . . .  an i n c o n s i s t e n t  p r o p o s a l . "  This i s  an impor tan t  moment
in t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  West because i t  marks the  s t a g e  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l
m a t u r i t y .  The "cur ious  double  f a t e "  which C h r i s t i a n i t y  has s u f f e r e d
in t h e  " l a s t  two hundred y e a r s "  i s  one o f  the  paradoxes o f  our  age ,
according t o  Collingwood.
Modern phi lo sophy  and s c ie n c e  have admir­
ab ly  succeeded in  a kind o f  d i s t i l l a t i o n ,  
by which th e  r a t i o n a l  c on ten t s  o f  t h e  
C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h  have been se p a r a te d  ou t  
from the  mass of  s u p e r s t i t i o u s  ideas  and 
magic r i t u a l s  in  which they  were embodied.
The " s p i r i t "  of  C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  i s s u i n g  from 
t h i s  a lembic o f  t h e  i n t e l l e c t ,  has been 
b o t t l e d  c l e a r  and cold and l a b e l l e d  
" p r i n c i p l e s  o f  p o l i t i c s , "  " p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  method,"  and th e  l i k e .  The 
re s id u e  . . .  has been thrown aw ay."72
In o r d e r  t o  unde rs tand what Collingwood meant by " th ink in g  in
words," i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  exp lo re  f u r t h e r  h i s  ideas  about  language.
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In P r in c i p l e s  o f  A r t , he developed an account  of  person as "speaker  
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and h e a r e r . "
In i t s  most e lementary form, language i s  
not  addressed t o  any audience .  A c h i l d ' s  
f i r s t  u t t e r a n c e s  a re  so completely i n ­
addressed  t h a t  one cannot  even de sc r ibe  
them as addressed to  the  world a t  l a rg e  
o r  to  i t s e l f .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
speaking to  o n e s e l f ,  speaking to  the  world 
a t  l a r g e ,  and speaking to  a p a r t i c u l a r  
person o r  group, i s  a l a t e r  d i f f e r e n t i a ­
t io n  in troduced  i n to  an o r ig i n a l  a c t  which 
was s imply th e  a c t  o f  s p e a k i n g .74
Thought , be fo re  i t s  u t t e r a n c e ,  i s  obscure ,  lying  "unrea l i zed  in the
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dark p laces  o f  t h e  soul . . . "  I t  i s  through language or  speech 
t h a t  a c h i l d  d i scove rs  h i s  world o f  persons .  Persons c o n s t r u c t  "a 
new s e t  o f  r e l a t i o n s  between themselves ,  a r i s i n g  ou t  of  t h e i r  cons­
c iousness  o f  themselves and one ano the r ;  t h e s e  a re  l i n g u i s t i c  r e l a -  
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t i e n s . "  In t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  an emotion i s  converted  in to  an idea and
i s  then  expressed in speech. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between emotion and
language may be seen in P r in c i p l e s  o f  A r t :
When language i s  s a id  to  express  emotion, 
t h i s  means t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a s i n g l e  expe r­
ience  which has two elements  in i t .  F i r s t ,  
t h e r e  i s  an emotion o f  a s p e c i f i c  kind,  not  
a psychic  emotion o r  impress ion,  but  an emo­
t io n  o f  which the  person who has i t  i s  cons­
c io u s ,  and by which t h i s  consciousness  he 
has converted  from impression i n to  idea .
Secondly,  t h e r e  i s  a c o n t r o l l e d  bodi ly  
ac t i o n  in which he expresses  t h i s  idea .
This express ion  i s  not  an a f t e r - t h o u g h t  to 
th e  idea ;  the  two a re  i n se pa rab ly  u n i t e d ,  so 
t h a t  the  idea  i s  had as an idea only in so
f a r  as i t  i s  e x p re s s e d .77 
An understanding  o f  Col l ingwood's p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  the  idea o f  s e l f ­
l i b e r a t i o n  a lso  involves  h i s  c r i t i c i s m  of  modern ways of  th in k ing  o r
-3A-
modem b e l i e f s  which,  in h i s  view, were not  in accord  with h i s t o r i c a l  
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development.
Although the  achievement  o f  f r e e  w i l l  marks the  s t a g e  c a l l e d
i n t e l l e c t u a l  m a tu r i t y  in European c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i t s  a r r i v a l  f o r  each
ind iv idua l  i s  r a t h e r  p r e c a r io u s :  the  development may be i n t e r f e r r e d
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with o r  a person may be unaware o f  possess ing  i t .  In the  l a t t e r  
e ve n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  r e l a t i o n  to  governmental p r a c t i c e s  o r  educa t io n ,  
t h e r e  i s  a lack of  t h e  a b i l i t y  to  make a d e c i s i o n .  Collingwood ad­
v i se d  the  remedy o f  "arousing h i s  s e l f - r e s p e c t ,  t h a t  i s ,  making him
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conscious t h a t  he i s  f r e e  w i thou t  being aware o f  i t . "  Sherman M.
Stanage has w r i t t e n  l u c i d l y  upon Coll ingwood's  concept  o f  what he has
termed th e  "phenomenology o f  educa t ion" :
Adducing the  erroneous w i th in  a s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  
i s  the  growing edge in  o n e ' s  educa t ion .  The 
h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  methods f o r  dea l i ng  with a sub­
j e c t  c l a r i f i e s  the  e r r o r s  o f  t h e s e  ways and 
suggest s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e i r  r e c o n s t r u c ­
t i o n .  Thus a c h i l d  must come t o  understand 
t h i s  p rocess  and t o  know in hi s  own l i f e  t h a t  
educat ion  i s  f o r  ' r e a l  l i f e ' ,  bu t  not  in  i t ,  
f o r  during h i s  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  l i f e  he i s  
allowed t o  run th e  r i s k  of  e r r o r  wi thout  
paying th e  p e n a l t i e s  f o r  t h i s  which might  be 
exacted a t  a l a t e r  da te .B i
Collingwood be l i e ved  t h a t  t h e r e  was such a th in g  as a f a l s e  cons­
c io usne ss ,  a disowning o f  f e e l i n g s .  There were t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
whereby consciousness  could convert  an impression i n to  an idea :  f i r s t ,
i t  may be a t t ended  t o ;  second,  i t  may be ignored;  and t h i r d ,  i t  may
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be a t t ended  t o  and recognized  a b o r t i v e l y .  The t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  
can produce a f a l s e  consciousness  o r  a c o r r u p t  consciousness  which 
must be d e l i b e r a t e l y  broken.  For Collingwood,  t h i s  i s  an example of
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e v i l ,  a d i sc uss ion  found in P r i n c i p l e s  o f  A r t . A c o r ru p t io n  o f  cons­
c iousness  a l s o  i n f e c t s  the  im ag in a t io n .  "When t h i s  happens,  the  c o r ­
rupted consciousness  o f  a man, a s o c i e t y ,  or  a c i v i l i z a t i o n  i n f e s t s
a l l  o f  the  imagina t ive  l abours  o f  t h a t  man, s o c i e t y ,  o r  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,
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and n e c e s s a r i l y  a l l  o f  i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p ro d u c t s . "
Choosing i s  i n t i m a t e l y  r e l a t e d  to  deed. I t  i s  a l s o  r e l a t e d  to  
reason.  To dec ide  i s  a f i r s t - o r d e r  o b j e c t  o f  consc iousness ;  to  de­
c ide  what t o  do i s  a s econd-o rder  a b s t r a c t i o n .  A deed, t o  be exe-
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cu ted ,  needs t h e  c o n s t a n t  a c t i v i t y  o f  w i l l  in t hough t .  "Rat ional
th ink ing  begins  when a d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' t h e  t h a t '  and ' t h e  why'"
i s  made. This  i s  t h e  s im p les t  form o f  knowledge. Reason, p r im a r i ly
p r a c t i c a l ,  i s  a l s o  t h e o r e t i c a l .  " P r a c t i c a l  reason comes i n to  e x i s -
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tence  when a man forms an i n t e n t i o n . "  T heo re t ica l  reason comes i n ­
to  e x i s t e n c e  when a man f i r s t ,  by p r e p o s i t i o n a l  t h in k i n g ,  makes up 
h i s  mind t h a t  something i s  so and needs a reason f o r  confirming i t .  
Theore t ica l  reason i s  dependent  upon f r e e  w i l l  o r  t h e  a b i l i t y  to  
t h ink  t h i s  and not  t h a t .  In a i l  t h e o r e t i c a l  reason t h e r e  i s  a s u r ­
v ival  o f  p r a c t i c a l  reason from which i t  developed.  In European 
thought ,  t h e r e  has been t h r e e  types  o f  p r a c t i c a l  reason:  t h a t  c a l l e d
' u s e f u l ' ,  t h a t  used because i t  i s  ' r i g h t ' ,  and t h a t  used in  the  name 
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of  ' d u t y ' .
Before p rog res s ing  onward in Col l ingwood's  argument regard ing  
choice and i t s  outcome in p r a c t i c a l  a c t i o n ,  i t  i s  ne cessa ry  t o  d i ­
g ress  i n to  the  complex problem o f  the  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  C o l l in g ­
wood's thought  as i t  i s  found in  severa l  volumes. Repeat ing the
p o in t  a l r e a d y  made. The New Leviathan i s ,  l i k e  The P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Ar t ,  
concerned with a n a l y s i s  o f  i n d iv idua l  consc iousness .  I t  i s  a l s o ,  how­
eve r ,  concerned with the  h i s t o r y  o f  Western c i v i l i z a t i o n  and the  h i s ­
t o r y  o f  i t s  fundamental ideas  as  found in  The Idea o f  Na tu re , The Idea 
o f  H i s t o r y , and Essay on Metaphysic s . His moral phi losophy i s  a l s o  
found in  The New Leviathan and in The P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Ar t  wh ile  h i s  
formal d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  l o g i c  i s  found in  the  Essay on Ph i lo soph ica l  
Method. Reason, in Col l ingwood 's  works,  i s  always p h i lo s o p h i c a l .
That i s ,  wh i le  we t h in k  in  t h e  p re s e n t  o r  the  f u t u r e ,  we understand 
in  r e t r o s p e c t .  This p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  underscored  with the  theme t h a t ,  
as  both Mink and Rubinoff  have p o s t u l a t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  a un i ty  in the  
thought  o f  Col lingwood. I f  t h i s  u n i ty  i s  t o  expose any i n s i g h t  i n to  
p o l i t i c a l  ph i losophy,  t h e  t h r e e  e s s e n t i a l  themes to  be found in a l l  
Col lingv/ood's works a re :  t h e  idea  o f  t h e  d i a l e c t i c ,  t h e  idea  o f  
phi losophy as s e l f - r e f l e c t i n g ,  and the  idea  o f  a c o n t i n u i t y  o r  r a -  
prochement between though t  and a c t i o n .  The l i n c h p in  underscoring  a 
d i a l e c t i c  o f  exper ience  and a d i a l e c t i c  o f  concepts  l i e s  in  the  d i a ­
l e c t i c  o f  mind. The d i a l e c t i c  o f  mind,  concerned as i t  i s  with human 
f a c u l t i e s  o f  s e n s a t io n  and t h o u g h t ,  passion  and d e s i r e ,  connects  with 
language and reason and then  emerges i n to  moral phi losophy through 
th e  uses o f  "good" and " e v i l "  as e x p la na t ions  of  the  o b j e c t s  of  man's 
d e s i r e s  or  a v e r s i o n s .  Choice i s  always bound up wi th  judgments of  
va lue .  Act ions a re  purpos ive  when we a r e  aware o f  t h in k in g  o r  a t  the 
f o u r th  l eve l  o f  consc iousness .  This l a t t e r  s ta t em en t  must be viewed 
in  two ways: f i r s t ,  i t  i s  the  emotion y e t  underscoring  h ig h e r  l eve l
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a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  mind and second,  a c t i o n s  a re  l in k e d  in  thought  and 
a c t io n  a t  the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  l eve l  through the  theo ry  o f  ab s o lu t e  p re ­
s u p p o s i t io n s .  This  same no t ion  u n d e r l i e s  Col l ingwood's  concept  o f  
h i s t o r y .  While h i s  ph i losophy of  mind does no t  squa re  with Freudian 
a n a l y s i s ,  i t  does f i t  t h e  more r e c e n t  t h e o r i e s  o f  e x i s t e n t i a l  psycho­
a n a ly s i s  which r e j e c t s  concepts  o f  t h e  unconscious and f in d s  t h a t  the  
i n d iv idua l  i s  p lay ing  a r o l e  in a drama. Collingwood has supported  
t h i s  with an a b s o lu t e  theo ry  o f  mind.  S i m i l a r l y ,  Collingwood and 
t h e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  a r e  in agreement  t h a t  freedom i s  an e s s e n t i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  consc iousness .  Such freedom i s  no t ,  however, 
guaran teed .  To a b s t r a c t  a t  the  l ev e l  o f  reason in s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n  
i s  r a d i c a l  freedom.
Collingwood has p o s tu l a t e d  t h e  concep t  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l  reason 
and t h e o r e t i c a l  reason i s  developed through p r e p o s i t i o n a l  t h in k i n g ,
th e  f o u r t h  l e v e l .  To choose an a l t e r n a t i v e  because i t  i s  useful  means
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t h a t  an ends-means r e l a t i o n s h i p  has been c o n s t r u c t e d .  The answer
to  such a c o n s t r u c t i o n  can be d iv ide d  i n t o  two p a r t s :  the  nega t ive
and th e  p o s i t i v e .  The p o s i t i v e  element  w i l l  d e s c r ib e  t h e  r a t i o n a l
p a r t s  o f  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a l though such an e x p la n a t io n  w i l l  be only
88 89
p a r t i a l .  In  such p lann ing ,  " the  end p r e c e d e [ s ]  t h e  mean in t i m e . "
That  i s ,  t he  goal i s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  means o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  i t .  "What
i s  e s s e n t i a l  in t h e  r e l a t i o n  between means and end . . .  i s  . .  . t h a t
t h e r e  should be a l o g i c a l  i n t e r r e l a t i o n  . . . such t h a t  each p lan ,  the
menas-end pi and and the  end-p lan a l i k e  i s  checked and c o r r e c t e d  by
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r e f e re n c e  t o  t h e  o t h e r . "  What happens i n s t e a d  i s  t h a t  t ime r e l a t i o n s
- 4 0 -
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become "symbols f o r  l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n s . "  Collingwood demonstrated 
the  lo g ic a l  n e c e s s i t y  o f  h i s  argument by exp la in ing  t h a t  a "y plan" 
n e c e s s i t a t e d  an "x plan"  although the  plan in p r a c t i c e  worked the 
o t h e r  way. Thus, u t i l i t y  is  a p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n  between a second- 
o rd e r  choice X and y .  The nega t ive  element  in t h i s  plan l i e s  in i t s  
p a r t i a l  exp lana t ion  o f  a c t  o r  i t s  l im i t e d  r a t i o n a l i t y .  I t  i s  i r r a ­
t i o n a l  in t h a t  choice must be made be fo re  ac t ion  and thus does not  
c o ns ide r  end due to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  end i s  a l r eady  implied .  U t i l i t a r ­
ian reasoning "s tops  s h o r t "  because i t  exp la ins  only so much. F i r s t ,
i t  d ea l s  with i n d iv i d u a l s  r a t h e r  than u n i v e r s e l s ;  f u r t h e r ,  i n d iv id u a l s
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a re  i n d e f i n i t e  r a t h e r  than s p e c i f i c .  Both the  means plan and the
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ends plan are  a b s t r a c t ;  t he  exp la na t i on  f o r  a c t  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t .
I t  i s  c a p r i c i o u s .
The b e l i e f  t h a t  u t i l i t y  i s  the  only form of  
p r a c t i c a l  reason . . .  was a d e l i b e r a t e  
cha l l enge  t o  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  d o c t r in e  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  ano the r  form, namely r i g h t  . . .^4
The appeal t o  language in the u t i l i t a r i a n  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  r i g h t  and
usefu l  meant t h e  same t h in g .  The h i s t o r y  of  the  term ' r i g h t '  shows a
process  o f  development from the  term ' s t r a i g h t ' .  I t  means ' r u l e ' .
T h i s ,  r epo r ted  Collingwood, was "why the  u t i l i t a r i a n  appeal f a i l s ;  why
' r i g h t '  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  never  means ' u s e f u l ' .  "A th ing  i s  useful
. . .  in r e l a t i o n  to  the  end i t  a ch ieves ;  i t  i s  r i g h t  . . .  in r e -
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l a t i o n  to  the  r u l e  i t  obeys."  A r u l e  e x h i b i t s  ge n e ra l i z e d  purpose 
o r  a r e g u l a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e .  To become r e g u l a r i a n  a c t i o n ,  a person must 
make a dec is ion  t o  obey o r  to  disobey the  r u l e .  While ru le s  a re  o f ten  
thought  o f  in the  soc ia l  sense,  they can be framed by an i n d i v i d u a l .
-41-
Persons behave in sha r ing  o r  obeying r u l e s  much in  t h e  same f ash ion
as was the  case in u t i l i t a r i a n  a c t i o n  except  t h a t ,  in r e g u la r i a n
a c t i o n ,  i t  may be spread over  t ime o r  occur  a t  va r ious  t imes with
va rious  agents  o r  in  va r ious  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  Regular ian a c t io n  s u f f e r s
from the  same d e f i c i e n c y  as does u t i l i t a r i a n  a c t i o n ;  exp la na t ions  a re
p a r t i a l  because a c t i o n  i s  covered only  by r u l e  a p p l i c a t i o n .  Such
th in k in g  i s  l im i t e d  by what the  r u l e  l eaves  o u t ;  "what conduces to
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one end o f t e n  f r u s t r a t e s  a n o th e r . "  " I f  a ' r i g h t '  means 'accord ing
t o  a r u l e '  . . . t h e  same a c t i o n  may be both r i g h t  and wrong, acco rd-
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ing as i t  i s  judged by d i f f e r e n t  r u l e s  . . . "  "Such ge n e ra l i z e d  in -
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t e n t i o n s  " leave much t o  c a p r i c e  o r  to  a c c i d e n t . "
To exp la in  choice as ' d u t y '  means d e f i n i n g  the  term as was
done in u t i l i t y  and in r i g h t .  Duty r e f e r s  t o  the  p a s t  as i t  i s  found
in t h e  terms,  owe, deb t ,  o r  o b l i g a t i o n .  The sp e c i a l  c h a ra c te r  of
duty as  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from r i g h t  and u t i l i t y  a r e  determinancy and 
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p o s s i b i l i t y .
In modern Eng l i sh ,  consciousness  o f  o b l ig a t i o n  
i s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from o t h e r  forms o f  consc ious ­
ness by th e  name ' c o n s c i e n c e . '  'Consc ience '  has 
a f i r s t - o r d e r  o b j e c t ,  v i z .  the  o b l i g a t i o n  i t s e l f .100
Duty admits  o f  no a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  i t  i s  s p e c i f i c  and implies  a f r e e l y  
101
w i l l i n g  age n t .
I f  t h e  account  o f  Col l ingwood's  answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  "Why
did you do t h a t ? "  i s  taken only from The New L ev ia than , then the
c r i t i q u e  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n  as o u t l i n e d  by A.J.M. Milne in "Collingwood's
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E th ic s  and P o l i t i c a l  Theory" must be acknowledged as v a l i d .  C o l l ­
ingwood has ,  however, again assumed t h a t  h i s  r eaders  were f a m i l i a r
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with Speculum M entis . F i r s t  Mate 's  Log, Essay on Ph i lo soph ica l  Method, 
and "What i s  the  Problem o f  Ev i l"  as well  as Autobiography! (This 
l a s t  work shou ld ,  perhaps be included  s in c e  i t  was composed l a t e r ;  i t  
does throw l i g h t  on the  whole t h o u g h t . )  The t h r e e  answers Collingwood 
gave in response t o  the  q u e s t io n ,  "Why does a person choose t h i s  ac t ion  
and no t  t h a t ? "  were u s e f u l n e s s ,  r i g h t ,  and duty .  These terms have 
been e x p l i c a t e d  with new meanings and they  must be f i t t e d  i n t o  the  
framework of  mind as developed.  F i r s t ,  t h e  t h r e e  concepts  a re  to  be 
viewed on a s c a l e  o f  t h e  forms o f  moral exper ience  which then may 
move forward o r  backward as p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  a re  e i t h e r  accepted  or  
r e j e c t e d .  The mind can a l s o  move beyond. The concept  o f  u t i l i t y  as 
a f i r s t  s t e p  on an e t h i c a l  s c a l e  o f  forms presupposes  t h a t  t h e  value 
of  a c t i o n  l i e s  in  i t s  end o r  purpose.  As th e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  choosing 
such an a c t  from amongst a t o t a l i t y  o f  p o s s i b l e  a c t s  which may have 
been chosen in  o r d e r  to  have achieved the  same end, i t s  exp la na t i on  
i s  l im i t e d  in t ime and achievement.  Such sequences,  Collingwood
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poin ted  out  in  The New L ev ia than , a re  n e i t h e r  un ive r sa l  nor  common.
Time sequences do not  form the  essence  o f  a means-end r e l a t i o n  even
though t h i s  f a c t  may be supposed a t  the  t ime;  r a t h e r ,  t ime r e l a t i o n s
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a re  used f o r  "symbols in lo g ic a l  r e l a t i o n s . "  In F i r s t  Mate 's  Log,
Collingwood exp la ined  t h a t  the  theo ry  of  good as  pure u t i l i t y  i s  s e l f -
c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
Sooner o r  l a t e r ,  the  judgement  t h a t  some­
th in g  i s  good because i t  i s  usefu l  r e s t s  on 
the  jiji^gement t h a t  something i s  good in i t -
To f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o i n t ,  Collingwood examined the  problem o f
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good and e v i l .  In concepts  o f  u t i l i t y ,  good i s  bestowed upon conse­
quences ,  e v e n t s ,  t h i n g s ,  and c o n d i t i o n s ,  o r  f i n a l l y ,  as Kant had 
demons tra ted ,  upon th e  w i l l  i t s e l f .  Concepts o f  good and e v i l  a re  
concepts  o f  t h e  mind o r  o f  the  w i l l .  Events cannot  be e i t h e r  good
o r  e v i l .  Only a c t i o n s  can assume such con n o ta t io n s .
Taken a s t e p  f u r t h e r  in  t h e  Collingwoodian scheme, the  concept
o f  u t i l i t y ,  viewed above in  a s c a l e  o f  overl app ing  forms can be put
i n to  the  " lo g i c  o f  que s t i o n  and answer ."  A concept  o f  a c t i o n  a r i s e s
as an answer t o  a q u e s t i o n .  The premise of  u t i l i t y  r e s t s  upon c e r t a i n
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  I f  t h e s e  a r e  abandoned, o r  i f  " s t r e s s e s  and s t r a i n s "
occur  in the  mind concerning them, a move to  the  nex t  l eve l  o f  the
d i a l e c t i c  i s  a l r e ad y  s e t  in  motion.  A u t i l i t a r i a n  ex p la n a t io n  f o r  an
a c t i o n  i s  now q u i t e  una c ce p tab le .  This " d i a l e c t i c a l  c r i t i c i s m  of
e r r o r s "  has been exp la ined  by Collingwood in  Speculum M ent i s .
. . . t h i n k i n g  moves by the  d i a l e c t i c a l  c r i ­
t i c i s m  o f  e r r o r s  . . . i t s  break-up under the  
s t r e s s  o f  i t s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  — to  
t h e i r  d e n i a l :  t h i s  de n ia l  i s  a t r u t h ,  so 
framed as  t o  nega te  t h e  e r r o r  j u s t  exploded,  
bu t  g e n e r a l l y  f a l l i n g  i n to  a new and op p o s i t e  
e r r o r  by an exaggera ted  f e a r  o f  the  o l d .  Any 
element  o f  e r r o r  in  t h i s  new t r u t h  w i l l ,  i f  
t h in k in g  goes v ig o ro u s ly  fo rw ard ,  i n i t i a t e  a 
new d i a l e c t i c a l  c r i t i c i s m  and the  process  w i l l  
be r ep e a te d  on a h ig h e r  p lane .  Thus thought  
in i t s  p rog re s s  . . . moves through a s e r i e s  
of  phases  each o f  which is  a t r u t h  and y e t  an 
e r r o r ,  bu t  so f a r  as t h e  p rogress  is  r e a l , each 
i s  a t r iumph o f  t r u t h  over  a preceding e r r o r  and 
an advance t o  what may be c a l l e d  a t r u e r  t r u t h . 1 0 6
Collingwood has been d i sc u s s in g  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  in the  generi c  
sense r a t h e r  than in  the  Benthamite  u t i l i t a r i a n  se nse .  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
in the  Engl ish ve rs ion  t ak e s  t h e  view t h a t  the  m o r a l i t y  of  an a c t i o n .
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i t s  r i g h t n e s s  o r  wrongness,  i s  d e r i v a t i v e  from th e  consequences o f  the  
a c t i o n .  Thus,  "good" and "bad" in t h i s  d o c t r i n e  a re  equated with 
"p leasu re"  or  "pain" .
The p o s i t i o n  of  Col lingwood on th e  t h r e e  reasons f o r  a c t i o n  
now begins  to  emerge: r a t h e r  than  advancing a metaphysics  o f  be ing ,
he has advanced a c o n c re te  metaphysics  o f  pure a c t .  Mind i s  change­
l e s s  and e t e r n a l  a l b e i t  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  mind presupposes  change. His 
p o s i t i o n  f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t e s  two o t h e r  p o s i t i o n s  in h i s  ph i lo sophy:  
t h e  r o l e  o f  overl ap  and t h e  d i a l e c t i c a l ,  h i e r a r c h i c a l  concept  o f  l e v e l s  
o f  knowledge and th e  d i a l e c t i c a l  l e v e l s  o f  e x r s r i e n c e .  Choice,  taken 
upon th es e  premises  would appear  t o  be e v o lu t io n a r y  indeed ,  even in 
terms o f  Western c i v i l i z a t i o n .  I t  was f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  C o l l i n g ­
wood was so concerned wi th ba rbar ism .
The t h i r d  cho ice ,  t h a t  o f  d u ty ,  must be seen in  the  s c a l e  o f  
exper ience  forms invo lv ing  reason  to  some degree  o r  a t  l e a s t  d e l i b e r a ­
t i o n .  This choice i s  concerned wi th  h i s t o r i c a l  a c t i o n  in  t h a t  i t  con­
s i d e r s  not  on ly  t h e  s e l f  but  t h e  o t h e r  o r  the  community. I t  i s  a 
going beyond t h e  s e l f .  The problem hinges upon opposing vi ewpoints  
accord ing t o  Col lingwood.
From t h e  e t h i c a l  p o i n t  o f  view the  problem 
[ o f  p l e a s u r e  and pa in  o r  o f  good and e v i l ]  
i s  s o l e l y  the  problem o f  s i n ;  the  problem o f  
pain i s  seen to  be a q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  problem, 
p r e s e n t in g  a q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r .  From 
th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  p o i n t  o f  view the  r e a l  p rob­
lem i s  t h e  problem o f  p a in ;  t h e  problem o f  s in  
i s  e i t h e r  s imply so lved  by the  concept ion of  
human freedom, o r  e l s e  remains as a p a r t i c u ­
l a r  case o f  t h e  p r o b l m  of  p a in .  I f  we r e ­
gard t h e  w i l l  as means ( u t i l i t a r i a n  view) the  
problem o f  t h e  bad w i l l  d i sappea rs  i n to  the
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problem of  bad events  o r  s t a t e s  o f  t h i n g s ,  
t y p i f i e d  by pa in .  I f  we regard  the  wil l  
as end ( e t h i c a l  view) the  problem o f  un­
d e s i r a b l e  th ings  o r  e v e n t s ,  such as  pa in ,  
i s  swallowed up in the  problem o f  the  ev i l  
w i l l .  But i f ,  i n s t e a d  of  adopt ing e i t h e r  
o f  t h es e  views, we merely h a l t  between two 
op in io n s ,  then our  t r e a tm e n t  of  the  problem 
of  ev i l  w i l l  f a l l  i n to  the  two heads which 
we have enumera ted . 'O '
With t h e s e  i d e a s ,  Collingwood a l s o  implied two f e a t u r e s  to  be explored  
l a t e r ,  t h a t  of  h i s  d o c t r i n e  o f  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  o f  the  b e n e f i t s  of  
h i s t o r i c a l  s tu d y ,  and the  freedom o f  w i l l .  These i n e v i t a b l y  lead  to  
the  c o n d i t ions  o f  self -making  through self -knowledge  which i s  i n ­
he ren t  in  the  p a s t  o f  Western c i v i l i z a t i o n .
S^Ea_
FOOTNOTES
1. The pr imary source f o r  t h e  phenomenological approach by Collingwood 
i s  The New L e v ia tha n . I am indeb ted to  t h e  work o f  Lionel Rubinoff 
in h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  works o f  Collingwood as found in his 
Collingwood and The Reform of  Metaphysics:  A Study in the  P h i lo ­
sophy' o f  Mind. (Toronto:  U n ive rs i ty  P r e s s ,  1970).
For example, knowledge i s  based upon a pr imord ia l  s t r u c t u r e  of  ex­
p e r i e n ce .  In Husse r l i an  language ,  the  n o e t i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  exper­
ience  i s  r evea led  through a phenomenology o f  e xpe r iences .  Thereby, 
pr imary experi ence  i s  r e l a t e d  to  f e e l i n g  whereas r e f l e c t i v e  exper ­
ience i s  " the  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  mind upon i t s e l f  t o  s tudy  i t s  own p r i ­
mary e x p e r i e n c e . "  (SM, 255) .  This example has been suppl ied  by 
Rubinoff  on p.  55.
2. Speculum M entis , op. c i t . ,  p. 9.
3. I b i d . ,  p. 97.
4. The^New L e v ia th a n , op.  c i t . ,  1 .65 -1 .67 .  Due t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  
Collingwood has based h i s  t h e o r i e s  upon mind and t h a t  hi s  work is  
model led upon t h a t  o f  Hobbes, he r e p o r t e d ,  i t  may seem t h a t  he 
appears  in t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  l i b e r a l i s t  p o s i t i o n .  Before t h a t  assump­
t i o n  i s  made, t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  p o s i t i o n  o f  Collingwood 
and those  of  He lve t ius  as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  French U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
o r  Hume as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  Engl ish U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  can be con­
t r a s t e d  with t h e  methodological  impera t iv e  which th e  systems o f  the  
seventeenth o r  e ig h t e en th  c e n t u r i e s  pe rce ived  and t h a t  which the 
sys tem at ic  ph i losophy o f  Collingwood pe rce ived .  The psychological  
approach of  the  e a r l i e r  pe r iod  emphasized t h a t  the  end o f  human con­
duc t  was simply t o  enjoy as much p l e a s u r e  and s u f f e r  as l i t t l e  pain 
as p o s s ib l e  a l though  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  French and th e  Eng­
l i s h  p o s i t i o n s  l ay  in the  realm o f  e t h i c s .  He lve t ius  made the 
p l ea s u re  p r i n c i p l e  one o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  reform al though both emphasized 
t h a t  men must o f  n e c e s s i t y  pursue t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  and t h a t  motion 
in  both i s  akin t o  t h a t  seen in phys ic s .  This i s  q u i t e  removed from 
th e  complex system of  Col lingwood.
5. I ^ . ,  1 .35.
6. I b i d . ,  1 .43.
7. I ^ . ,  2 .4 - 2 .4 3 .
8. I b i d . ,  3 .5 -3 .5 4 .
9.  R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphys ics . (Oxford:  Clarendon 
P r e s s ,  1940) , p. 110. See a l s o  h i s  P r i n c i p l e s  of  A r t . (Oxford: 
Clarendon P r e s s ,  1938) ,  p.  164.
10. The New Lev ia than , op. c i t . , 2 .4 - 2 .4 3 .
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11. I ^ . ,  4 .1 .
12. I b i d .
13. I b i d . See pages 25-27.  See a l s o  Coll ingwood's  Idea of  His to ry  
e d i t e d  by T. M. Knox. (Oxford:  Clarendon P r e s s ,  1946),  pp.
306-307 as well  as h i s  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  A r t , op. c i t . ,  pp. 163-64.
14. I b i d . , 9 .5 - 9 .5 5 .  Collingwood was r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  su rv iva l  of
o f  the  p r i m i t i v e  along with the  more developed forms in an ev o lu ­
t i o n a r y  s e r i e s .  That  i s ,  i f  t h e  argument can be accepted by 
"evo lu t iona ry  cosm o lo g i s t s , "  i t  i s  a l s o  e v ide n t  in the  ac tua l  
workings o f  t h e  mind. [Evo lu t io nary  cosmologis ts  r e f e r s  he re  to  
the  h i s t o r y  o f  cosmological t h e o r i e s  concerning the  g e n e ra t i o n  of  
the  e x i s t i n g  un iverse  in space and t ime from the  Greeks onward.]
15. I b i d . I f  t h i s  t r a c i n g  of  t h e  development of  Col l ingwood's  p h i lo -  
sophy o f  mind appears  t o  be kin t o  t h a t  o f  Rousseau,  i t  i s  only
a t a n g e n t i a l  appearance wherein both see man as so c ia l  and b e l i e v e  
in man's w i l l .  To d iverge  i n to  t h e  meaning o f  Rousseau l i e s  beyond 
t h i s  paper .  However, t o  t h e  degree t h a t  Kant admired Rousseau, 
Col l ingwood's th ough t  may be s a id  t o  emerge from the  same h i s t o r i ­
cal  p rem ises ,  c h i e f l y  with P l a t o .  Col l ingwood's  c r i t i q u e  of  the  
thought  o f  Kant must a l s o  be cons ide red .  P r im a r i l y ,  Rousseau never  
developed a d i a l e c t i c a l  form o f  knowledge nor  a complete phi losophy 
o f  mind al though t h e r e  a re  those  such as Donagan who would argue 
t h a t  n e i t h e r  did Collingwood.  In espousing a r e l i g i o u s  and an 
e t h i c a l  component, Engl ish idea l i sm  more n e a r ly  approaches Rousseau's  
though t .  Coll ingwood,  however, v igo rous ly  denied the  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  the  l abe l  " i d e a l i s t "  t o  h im se l f .  The a f f i n i t y  between C o l l in g ­
wood and Green i s ,  however, n o t ab l e  in  severa l  r e s p e c t s :  ( l ) i n  the
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  i n d iv idua l  and the  s o c ia l  community of  
which he i s  a member, ( 2 ) in  t h e  premise t h a t  government depends 
upon w i l l  and not  f o r c e ,  ( 3 ) in t h e  no t io n  t h a t  a comnunity o f  p e r ­
sons i s  a "Kingdom o f  ends" ,  not  means, ( 4 ) in t h e  idea t h a t  r i g h t  
has two elements:  (a)freedom o f  a c t i o n ,  and (b)a  so c ia l  r ec o g n i ­
t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  presumed in (a) i s  war ran ted .  Beyond Green, 
Collingwood a l t e r e d  the  concep t ion  o f  m e taphys ic s ,  h i s t o r y ,  and 
phi losophy o f  mind. For exampley.Col1ingwood did no t  support  an 
i d e a l i z e d  ve rs ion  of  l i b e r a l  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  Thereby,  he found 
support  f o r  h i s  con ten t ion  o f  the  growth of  " i r r a t i o n a l i s m "  beginning 
with t h e  l a t e  n in e t e e n th  cen tu ry  and con t inu ing  through both World 
wars .
16. Collingwood accepted the  Freudian exp lana t ion  o f  the  unconscious 
only t o  a degree.  He main ta ined  t h a t  p s yc ho log i s t s  should be 
e x p e r t s  in the  s tudy  of  f e e l i n g  and r e j e c t e d  claims made by the  
p ro fe s s io n  o u t s i d e  t h i s  f i e l d .  I t  can be noted he re  a l s o  t h a t  
Collingwood agreed with Descar tes  t h a t  the  b a s i s  o f  phi losophy l i e s  
in the  c o g i t o ,  i . e . ,  I t h in k  t h e r e f o r e  I am; t h u s ,  what I th ink  
a c t u a l l y  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  in  my experi ence .  Mind i s  the  o b j e c t  o f  
phi losophy.
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17. Hugh Walpole, "R. G. Collingwood and the  Idea o f  Language," 
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Wichita B u l l e t i n ,  No. 55, (May, 1963),  pp. 4-5.
18. The New L ev ia than , op. c i t . ,  5 .5 .
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26. I b i d . ,  8 .12 .
27.  I ^ . ,  8 .44 .
28.  I b i d . .  8 .51 -8 .54 .
29. I ^ . ,  8 .14 .
30. I b i d . .  8 .35 .
31. I b i d . .  11.22.
32. I b i d . For a good d i sc u s s io n  o f  t h e s e  i d e a s ,  see Louis 0. Mink. 
Mind. H i s to ry ,  and D i a l e c t i c :  The Phi losophy o f  R.G. Col l ingwood, 
(Bloomington: I n d ia n i a  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s .  1969),  Chapter  V.
33. I b i d . , 11.24.  In Chapter  6 o f  Hobbes's Levia than ,  the general  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  goal and motion i s  b u i l t  i n to  h i s  method. Motion 
towards o b j e c t s  con t inues  the  forward motion while  movement 
away ( c a l l e d  ave rs ion )  r e v e r s e s  the  motion.  The e n t i r e  system 
r e s t s  upon l o g i c .  Some o f  the  a p p e t i t e s  and avers ions  a r e  b u i l t  
i n t o  human na tu re  but  o t h e r s  a re  due t o  e x pe r ience .  This i s  a 
much s im ple r  system than t h a t  of  Col lingwood.  Both a p p e t i t e  and 
a v e r s i o n ,  in Coll ingwood. r i s e  from love o r  phys io log ica l  needs. 
The Hobbesian system i s  based upon the  ind iv idua l  whereas t h a t  of  
Collingwood i s  based upon the  s o c ia l  n a tu re  of  man and h i s t o r y .  
S i m i l a r l y .  Hobbes assumed a connect ion between the  motion of  
bodies  and motions o f  humankind. The l a t t e r  was assumed to  be 
connected with goods.  Collingwood p o s tu l a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  paradigm 
was no t  i n  accord with t h e  newer knowledge. F u r th e r ,  he be l i eved  
t h a t  the  p a r t i c u l a r s  o f  s c ie n c e  must ,  through h i s t o r y ,  g ive  way.
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be detached  from t h a t  found in law and custom w i th in  the  community.
38. I b i d . ,  11.68.
39. Essay on M etaphys ic s , op. c i t . ,  p.  11.
40. I b i d . ,  p. 39.
41. I b i d . , p. 40.
42.  Mink, Mind, H i s to r y ,  and D i a l e c t i c , op. c i t . .  Chapter  V.
43. I ^ . ,  pp. 124-25.
44.  John F. P o s t ,  "A Defense o f  Col l ingwood's  Theory o f  P re suppos i ­
t i o n s , "  I n q u i r y , Volume 8,  (1967) ,  p. 332.
45. Mink, Mind, H i s to r y ,  and D i a l e c t i c , op. c i t . ,  p.  131.
46. The New L e v ia th a n , op. c i t . ,  34.18 .  See Appendix C.
47. Collingwood b u i l t  h i s  p h i lo s o p h ica l  system throughout  h i s  s evera l
works never  bo the r ing  t o  show t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  and always
appearing t o  assume t h a t  each r e a d e r  had read what had gone on in
the  p rev ious  work. Even when he a l t e r e d  some of  h i s  c o n c ep t s ,  he
l e f t  the  d i scove ry  o f  t h i s  up to  t h e  r e a d e r  as w e l l .
48. Walpole, "R. G. Collingwood and th e  Idea o f  Language," op. c i t . ,
p.  6.
49.  The New L e v i a t h a n , op.  c i t . ,  12.28.
50. I ^ . ,  12 .3 .
51. I b i d . ,  10 .5 -10 .51 .
52. I b i d . , 10.48.  See a l s o  Speculum M enti s , pp. 245, 280-81.
In h i s  e s s a y ,  " A e s the t ic "  (1927) ,  Collingwood exp lo red  th e  psy ­
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CHAPTER I I I  
SOCIETY
P a r t  I I  of  Hobbes's Leviathan  and Pa r t  I I  o f  Col l ingwood's 
New Leviathan a re  concerned with s o c i e t y .  Collingwood approached t h i s  
term w i th in  a framework of  he rm eneu t ics ,  m e taphys ic s ,  and the  conc re te  
whole plus  the  concepts  p r e v io u s ly  developed in P a r t  I .  Perhaps the  
two i d e a s ,  those  o f  hermeneut ics  and metaphysics can b e s t  be i l l u s ­
t r a t e d  by p lac ing  a c u r r e n t  ph i lo s o p h e r  o f  hermeneut ics  a longs ide  
Col l ingwood's  double p h i lo soph ica l  concept  o f  the  rapprochement be­
tween metaphysics  and h i s t o r y .  Collingwood never  explored  hermeneutics  
as such;  Louis 0. Mink contends t h a t  h i s  ' l o g i c  o f  ques t ion  and answer'  
i s  b e t t e r  understood  as a "hermeneut ics"  s in c e  i t  i s  not  a theory  o f  
l o g i c  nor  a theo ry  o f  semant ic s .  The l o g i c  o f  ques t ion  and answer is
b e t t e r  comprehended as "s t ages  in  t h e  p rocess  o f  i n q u i r y  o r  o f  a c t i v e
2
thought  in  g e n e r a l . "  I t  i s ,  as  was po in ted  ou t  in P a r t  I o f  t h i s
work, a d i a l e c t i c  o f  ques t ion  and answer.  For example, Hans-Georg
Gadamer in Ph i lo soph ica l  Hermeneutics has expressed the  same concerns
as  has Collingwood in metaphysics  and h i s t o r y :
The ques t ion  o f  the  founda t ions  o f  an 
epoch, cen tu ry ,  o r  age i s  d i r e c t e d  a t  
something t h a t  i s  immediately obvious 
. . .  I t  sounds t r i v i a l  perhaps t o  say 
t h a t  t h e  foundat ions  o f  the tw e n t i e th  
cen tu ry  l i e  in  the  n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry .
[The t a s k  o f  ph i lo sophy]  has remained 
the  same to  the  p r e s e n t  day. The a n s ­
wers i t  has found in t h e  t h r e e  c e n tu r i e s  
o f  t h e  modern pe r iod  sound d i f f e r e n t ,  
but they a re  answers t o  the  same ques ­
t i o n .  Furthermore,  t h e  l a t e r  answers 
a re  not  p o s s ib l e  w i thou t  t h e  e a r l i e r  
ones and must be t e s t e d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  
a g a i n s t  them.3
Coll ingwood's  express io n  of  t h i s  idea  may be found in  his  Essay on
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Metaphysics:
All metaphysical ques t ions  a re  h i s ­
t o r i c a l  q u e s t i o n s ,  and a l l  metaphys i­
cal p ro p o s i t io n s  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  p ro ­
p o s i t i o n s .  Every metaphysical ques­
t i o n  e i t h e r  i s  s imply th e  ques t ion  
what a b s o lu t e  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  were 
made on a c e r t a i n  occas ion ,  o r  i s  
capable  o f  being reso lved  in to  a number 
o f  such ques t ions  t o g e t h e r  with a 
f u r t h e r  ques t ions  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  
these  . . .4
The hermeneut ical  approach can a l so  be i l l u s t r a t e d  through C o l l in g ­
wood's concept  o f  t h e  s t a t e  as  a concre te  u n i v e r s a l ,  an idea he ex-
5
plored  in  " P o l i t i c a l  Act ion" in 1929. Too o f t e n ,  observed C o l l in g ­
wood, the  s t a t e  has been taken to  be an a b s t r a c t  un ive r sa l  as i s  the  
case in p o l i t i c a l  s c ience  g e n e r a l l y ,  i . e . ,  where i t  i s  a substance 
having an essence  and a t t r i b u t e s .  Collingwood approached p o l i t i c a l  
theory  from ano the r  s t a n d p o i n t .  In t h e  p lace  of  the  q u e s t i o n ,  "What
6
are  the  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  a s t a t e ? "  he asked,  "What i s  p o l i t i c a l  ac t ion?"  
P a r t  I I  o f  both the  works of  Hobbes and Collingwood moved from a 
survey o f  the  ind iv idua l  through mind and a c t io n  as surveyed in P a r t  
I t o  t h e  concept of s o c ie ty  as  c o rpo ra te  a c t ion  and w i l l i n g  based upon 
ind iv idua l  cho ice .  Collingwood appeared to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  was ne c es s ­
ary t o  keep in  mind th e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  whole while  cons ide r ing  the  iden­
t i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s .  Within t h e  conc re te  u n i v e r s a l ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  be­
come e s s e n t i a l ,  t h a t  i s ,  each "'moment' o f  a c o nc re te  un ive r sa l  ex­
presses  a d i f f e r e n t  y e t  i d e n t i c a l  a spec t  o f  the  whole,  and so f a r  as
7
i t  if; d i f f e r e n t ,  c o n t r i b u t e s  e s s e n t i a l l y  to  the  u n i ty  of  the  whole." 
Bernard Bosanquet ' s  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  a conc re te  whole i s  very l i k e  t h a t  
o f  Collingwood:
A world o r  cosmos [ i s ]  . . . a system o f  
members, such t h a t  every member, being ex­
hypothes is  d i s t i n c t ,  n e v e r th e l e s s  c o n t r i ­
butes  t o  the  un i ty  o f  t h e  whole in v i r t u e  
o f  t h e  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  which c o n s t i t u t e  i t s  
d i s t i n c t n e s s  . . .  t he  important  po in t  . . . 
i s  the  d i f f e r e n c e  of  p r i n c i p l e  between a 
world and a c l a s s  . . . The u l t im a te  p r i n ­
c i p l e  . . .  i s  sameness in  o t h e r ;  u n i v e r ­
s a l i t y  i s  sameness by means o f  o t h e r . 8
The s t a t e ,  conceived o f  as a conc re te  u n i v e r s a l ,  i s  d i scovered  in  i t s  
essence only w i th in  an h i s t o r i c a l  concept  of  i t s  developed moments. 
Fu r the r ,  a comprehensive unders tand ing of  i t s  na tu re  presupposes  know­
ledge a t  each s t a g e  o f  i t s  development.  Collingwood b e l i eved  t h a t  
t h i s  understanding  requ i r ed  knowledge of  two types :  f i r s t ,  t h a t  of  
h i s t o r i c a l  knowledge o f  t h e  p a s t ,  and secondly,  the imagina t ive  r e ­
cons t ru c t io n  o f  what the  un iver sa l  has i d e a l l y  become. I t  i s  know­
ledge mediated by the  mind. The idea l  n a tu re  o f  the  s t a t e  i s  t o  be 
d iscovered through the  s tudy  of  i t s  concept ion as t h i s  occurs  wi th in
p o l i t i c a l  experi ence .  The conc re te  un ive r sa l  i s  synonymous with
experi ence .  For t h i s  r ea s o n ,  Collingwood a t t acked  a l l  r e a l i s t s .  To 
regard  the  s t a t e ,  as have the  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i s t s ,  as a permanent en­
t i t y  means t h a t  the  i nd iv idua l  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  which the  s t a t e  i s  
comprised must be ignored .  This same po in t  has r e c e n t l y  been em­
phasized by Robert A. Isaak in In d iv id u a l s  and World P o l i t i c s :
This pr imer  on world p o l i t i c s  assumes 
t h a t  i n d iv i d u a l s  do m a t t e r  . . .  In 
c o n t r a s t  to  most books in troduc in g  i n ­
t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  t h i s  one assumes 
t h a t  mere a b s t r a c t  t h e o r i e s  . . .  a r e  
not  as meaningful  to  human beings as 
p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  grow n a t u r a l l y  ou t  of  
c o n c re te ,  everyday expe riences  of  
people . . .9
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I f  the  s t a t e  deve lops ,  and concepts  o f  the  s t a t e  develop h i s t o r i c a l l y  
through the  experi ences  o f  a peop le ,  then an e s s e n t i a l  p o in t  t o  be 
cons idered i s  t h a t  the  moment to  moment h i s t o r i c a l  p res u p p o s i t i o n s  un­
d e r ly in g  t h a t  experi ence  as enjoyed by i t s  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  On C o l l i n g ­
wood's accoun t ,  p o l i t i c a l  experi ence  in  c l a s s i c a l  Greece,  as def ined  
by P l a to  in  the  Repub l ic , r e l i e d  upon the  p r e s u p pos i t ions  of  p o l i t i ­
cal experience  o f  t h a t  p e r io d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as found in  the  i d e a l s  of  
P l a t o ' s  con tempora r ie s .  Likewise ,  Hobbes 's  Leviathan can be con­
s id e r e d  to  be the  epitome of  the  thought  as  der ived  from the  i n t e r ­
weaving of  ideas  in  h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  e r a .  Each, d e c la re d  Collingwood,
Is  an example o f  dogmatic ph i losophy s in c e  each b e l i e ved  h imse lf  to  
be a speaker  f o r  a l l  t ime .  P l a t o  and Hobbes a r e  moments in  a s e r i e s  
o f  s p e c i e .  Today, an example o f  a s e r i e s  o f  spe c ie  w i th in  p o l i t i c a l
experience  as i t  i s  pe rce ived  in t h e  eyes o f  our  contemporar ies  may be
10
t h a t  o f  Henry S. Kar iel  in Beyond L ib e ra l i s m ,  Where R e la t ions  Grow. 
K a r i e l ,  as a modern p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  a l i e n a t e d  from the  m a jo r i t y  
o f  those  who p r a c t i c e  i t s  s tudy  as  a p r o f e s s i o n ,  f in d s  himse lf  con­
cerned with the  same c a t e g o r i e s  as a r e  Hobbes and Coll ingwood, i . e . ,  
t hose  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l ,  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  a c t i o n ,  and the  idea  o f  f r e e ­
dom in cho ice .  Undoubtedly,  t h e s e  a re  prime c a t e g o r i e s  o f  concern 
to  p o l i t i c a l  t h eo ry .  The problem as posed by Kariel  i s  t h a t  o f  the  
underly ing p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  i n h e r e n t  in  the  myth of  l i b e r a l i s m .  C o l l i n g ­
wood be l i eved  t h a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h ica l  ques t ion  concerning 
the  n a tu re  o f  the  s t a t e  cannot  be se p a r a te d  from the na tu re  o f  i t s  
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  Thus,  the  s t a t em en t  o f  Collingwood in  Speculum 
Mentis t h a t  the  " s t a t e  i s  an h i s t o r i c a l ,  no t  a s c i e n t i f i c  concep t ion—
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a c o n c re te ,  not  an a b s t r a c t  u n i v e r s a l "  can be summed in con junc t ion
with h i s  idea  t h a t  a p l u r a l i t y  o f  e s se nc e s ,  each exempl if ied  as a
spec ie s  o f  knowledge, can be seen in a s c a l e  o f  forms o r  a c t i v i t i e s ,
11
i . e . ,  a r t ,  r e l i g i o n ,  s c ie n c e ,  h i s t o r y ,  and ph i losophy.  Collingwood 
searched f o r  the  n a tu r e  o f  s o c i e t y  as a p a r t  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  w i th in  
the  concepts  ske tched  and y e t  a l s o  as c o r r e l a t e d  with t h e  concept  of 
an ove r l a p  in  a c t i v i t i e s  in mind proceeding d i a l e c t i c a l l y .
Col l ingwood's  approach t o  s o c i e t y  he rm eneu t i ca l ly  explored  the  
term by pa r ing  down i t s  usage i n t o  h i s t o r i c a l  e s s e n t i a l s .  As e l a ­
bo ra ted  by Collingwood, s o c i e t y  has two c u r r e n t  meanings. 'S o c i e t y '
s tands  f o r  a genus,  an ex tens ion  of  the  te rm,  s o c i e t y ,  an o l d e r  con- 
13 14
c e p t .  Both a r e  comprised o f  wholes and wholes a re  made up o f  p a r t s .
Soc ie ty  i s  d i s t i n c t  from c l a s s  because s o c i e t y  i s  an a c t i v i t y .  The 
term ' s o c i e t y '  in  modern European language i s  borrowed from the  voca­
bu la ry  o f  Roman law. "Socie tas  i s  a r e l a t i o n  between personae where-
15
by they  j o i n  t o g e t h e r  o f  t h e i r  own f r e e  w i l l  in j o i n t  a c t i o n . "
"Such a r e l a t i o n  comes in to  e x i s t e n c e  by what i s  c a l l e d  a ' s o c i a l
16
c o n t r a c t '  o r  a ' c o n t r a c t  o f  s o c i e t y  . . . "  "A ' s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t '  i s
a ' c o n s e n s u a l '  c o n t r a c t  . . .  ; i t s  e ssence  i s  s imple agreement  o f
17
wi l l  . . .  v a l i d  a t  law . .  ."  Three i n d i s p e n s a b le  e lements of  any
s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  a re :  ( l ) r e c i p r o c a l  agreement ,  (2)common i n t e r e s t ,
18
and ( 3 ) "a bona f i d e  i n t e n t i o n  to  form a p a r t n e r s h i p . "  There a r e
l ikew ise  t h r e e  o b l i g a t i o n s :  ( l ) t o  make a pe rsona l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to
the  p a r t n e r s h i p ,  ( 2 ) t o  promote the  o t h e r ' s  i n t e r e s t  as your  own, and
19
( 3 ) to  share  p r o f i t  and l o s s .  The Roman fo rm u la ' s  b a s ic  concept  was 
" the  idea t h a t  a c o n t r a c t  must be a j o i n t  a c t i v i t y  of  f r e e  a ge n ts .
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t h e i r  f r e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in a j o i n t  e n t e r p r i s e . "
A change in the  meaning o f  t h e  word, a f f e c t i n g  i t s  e s s e n t i a l s ,
occurred in the  l a t e  s even teen th  cen tu ry  with t h e  usage o f  the  term,
21
' s o c i e t y ' ,  to  c l a s s i f y  p l a n t s .  A. N. Whitehead, r epor ted  C o l l in g ­
wood, went a s t e p  f u r t h e r  when he a pp l i e d  the  term ' s o c i e t y '  to
22
e l e c t r o n s  making up an atom. Here, the term no longer  has connota­
t i o n s  o f  c l a s s .  Then,  concluded Collingwood, a ' s o c i e t y '  means some-
23
th ing  shared and "ass igned  a one-one r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  members." The
English language has not  chosen to  prov ide a word to  f i t  t h i s  idea .
24
" . . .  t he  word ' s o c i e t y ' ,  thus  used ,  imp l ie s  . . .  the  f a c t
which I c a l l  a suum cuique . . .  a one-one r e l a t i o n  between sha re r s
25
o r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and s h a r e s . "  Yet t h e r e  i s  a c o nd i t ion  where a
commonality can be sha red  where t h e r e  i s  no d i v i s i o n  as t h a t  found in 
26
' s o c i e t y ' .
The d i f f e r e n c e  between a ' s o c i e t y '  and a
s o c i e t y  i s  t h i s :  each o f  them has a suum
c u iq u e ; in each o f  them th e  members have a
sha re  in  something t h a t  i s  d iv ided  among 
them; bu t  in  a s o c i e t y  p roper  t h e  e s t a b ­
l ishment  and maintenance o f  the suum cuique 
i s  e f f e c t e d  by th e  j o i n t  a c t i v i t y  as f r e e  
a g e n t s . 27
This means t h a t  n o n - b e l i e f  in  f r e e  a c t i v i t y  r u l e s  ou t  a b e l i e f  in
s o c i e t y .  Collingwood be l i e v e d  t h a t  Karl Marx d id  j u s t  t h a t  because
the  c l a s s i c a l  economic o r d e r  was imposed by b r u t e  f o r c e ,  no t  a mean-
28
ing conta ined  in Col l ingwood's  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  term s o c i e t y .
This c r i t i c i s m  by Collingwood s p r in g s  from h i s  theo ry  of  metaphysics ,
exp la ined  as an h i s t o r i c a l  s c i e n c e  in  Essay on Metaphysics . Meta­
phys ics  has as i t s  base c e r t a i n  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  which a r e  performed
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by ( a ) r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  the  a b so lu te  p resuppos i t ions  of  p a s t  though t  in 
t h e  mind o f  the  m etaphys ic ian ,  and ( b )e x h i b i t i n g  th e  process  o f  change 
as one s e t  o f  p r e s u p pos i t ions  i s  exchanged f o r  ano the r  and th en ,  (c) 
c r i t i c i z i n g  them thereby  exposing l i m i t a t i o n s  and showing t h a t  t h es e  
have been overcome. Such an e x e r c i s e  i s  accompanied by the  s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  o f  two c r i t e r i a :  ( l ) t h e  l o g ic a l  c r i t e r i a  o f  " r i g h t n e s s " ,
and (2 ) the  guidance o f  a c r i t e r i o n  of  t r u t h  as o u t l i n e d  in Speculum
29
Mentis . By " r i g h t n e s s " ,  Collingwood i s  r e f e r r i n g  to  the  f a c t  t h a t  
he be l i eved  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  ac t i o n  and economic a c t io n  were n e a r ly  
always entwined with moral a c t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  both p o l i t i c a l  and 
economic a c t io n s  have an e t h i c a l  component. In t h i s  manner, the  meta­
phys ic ian  becomes an organ of  c o rp o r a te  consciousness  whereby a people 
c r i t i c i z e  themselves in o r d e r  to  c r e a t e  an i d e n t i t y  in the  same f a s h ­
ion as does the  s e l f .  According to  Collingwood, the  work o f  meta­
phys ics  as o u t l i n e d  i s  impor tan t  t o  s o c i e t y ' s  con t inuance .  The l i n k  
between metaphysics  and h i s t o r y  l i e s  in the  dimension wherein humanity 
d i scovers  i t s  freedom t o  choose a c t i o n .  Metaphysics and h i s t o r y  ex­
pose a d i a l e c t i c a l  h i s t o r y  o f  e r r o r s  r e s t i n g  upon two concep ts :  (a)  
t h a t  o f  ' l o g i c a l  e f f i c a c y '  wherein concepts  a r e  judged as ' r i g h t '  but  
no t  ' t r u e '  and ( b ) t h a t  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  change wherein one s e t  o f  p ro ­
p o s i t i o n s  i s  s lowly r ep laced  by ano the r  in a process  viewed as  a pro-
30
g res s ion  towards t r u t h .
Collingwood has taken i r f i n i t e  pains  t o  d e f in e  the  two terms,  
' s o c i e t y ' ,  as a s t a t e  of  a f f a i r s  wheresomething i s  div ided  o r  sha red ,  
and s o c ie ty  as a s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  wherein members a r e  r e l a t e d  by 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The term community i s  then s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  the  term
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' s o c i e t y '  ( o r  a s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  whereby something i s  div ided  or  s h a re d . )
Community, s o c i e t y ,  and c u l t u r e  a r e  the  bu i ld in g  blocks t o  Western
concept ions o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  and p o l i t i c a l  cho ice .  A community, in
becoming e s t a b l i s h e d ,  develops a suum cuique or  "communal h a b i t s  of  
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a c t i n g . "  A community l i v e s  c o rp o r a t e l y .  Soc ie ty  i s  a type of
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community sha r ing  so c ia l  consciousness  or  shar ing  a w i l l .  That i s ,
the  members have been h i s t o r i c a l l y  involved through th e  s o c i a l i z a t i o n
process  in  "an a c t  ( i n d i v i d u a l l y )  o f  decid ing to  become a member and
to  go on being a member: [ they  have] a w i l l  t o  assume the  func t ion
o f  p a r t n e r s h i p  with o the r s  in a common undertak ing  and a w i l l  to
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c a r ry  ou t  t h a t  f u n c t i o n . "
Social  consciousness  involves  the  
consciousness  o f  freedom. A s o c i e t y  
c o n s i s t s  o f  persons who a r e  f r e e  and 
know themselves t o  be f r e e  . . . What­
ever  i s  a s o c i e t y  must be a community,
be c aus |  a s o c i e t y  i s  a kind o f  community
A community emerges i n to  a s o c i e t y  from a non-soc ia l  community, t h a t
i s ,  from a community ru led  not  by i t s e l f  bu t  by f o r c e .  A c h i e f  d i f f e r ­
ence between community and s o c i e t y  l i e s  in  the  f a c t  t h a t  " so c i e ty  r u l e s  
i t s e l f  by the  a c t i v i t y  of  i t s  members' soc ia l  w i l l ;  a s o c i e t y  i s  a
" s e l f - r u l i n g  community" whereas t h e  "non-soc ia l  community needs f o r
35
i t s  e x i s t e n c e  to  be ru le d  by something o t h e r  than i t s e l f . "  The 
rea de r  should be reminded he re  t o  delay judgment o f  the  foregoing 
argument u n t i l  i t  has been p resen ted  in  i t s  e n t i r e t y .  F i r s t ,  as con­
ceived  by Collingwcod,  the  argument w i l l  proceed d i a l e c t i c a l l y  which 
may imply a p rogre ss ion  although i t  i s  e qua l ly  as p o s s ib l e  to  r e g r e s s .  
Secondly,  the  idea of  h i s t o r y ,  which i s  p r e s e n t  in t h e  formation of
-61-
a community, i s  i t s e l f  found in a s c a l e  o f  forms,  always in  p rocess .  
Thus, a people ,  a conmunity,  o r  a s o c i e t y ,  becoming aware o f  l i m i t a ­
t i o n s  o r  e r r o r s  in  i t s  b e l i e f s  o r  th in k in g  f o rc e s  new ques t io n s  to  
a r i s e .  Experience i s  then r e c o n s t i t u t e d  in  o r d e r  to  so lve  new pro­
blems demanding s o l u t i o n s .  The New Leviathan i s  w r i t t e n  in the  l an g ­
uage of d i a l e c t i c a l  l o g i c  so t h a t  the  idea  o f  a s t a t e  c o n s t a n t ly  under­
goes r e v i s i o n .  There i s  no f i n a l  q u e s t i o n ,  "What i s  a s t a t e ? "  I t  is  
r a t h e r  a ques t ion  s u s ta in e d  th roughout  h i s t o r y .
Ru ling ,  accord ing  t o  Col lingwood,  may be of two ty p e s :  imma­
nent  and t r a n s u e n t ;  immanent r u l e  implies  t h a t  the  r u l e r  and the  ru led
a re  the same th in g  in a c t i v i t y  while  t r a n s e u n t  r u l e  i s  t h a t  "which
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r u l e s  something o t h e r  than i t s e l f . "  Immanent ru l i n g  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  
r u l e  i s  both s e l f - o r i g i n a t i n g  and s e l f - m a in t a in i n g  al though t h i s
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cannot  apply to  t h e  members’ dependents  as in t h e  case of  c h i l d r e n .
In a p a r t i a l  r e p l y  t o  those  rea d e r s  who may f e e l  t h a t  he o r  she is  
excluded from community, Collingwood averred  t h a t  the  term, ' f o r c e '  
w i th in  a so c ia l  community having immanent r u l e  "never  means 'phys ica l  
f o r c e '  but  'moral f o r c e '  or  mental s t r e n g t h .  Moral f o rc e  i s  r e l a t i v e .  
Mental s t r e n g th  may t ake  the  forms o f  p a s s io n ,  w i l l ,  mental develop­
ment o r  d e s i r e  bu t  "development  from any s tage  to  the  next  above i t  i s
c on d i t io n a l  on a c e r t a i n  qu iescence  in the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  lower
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and i s  impeded by any v io le n c e  on t h e i r  p a r t .  . . "  To s u f f e r  f o r c e ,
a person f i n d s  t h a t  " the  o r i g i n  of  the  f o rc e  i s  always something w i th -  
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in himself  . . (Obviously,  Collingwood was r e f e r r i n g  to  a p o s s i ­
b le  d i a l e c t i c a l  development he re  which may move in  e i t h e r  d i r e c t i o n . )
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Collingwood has been d i s c u s s i n g ,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  t he  element
of  s oc ia l  c o n t r a c t  by t u rn in g  t o  h i s t o r y ,  t r a c i n g  the  o r i g i n  o f  the
term s o c i e t y  as i t  developed in  Roman law and the  experi ence  o f  the
European people as i t  reshaped i t s e l f  dur ing the  f i r s t  f i f t e e n  cen-
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t u r i e s  o f  the  C h r i s t i a n  e r a .  In summation, Collingwood found the  
fo l lowing  to  be the  c h i e f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  modern European s o c i e t y :
(1 )S oc ie ty  i s  a p a r t n e r s h i p ,  between persons 
e x e rc i s in g  a f r e e  w i l l . 41
(2)A soc ia l  c o n t r a c t  e x i s t s  only when i t  i s  
consensual  through d e c l a r a t i o n .42
{3 )0 b l ig a t io n  in t h e  s o c ia l  c o n t r a c t  is  
l im i t e d  t o  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  the  common 
aim.43
(4 )Soc ie ty  i s  t h e  s ha r ing  of  so c ia l  cons­
c iousness  w i thou t  economic i m p l i c a t i o n s . ^ ^
Social  consciousness  a r i s e s  from f r e e  w i l l  and i s  always r e -
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l a t e d  t o  the  concept  o f  something o t h e r  than i t s e l f .  I t  i s  a f r e e
agen t .  A person ,  t o  engage in  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  must be aware of  hi s  
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a l l o t t e d  s h a re .  Ruling i s  perhaps the  only a c t i v i t y  of  a s o c i e t y .
This so c ia l  consciousness  can be c o n t r a s t e d  with t h a t  found in a
non-soc ia l  community where members sha re  a communal o rde r  he ld  t o -
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g e t h e r  by "some fo rce  brought  t o  bea r  upon them." Social  cons­
c iousness  comprises an awareness  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y  as well  as
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a un ive r sa l  s o c i e t y .  " . . .  t h e  aim of  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y  i s
always twofold . . t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  so c ia l  r e l a t i o n s  and the
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aim o f  pursuing a p a r t i c u l a r  e n t e r p r i s e .  Collingwood did not  be­
l i e v e  t h a t  a un iver sa l  s o c i e t y  could be r e a l i z e d  in  an a c tua l  s o c i e t y
50
because the  f a c t s  o f  h i s t o r y  d i spu te d  i t s  p o s s i b i l i t y .  The reason
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f o r  t h i s ,  as p re se n ted  by Collingwood, was t h a t  " t r a ce s  of  the  non­
s o c ia l  community ou t  o f  which i t  has emerged" remain.  Social  cons-
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c iousness  and i t s  aims remain incomple te .
Membership in  a s o c i e t y  presupposes  e q u a l i t y  and i n e q u a l i t y .
I n e q u a l i t i e s  a r e  compensated,  tu rned  in to  a s s e t s ,  o r  b u i l t  upon by
t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  i t s  members. I n e q u a l i t i e s  a r i s e  from the  na tu ra l
endowments o f  members ; t h e s e  endowments a re  not  inna te  but  "are  pro-
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duc ts  o f  p r e - s o c i a l  e x p e r i e n c e s . "  Au thor i ty  in a non-soc ia l  commun- 
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i t y  i s  f o r c e .
Reward and punishment have no weight  with 
f r e e  men, and the  theo ry  of  them has no 
p lace  in t h e  theory  o f  s o c i e t y .  I t  belongs 
to  the  theo ry  o f  t h e  non-soc ia l  community 
t o  which i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  . . . so long as the  
men thus  c o n t r o l l e d  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f o o l i s h ,  
they  can be j u s t  as  e a s i l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by an 
i n s i n c e r e  o r  imposs ib le  promise as by a t r u t h ­
fu l  one . . .54
Then, t h e  " c o r rup t ing  in f lu e n c e  o f  power" a r i s e s  by a r e tu rn  to  a
non-soc ia l  community. "Power means t h e  e x e rc i s e  of  fo rc e ;  i t  i s  the
c o r r u p t io n  o f  a member's w i l l .  Should s o c i e t a l  manbers degenerate
from f r e e  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  s o c i e t y  may r e v e r t  back to  a non-soc ia l
community. To p reven t  t h i s ,  two s t e p s  can be taken :  when the  s o c ie ty
i s  o rg an iz ed ,  " the  duty o f  given o rde r s  [can be] ass igned to  those  .
. . "  who can b e s t  r e s i s t  so c ia l  s t r a i n s  op! t he  machinery can be so
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des igned  as to  remove th e  l e a d e r  whose w i l l  gives  way. Such mach­
ine ry  i s  found in c r imina l  law al though t h i s  " is  no t  a un iversa l
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f e a t u r e  o f  s o c ia l  l i f e . "
Crime i s  an a c t i o n  by one member of  a 
s o c i e t y  p r e j u d i c i a l  no t  t o  t h e  r i g h t s
-64-
of  ano the r  member but  t o  the  p u r s u i t  o f  
i t s  s e l f - a p p o i n t e d  t a s k  by the  s o c i e t y  as 
a whole.  This i s  a somewhat l a t e l y  invented  
idea  in  the  h i s t o r y  of  law;  among t h e  a n c ie n t  
Greeks and many s o - c a l l e d  p r i m i t i v e  peoples  
i t  i s  unknown; even among t h e  Romans i t  ex ­
i s t s  on ly  in an i n c i p i e n t  fo rm .57
Where crime o c c u r s ,  the  s o c i e t y  has a l r e ady  to  some e x t e n t  become a 
non-soc ia l  community. While no s o c i e t y  l a s t s  f o r e v e r ,  t h e r e  a re  p e r ­
manent and temporary e n t e r p r i s e s .  I t  must be remembered t h a t  a
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s o c i e t y  i s  formed t o  j o i n t l y  execu te  an e n t e r p r i s e .
A fami ly  i s  a good example o f  a mixed community s in c e  i t  con­
t a i n s  both a s o c i e t y  and a non-soc ia l  community, the  nu r se r y .  The
aim o f  most European marr iages  i s  p r o c r e a t io n  and i t s  base i s  the 
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soc ia l  c o n t r a c t .  I t s  j o i n t  w i l l  v a r i e s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  p a r tn e r s  
t o  the  c o n t r a c t  in  regard  t o  a u t h o r i t y  according to  custom; i t  i s  
based upon the  no t ion of  choice  or  freedom as a p a r t n e r  to  t h e  soc ia l  
c o n t r a c t .  The d i a l e c t i c a l  process  o f  negat ing th e  non-soc ia l  element 
and the emergence o f  a so c ia l  community can be viewed in  two Steps:  
( l ) a  s oc ia l  consciousness  i s  developed through p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o r  (2 )a 
vague awareness o f  human so c ia l  na tu re  may lead t o  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t i e s  in the  community. Most l i k e l y ,  both w i l l  occur .  
The r e s u l t  i s  the  emergence o f  a s o c i e t y  from a mixed community. 
Parenthood i s  an o b j e c t  o f  w i l l  and the  d i a l e c t i c a l  development of 
soc ia l  consciousness  proceeds from th e  l e a d e r s h i p  of the  r u l e r s  over 
the  ru led .
The h i s t o r y  of  a non-soc ia l  community t u rn i n g  in to  a so c ie ty  
shows the  l i m i t a t i o n s  in concept ions o f  s o c i e t y .  F i r s t ,  in  Greece,
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we f i n d  t h a t  c i t i z e n s h i p  was q u i t e  l i m i t e d .  F u r th e r ,  the  aim of  soc-  
e i t y  was div ided in to  pu b l i c  and p r i v a t e  sphe res .  Ancient  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  and p o l i t i c a l  theory  were born in  t h e  c i t y  whereas medieval p o l i ­
t i c a l  l i f e  and theory  were t h e o r i e s  of  the  s t a t e ;  h e r e ,  however, an
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impor tan t  change occurred in  the  concept ion o f  the body p o l i t i c .
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I t  had become but  a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  human animals .  Soc ial  r e l a t i o n s
were maintained by means of  ' e s t a t e s '  so t h a t  one ' e s t a t e '  was supreme
over t h e  o t h e r s .  By th e  l a t e  Middle Ages, a new concept ion o f  the
body p o l i t i c  emerged; t h e r e  were sovere igns  and s u b je c t s  as wel l as
l i b e r t i e s  given t o  s u b j e c t s .  As was observed by M ach iave l l i ,  t h i s
p a t t e r n  began t o  break down in the Renaissance.  While a l l e g i a n c e  was
purchased through th e  bestowal o f  l i b e r t i e s ,  the  end r e s u l t  was bank-
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rup tcy  f o r  the  p r in c e .  The power of  the  p r inc e  lay  only in the
w i l l  of  h i s  s u b j e c t s .  There i s  a f u r t h e r  problem: l i b e r t y  given has
63
not  i n su red  a l i k e  concept  o f  o b l i g a t i o n .  For Col lingwood,  t h e  g r e a t
d iscovery o f  Hobbes what t h a t  he recognized  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  theo ry  was
d i a l e c t i c a l ,  t h a t  t h e  Engl ish s u b je c t s  of  t h a t  e ra  had achieved a
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so c ia l  l i f e  and cou ld ,  t h e re b y ,  confe r  a u t h o r i t y .  This s o lu t i o n  had
been worked out  by P la to  when he d i s t i n g u i s h e d  two types o f  d i s c u s s io n s :
the  e r i s t i c a l  and the  d i a l e c t i c a l .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between the  two is
t h a t  a d i a l e c t i c a l  aims t o  r e c o n c i l e  a ppa ren t ly  opposing views while
an e r i s t i c a l  d i sc u s s io n  aims t o  prove only t h a t  each d i s c u s s a n t  i s  
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r i g h t .
Collingwood held t h a t  t h e r e  were t h r e e  laws of  p o l i t i c s  holding 
good in every body p o l i t i c :  ( l ) " t h a t  a body p o l i t i c  i s  div ided  i n to  a
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r u l i n g  c l a s s  and a ru le d  c l a s s , "  ( t h a t  i t  has a nurse ry)  ( 2 ) " t h a t  the
b a r r i e r  between the  two c l a s s e s  i s  permeable in an upward se n se " ,  and
( 3 ) t h a t  the  " r e l a t i o n  between th e  two have t o  be solved by the  coun-
66
o i l .  These t h r e e  problems make up the  " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  problem."
Because t h es e  problems remain and cannot  be solved f o r  a l l  t im e ,  the  
s t a t e  Is a permanent s o c i e t y .  The re fo re ,  i t  cannot  'w i th e r  away’
In Marxian terms.  For the  same r eason ,  s o c i e t y  cannot  be viewed, as 
Spengler  does,  as developing in s t a g e s  of  growth s i m i l a r  to  the  v i s ­
ions o f  Cavour and Bismark. A s imple a n a l y s i s  o f  the  s t a t e  r e v e a l s  
t h a t  i t  no t  on ly  r e s t s  upon th e  ru le d  and th e  r u l e r s  bu t  a l s o  p r e ­
sumes t h a t  t h e  members have reached a mental  s t a g e  of  development
where they  can e x h i b i t  a w i l l .  "Will depends on freedom; and freedom
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Is  a m a t t e r  o f  de g re e . "  Due to  the  d i f f e r e n t  degrees  o f  develop­
ment in  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  make a de c i s io n  by those  who r u l e ,  t h e r e  i s  a
" m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  graded s u b - c l a s s e s "  o r  a h i e r a rc h y  based upon s t r e n g t h  
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o f  w i l l .  The h i e r a r c h y  r e p e a t s  i t s e l f  in t h e  ru le d  c l a s s  a l though 
here  t h e  subd iv i s io n  i s  based upon what Collingwood has termed "induc­
t i o n . "  Induct ion means " the i n s p i r a t i o n  o f  a weak w i l l  by a s t r o n g e r  
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one ."  " . . .  induc t io n  i s  not  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from e d u c a t io n . "
Always between the  r u le d  and th e  ru l i n g  c l a s s ,  t h e r e  i s  a vigorous 
e f f o r t  on the  p a r t  o f  t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s  t o  t r a i n  t h e  ru le d  c l a s s  in 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n .  Collingwood expressed  t h i s  as a " p e r c o la t io n "  of  
freedom th roughout  the  body p o l i t i c .  Whether the  freedom p e rc o l a t e s  
upward or  downward makes l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e .  I t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  the  "ad­
vancement o f  f reedom," the  development o f  the  " a b i l i t y  to  solve p o l i -
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t i c a l  problems" which i s  im por tan t .  ". . . freedom in the  r u l i n g
-67-
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c la s s  i s  nothing l e s s  than the  f a c t  t h a t  the  r u l i n g  c l a s s  r u l e s  . . . "
By t h i s ,  Collingwood meant t h a t  when th e  r u l i n g  c l a s s  ceased  t o  r u l e ,  
as was the case  in Nazism and Fascism, the  r u l i n g  c l a s s  has l o s t  t h i s  
freedom and has opened the  ga te s  o f  human i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  The doc­
t r i n a i r e  democrat  as wel l as the  d o c t r i n a i r e  a r i s t o c r a t  both deny 
the  f i r s t  law o f  p o l i t i c s  because each only p a r t i a l l y  answers the
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ques t ion :  "How s h a l l  we make th e  r u l i n g  c l a s s  as s t r ong  as pos s ib l e ?"
Both democrats and a r i s t o c r a t s  a r e  but  t h e  p o s i t i v e  and nega t ive  a s -
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pec ts  of  a d i a l e c t i c a l  p roce s s .  What both democrats and a r i s t o c r a t s  
do i s  to  f a l s e l y  a b s t r a c t  from th e  e n t i r e  process  two opposing elements 
which a re  each p a r t s  o f  the  whole.  Collingwood exp la ined  t h i s  a p p a r ­
e n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  in  t h e  fol lowing manner:
The r i s e  o f  d o c t r i n a i r e  democracy o r  
d o c t r i n a i r e  a r i s t o c r a c y  happens when 
t h e s e  elements a re  cons ide red  in  f a l s e  
a b s t r a c t i o n  from the  process  t o  which 
they be long ,  and then cons idered  e r i s -  
t i c a l l y  as  competing f o r  the  p o l i t i c i a n ' s  
l o y a l t y .  . . 76
False  a b s t r a c t i o n  i s  the  same th in g  com­
p l i c a t e d  by a f a l sehood  . . . t h a t  these  
two o p p o s i t e  e lements  a r e  m u t u a r y  i n ­
dependent  and h o s t i l e  e n t i t i e s . ' /
Ear ly  modern Europe,  o r  Christendom, renounced th e  Greek ques t
f o r  supe r  r u l e r s  because,  so o f t e n ,  experi ence  showed t h a t  they  could
e a s i l y  t u rn  i n t o  t y r a n t s .  N e i th e r  in Greek nor  in Roman p o l i t i c a l
though t  was the  concept  o f  a r i s t o c r a t i c  e lements  w i th in  the  democrat ic
elements a b o l i s h e d .  Both t e rm s ,  'demos' and ' p o p u l u s , '  have an a r i s -  
78
t o c r a t i c  f l a v o r .  These concepts  su rv ived  in t h e  Papacy, in the  
Empire, and in f euda l ism .  By th e  end o f  the  Middle Ages, the
-68-
democrat i c  e lement  was con ta ined  in  common law whereas t h e  a r i s t o -
79
c r a t i c  e lement  was con ta ined  in  Roman law. Thus, t h e  Hobbesian
a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  a Tudor monarchy was democracy pushed to  a l og ica l  
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conc lus ion .  For the  same rea son ,  t h e  French Revolut ion cannot  be
seen as e n t i r e l y  democrat i c  as i t  was a l s o  a r i s t o c r a t i c  due to  the
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  b o u rgeo i s ie  was t h e  " o r ig in a l  body c o rp o r a te ly  possessed 
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o f  economic power."
P o l i t i c a l  thought  in t h e  n ine teen th  
cen tu ry  f o r  t h e  most p a r t  allowed i t ­
s e l f  t o  be dazzled p a r t l y  by the  French 
Revolut ion . . .  and p a r t l y  by a mis­
unders tand ing  o f  i t s  n a tu r e ;  f a i l e d  to
. . . apprehend i t  c o n t i n u i t y  with the 
long h i s t o r i c a l  process  . . . f a i l e d  to 
see i t  as the  l e g i t i m a t e  o f f s p r in g  o f  
t h a t  p rocess  . . .82
In f a c t ,  a s s e r t e d  Coll ingwood, t h e  whole not ion o f  a " re vo lu t ion"  was
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due to  "bad h i s t o r y . "  The h i s t o r i a n  o f  the  seventeen th  and e igh te en th
c e n t u r i e s  had a l i n e a r  concep t ion o f  h i s t o r y .  Today, t h e  use o f  the
word ' r e v o l u t i o n '  has f a l l e n  out  o f  use by h i s t o r i a n s  a l though i t
remains in the  vocabulary  o f  p o l i t i c s ;  in the  l a t t e r ,  i t s  tone is
p r im a r i l y  emot iona l .  Changes such as the  French Revolut ion must be
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seen as a p a r t  o f  the  " d i a l e c t i c a l  process  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e . "
Both family l i f e  and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  have ind ispensab le  e lements 
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of  f o r c e .  S ince ,  however, a body p o l i t i c  i s  based on the  idea t h a t  
t h e  ru led  must e v e n tu a l l y  become r u l e r s ,  then the  degree o f  freedom 
o r  w i l l -pow er  in the  ru le d  should not  be f o r g o t t e n .  This l i m i t a t i o n ,  
in  p r a c t i c e ,  means: ( l ) a  r u l e r  must no t  b l u f f  unless  the b l u f f  can
-6 9 -
be enforced ,  (2)a  r u l e r  must never  l i e  un le s s  the  l i e  can s tand  or  
no t  be found ou t ;  ( 3 ) a r u l e r  must no t  p r a c t i c e  d e c e i t  o r  hypocrisy I f  
he can be found o u t .  These ideas  f i t  wi th  the  d i a l e c t i c  of  a r i s t o ­
cracy/democracy.  The a r i s t o c r a c y  i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  f o r c e  while  the
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democracy i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  se lf -gove rnm en t .  An e r r o r  o f  the
n ine t e en th  cen tu ry  was t o  imagine t h a t  t h e  e r i s t i c a l  p rocess  could
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rep la ce  the  d i a l e c t i c a l  p roce s s .  This i s  a dangerous idea  because 
when an opposing opponent in  a d i a l e c t i c a l  process  f a i l e s  t o  under­
s tand  the  d i a l e c t i c ,  the  r e s u l t  i s  an e r i s t i c a l  b a t t l e .
Without the  t h r e e  r u l e s  o f  p o l i t i c s ,  t h e r e  i s  no so c ia l  l i f e .  
P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  can be equated wi th  w i l l ,  i . e . ,  t he  j o i n t  w i l l  of
the  s o c i e t y ,  w i l l  e x e rc i s e d  as s e l f  r u l e ,  and w i l l  e x e rc i s e d  as fo rce
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on th e  non- soc ia l  community. Will does not  need to  be r a t i o n a l .
Here,  the  extreme importance a t t a c h e d  by Collingwood to  language can 
be viewed. I f ,  w i thout  language,  t h e r e  can be no though t ,  then w i th ­
out  language,  t h e r e  can be no d i a l e c t i c a l  p roces s .  An e r i s t i c a l  p ro ­
c e s s ,  on the  c o n t r a ry ,  can go on w i thou t  thought  because i t s  aim i s  
v i c t o r y ;  he re ,  v io lence  o r  f o rc e  i s  in o r d e r .  A d i a l e c t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  
process  aims a t  agreement .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  Par l i aments  a re
e s t a b l i s h e d .  I t  i s  t h e  deba t ing  forum f o r  t h e  j o i n t  w i l l  to  work
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through the  necessa ry  d i a l e c t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  A command i ssued  by a
s o c i e t y  upon the  non-soc ia l  community does ,  o r  may, involve fo rc e .
Yet , the  "more completely the  whole body p o l i t i c  can sha re  in  i t s
88
r u l e r s '  w i l l " ,  the  s t r o n g e r  w i l l  be the  body p o l i t i c .
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A "decree i s  the  s im ples t  form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n " ;  as the
s im p les t  form o f  w i l l ,  i t  i s  " ca p r ic e  t ransposed  in to  the  key of  
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p o l i t i c s . "  Three forms of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  correspond to  r eason ;
t h e s e  a re :  u t i l i t y ,  r i g h t n e s s ,  and duty.  As with ind iv idua l  a c t i o n ,
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p o l i t i c a l  u t i l i t y  implies  a " d i s t i n c t i o n  between ends and means."
A p o l i t i c a l  end i s  t h e  j o i n t  w i l l  o f  the  r u l i n g  c l a s s  f o r  the  e n t i r e
body p o l i t i c  imposed by fo rce  al though i t  " i s  immediately expressed
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as t h e  o b j e c t  o f  a de c re e . "  Such p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  po l ic y .
The end i s  an o b je c t  o f  w i l l  pursued by
th e  r u l i n g  c l a s s :  t h e  means i s  an o b j e c t
o f  w i l l  pursued by a r u l i n g  c l a s s  in  o r d e r  
the reby  to  r e a l i z e  t h e  e n d . 92
Since the  means e n t a i l s  achievement  o f  t h e  end, i t  i s  unnecessary f o r
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th e  r u l i n g  c l a s s  t o  exp la in  the  means; t h e  "end may be concea led ."
This i s  a Machiavel l ian form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c i t o n ;  moral ques t ions  l i e
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o u t s i d e  the  realm o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n  o r  q u e s t ions .
The second r a t i o n a l  form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  i s  law which i s  
r e g u l a r l a n  a c t i o n  in  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  form.  As with the  i n d iv i d u a l ,  such 
a c t io n  involves  two d e c i s io n s :  ( l ) " a  g e n e ra l i z e d  dec is ion  to  do many
th in g s  o f  a s p e c i f i c  kind on occasions o f  a s p e c i f i c  kind",  and (2)
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"an in d iv i d u a l i z e d  dec is ion  to  do one a c t  of  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  kind now."
This i s  c a l l e d  law and th e  a c t  of  making i t  i s  c a l l e d  l e g i s l a t i o n .
Compulsion here  o f  the  r u l e r s  upon th e  ru le d  i s  c a l l e d  adm ini s te r ing  
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th e  law. In Europe, l e g i s l a t i o n  as a normal p o l i t i c a l  a c t  begins  to
appear  in the  t h i r t e e n t h  cen tu ry ;  i t  i s  customary law r a t h e r  than p o s i -
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t i v e  law because i t  involved no l e g i s l a t i o n .  Law, f o r  the  Greeks,  
meant custom. The formal essence o f  law i s :  ( l ) " t h a t  i t  should be an
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a c t  o f  w i l l  on t h e  p a r t  o f  the  r u l e r s , "  and ( 2 ) " th a t  i t  should be
obeyed by the  r u l e r s  t hem se lves ,"  and ( 3 ) " th a t  i t  should be obeyed by
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members o f  the non-soc ia l  community." The ' m a t e r i a l '  e ssence  o f  law
i s  i t s  s p e c i f i e d  mode o f  l i f e .  I t  i s  much b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  body p o l i t i c
t o  be ab le  t o  unders tand  law because enforcement  o therwise  involves
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not  only a l o s s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  bu t  huge expense as w e l l .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  law thus  does no t  need l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  be e f f e c t i v e ;
indeed,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i s  very old customary law da t ing  back to  the  
100
I s l a n d i c  sagas.
The t h i r d  form o f  r a t i o n a l  ac t ion  is  duty.
A man's duty i s  a th in g  which f o r  him in 
h i s  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n ,  both i n t e r n a l l y  or  
with r e s p e c t  t o  h i s  ' c h a r a c t e r '  and e x t e r ­
n a l l y  o r  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  h i s  ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' ,  
i s  both p o s s i b l e  and necessa ry :  something 
he can f r e e l y  dec id e  to  d o . T00
Duty as a form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  i s  the  
case where a dec i s io n  made by a ru l i n g  
c l a s s  and enforced by them upon the  c o r r e s ­
ponding ru le d  c l a s s  i s  made because no a l ­
t e r n a t i v e  i s  p o s s i b l e . '01
In du ty ,  the  element o f  c a p r i c e  has d i sappeared .  Choice i s  now
l im i t e d  to  one a l t e r n a t i v e ;  t h a t  i s  the  only way open.
The idea o f  a c t i o n  as duty . . . i s  i n ­
e v i t a b l e  t o  a person who cons ide r s  i t  
h i s t o r y i c a l l y .  H is to ry  i s  the  s c ience  
o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l ;  t h e  i nd iv idua l  i s  the 
unique;  . . .  The more a man accustoms 
h imse lf  t o  t h in k in g  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e  more 
he w i l l  accustom h im se l f  t o  t h ink ing  what 
course o f  a c t i o n  i t  i s  h i s  duty to  do, as 
d i s t i n c t  from asking  what i t  i s  exped ien t  
f o r  him t o  do and what i t  i s  r i g h t  f o r  him 
to do . . .102
P o l i t i c a l  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  as a t h e o r y ,  was i n e v i t a b l e  t o  the
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a n c i e n t s ,  the  m e d i e v a l i s t s ,  and to  Renaissance man who drew from those  
two s o u rc e s .  I t  was a d o c t r i n e  u t i l i z e d  in the  n ine t e en th  cen tu ry  by 
l i b e r a l s  as  a concession to  an i n d u s t r i a l  and commercial s i t u a t i o n .
The im p l ic a t i o n s  o f  what Collingwood has been saying w i l l  be taken 
up in the  next  c h a p te r .
As in p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n ,  t h e r e  a re  t h r e e  l o g i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t  
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s t a g e s  in p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  "The f i r s t  s t a g e  i s  s o c i e t y , "  "a j o i n t
a c t i v i t y  of  va r ious  w i l l s  in  which a number of  persons i m a n e n t l y  r u l e  
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them se lves . "  "The second s t a g e  i s  t r a n s e u n t  r u l e "  whi le  the  t h i r d
s ta g e  i s  t h e  a c t i v i t y  whereby t h e  body p o l i t i c  a t t e n d s  t o  problems
a r i s i n g  ou t  o f  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with o t h e r  bodies  p o l i t i c , "  e x te rna l
p o l i t i c s .  These s t a g e s  e x i s t  in  a s e r i e s  and each l o g i c a l l y  p r e -  
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supposes  t h e  o t h e r .  Problems connected wi th  t r a n s u e n t  r u l e  a r e
i n t e r n a l ;  they must be con fron ted  by a j o i n t  s o c ia l  consciousness
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and a j o i n t  soc ia l  w i l l .  " In t e rn a l  p o l i t i c s  presupposes  so c ia l  o r  
107
immanent r u l e . "  The s t a g e s  r e p r e s e n t  s e p a r a t e  d i a l e c t i c a l  Hera-
c l i t a n  wor lds .  "The d i a l e c t i c  o f  s o c i e t y  i s  t h e  conversion o f  what
begins  as a non-soc ia l  community i n t o  a s o c ia l  community," a l though
the  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  remains incomple te .  F u r th e r ,  the  o pe ra t ion  of  the
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d i a l e c t i c  i s  conscious .
Thinking h i s t o r i c a l l y  about  p o l i t i c s  w i l l  
produce [ q u e s t i o n s ] ,  w i l l  ask,  . . .  how 
they can do the  one th in g  which i s  open to  
them as s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g  men, conscious of  
t h e i r  severa l  freedom and each o t h e r ' s ,  
agreeing upon a j o i n t  a c t i o n  in doing 
which each w i l l  be doing h i s  d u t y . 108
The im p l ic a t i o n s  of  Col l ingwood's  ideas  here  a re  profound in terms of
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the  f am i ly ,  o f  r e l a t i o n s  between the  sexes as well as in terms of  
product ion/consumption and ideas  of  the p r i v a t e / p u b l i c  dichotomy. 
Collingwood has d i scussed  h i s  ideas  upon educat ion r a t h e r  randomly 
throughout  hi s  severa l  works. Taken s e r i o u s l y ,  t h e s e  a r e ,  in t h e i r  
t o t a l  a s p e c t ,  r e v o l u t io n a ry  indeed,  perhaps going beyond his  own 
v i s io n .
Collingwood s t r e s s e d  in va r ious  ways the  importance o f  the
d i a l e c t i c  in i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s  which is  the  "conversion o f  a ruled
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c l a s s  i n t o  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  in the  a c t  o f  ru l i n g  . .  ." In case the  
a c t  o f  r u l i n g  i s  not  an a c t  o f  w i l l ,  what i s  c i r c u l a t e d  throughout  
the  body p o l i t i c  i s  s e r v i l i t y ;  the  t h i r d  law of  p o l i t i c s  opera tes  
n e g a t i v e l y .  Should the  ru l i n g  c la s s  become e n t i r e l y  d i a l e c t i c ,  every 
element  o f  f o r c e  would be e l im ina te d .  Because th e r e  i s  a p roport iona l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  harmonious elements  of  the  r u l i n g  c l a s s  to  
t h a t  of  the  r u l e d ,  the  mere g ran t ing  o f  a c o n s t i t u t i o n  never  achieves 
more than th e  r u l i n g  group a lready had t o  g ive  and thus can accomplish 
nothing wi thou t  coopera t ion  and harmonious so c ia l  awareness by the 
r u l e r s .  Elements o f  f o r c e  in  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  of  a commun­
i t y  a r e  due t o :  ( 1 ) " p o l i t i c a l  immaturi ty  on the  p a r t  of  the  ru le d ; "
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and ( 2 ) "soc ia l  immaturi ty  on the  p a r t  o f  the  r u l e r s ;  . . . "
The d i a l e c t i c  of  ex te rna l  p o l i t i c s  i s  concerned with problems 
a r i s i n g  from r e l a t i o n s h i p s  amongst d i f f e r e n t  bodies  p o l i t i c .  A 
d i a l e c t i c  i s  a process  from non-agreement r a t h e r  than disagreement .
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  non-agreement  may harden in to  disagreement  although a 
c e r t a i n  amount o f  non-agreement between two fo re ign  bodies  p o l i t i c  is  
i r removable .  These d i f f e r e n c e s  may be due t o  c o n f l i c t s  of  the  same
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type  as a r e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  i . e . ,  a c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  a
1 1 1
c o n f l i c t  o f  r i g h t s ,  and c o n f l i c t  o f  d u t i e s .  Again,  t h e r e  are 
only two ways of  s e t t l i n g  c o n f l i c t s :  the  e r i s t i c a l  and the  d i a l e c t i ­
c a l .  To adopt  the  former p o s i t i o n  means to  make war which i s  a s t a t e  
1 1 2
o f  mind. War, as a s t a t e  of  mind, means "b e l i ev in g  t h a t  d i f f e r ­
ences between bodies  p o l i t i c  have to  be s e t t l e d  by one giv ing  way to
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the  o th e r  and the  second t r iumphing over  t h e  f i r s t . "  Both v i c to r y
and d e fe a t  a re  a l s o  s t a t e s  o f  mind. To y i e l d  to  t h r e a t ,  f r a u d ,  or
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f e a r  i s  t o  th in k  d e f e a t .  Thus,  a p r o p o s i t io n  invo lv ing  economic 
sanc t ions  i s  tantamount  t o  a r e v e r s a l  o f  t h e  d i a l e c t i c  and t h e  adop t­
ion o f  an e r i s t i c a l  s t a n c e .  To do t h i s  i s  to  r ev e r s e  "a po l i c y  on
115
which b e l i g e r e n t s  depend f o r  t h e i r  very e x i s t e n c e . "  For the
same reason ,  t o  punish an agg res so r  as was done by the  League of
Nat ions a f t e r  World War I ,  war cannot  be viewed as e n t i r e l y  due to
the  pa r ty  who i n s t i g a t e d  i t .  Did Collingwood advocate  a po l i c y  of
no n - re s i s t a n ce ?  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  he be l i eved  t h a t  a p a c i f i s t  s tance
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i s  pro-war  because such a r u l e r  has done noth ing to  decrease  i t .
Fu r the r ,  p a c i f i c i s m  i s  no t  on ly  pro-war but  i t  c a s t s  t h a t  p a r ty  in the 
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r o l e  of de fea t i sm.
Wars happen in the  modern world because ex te rn a l  p o l i t i c s  are  
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handled e r i s t i c a l l y .  I t  r e s u l t s  in a breach o f  i n t e r n a l  soc ia l  
l i f e .  Since modern s t a t e s  do tend to  handle ex te rn a l  p o l i c y  e r i s ­
t i c a l l y ,  and y e t  p o l i c y  impl ies  a vo lun ta ry  a c t ,  " i s  war an extens ion
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o f  po l ic y  o r  a breakdown o f  po l icy"?  In t h e  former c a s e ,  no ex­
p lana t ion  i s  needed al though in the  l a t t e r  ca se ,  how can t h i s  b reak­
down be expla ined?  As t h e r e  i s  an element  of  f o rc e  in  every s o c i e t y .
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even as the  job  of  a body p o l i t i c  i s  t o  main ta in  harmony through the
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j o i n t  w i l l  in  a j o i n t  aim, t h i s  i s  never  e n t i r e l y  ach ieved.  Be­
cause fo rce  i s  more conspicuous in a body p o l i t i c  whose a c t  o f  ru l i n g
e s t a b l i s h e d  law and o rd e r ,  war must be viewed as " the breakdown of  
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p o l i c y . "  The primary ques t ion  i s :  "Why does such a breakdown
122
occur?"  Collingwood has suggested t h re e  reasons:  ( 1 ) "because
men charged with the  conduct  of  ex te rn a l  p o l i t i c s  a re  confron ted by
a problem they cannot  s o l v e , "  ( 2 ) "because the  i n t e r n a l  cond i t io n  of
the body p o l i t i c  i s  unsound,"  and ( 3 ) "because t h e  r u l e r s  a r e  a t  
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loggerheads ."  Then, Collingwood has concluded,  the  " u l t im a te
cause of  war i s  disharmony among the  r u l e r s "  due to  the  f a c t  t h a t
t r a c e s  o f  " n o n - s o c i a l i t y  a re  no t  completely overcome by the  ' d i a l e c t i c  
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o f  s o c i e t y ' .  War must be viewed as a breakdown of  p o l i c y  and i t  
i s  due, not  to  p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g th  bu t  to  p o l i t i c a l  weakness.  Through 
th e  techn ique  of the  u t i l i z a t i o n  of  an imaginary "yahoo" he rd ,  C o l l i n g ­
wood attempted t o  p o r t r a y  Hobbes's Leviathan as a s o c i e t y  where the
" l i f e  o f  man, s o l i t a r y ,  poore ,  n a s t y ,  b r u t i s h ,  and s h o r t "  i s  t h a t  of
125
t h e  non-soc ia l  community. The p i c t u r e ,  according to  Collingwood,
must be c o r r e c te d  because the  herd would be " g re g a r io u s , "  " i m i t a t i v e , "
and the  l e a d e r  of  the  herd would r u l e  e r i s t i c a l l y  so t h a t  a po l i c y  of
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war would be an ex tens ion  o f  i t s  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c y .  The p i c t u r e  i s
an a b s t r a c t i o n ;  i t s  i n t e n t  i s  t o  de s c r ib e  non- soc ia l  human l i f e .
The reason f o r  i t s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  to  con t ro l  a process  of  change
wherein the  " i n i t i a l  and te rmina l  p o in t s "  a re  a b s t r a c t i o n s  from the  
127
f a c t  of  change. P re v io u s ly ,  t o  f a c e  change in t h i s  manner was 
unnecessary because,  in the c e n tu r i e s  be fo re  the  tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry .
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"people  be l i eved  in a law o f  p r o g r e s s . "  The Yahoo herd,  o r  the 
elements  o f  n o n - s o c i a l i t y ,  remain;  such soc ia l  de fe c t s  a re  the  source 
o f  war. Defects  a re  not  c u ra b le  but  they  a re  changeable so t h a t  war 
w i l l  con t inue  to  d i f f e r  from t h a t  we p rev ious ly  knew. The only good 
cause o f  s o c i e t y  i s  peace ;  however, the  Yahoo des t roys  t h i s  cause.
In t h i s  c a se ,  war "would be j u s t i f i e d  as se rv ing  the  cause o f  i n ­
t e l l i g e n c e ,  the  cause o f  w i l ,  the  cause o f  p o l i t i c a l  v igour ,  s c i e n ­
t i f i c  e f f i c i e n c y ,  and e ve ry th ing  e l s e  t h a t  i s  included in the one 
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word peace ."
C la s s i c a l  p h y s ic s ,  a r i s i n g  in the  l a t e  s ix t e e n th  and e a r l y
s even teen th  c e n t u r i e s ,  he ld  sway f o r  over  two-hundred yea rs  u n t i l  i t s
recognized  d e fe c t s  made i t  o b s o l e t e .  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  c l a s s i c a l
physic s  i s  a double one:  t h e  mathematical o r  t h e  'm a t t e r '  o f  an i n -
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q u i ry  must be sound and i t s  ' form o r  l o g i c  must be r i g h t . '  The
e r r o r  l a y  in i d e n t i f y i n g  l o g i c  with mathematics .  Hobbes, in the  middle
o f  t h e  s even teen th  c e n tu ry ,  worked o u t  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  which may
be d esc r ibed  as "an a t t em p t  a t  a s c ience  o f  human l i f e  . . . in p o l i -
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t i c a l  l i f e . "  I t  too can no l onger  be regarded as t h e  f i n a l  word
on t h i s  s u b je c t  y e t  we have no succes so r  a l though we do have some
132
"agreement as to  where i t  needs c o r r e c t i o n . "  Like c l a s s i c a l  phy­
s i c s ,  to  anyone who d e s i r e s  to  l e a r n  the  s u b j e c t ,  i t  must not  be f o r ­
g o t t e n .  Hobbes's ph i losophy  a l so  r e s t s  on a double foundat ion:  f a c t s
133
a s c e r t a i n e d  by o b s e rva t ion  o r  experiment  and a b s t r a c t i o n s .  What
the  s c i e n t i s t  does i s  t o  t ake  crude f a c t s  and convert  th es e  i n to  laws
which a re  the  body o f  a s c i e n c e .  These laws a re  hybr id s .  "Ancient
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s c iences  aimed a t  an u n l im i ted  o b j e c t i v e . "  Modern s c ie n c e ,  in
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c o n t r a s t ,  l i m i t s  i t s  o b j e c t i v e .  Authors of  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  aimed
a t  a "sc ience  o f  p o l i t i c s  which would exp la in  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  of
135
p o l i t i c a l  f a c t s  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  idea  of s o c i e t y .  Authors of  
c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  aimed a t  a " sc ience  o f  p o l i t i c s  which would exp la in
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a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  of  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t s  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  the  idea o f  s o c i e t y . "
A p r i n c i p l e  o f  l im i t e d  o b j e c t i v e  means the  r e n u n c i a t i o n  of  e xp lana t ion
of  o t h e r  f a c t s  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t .  They did  no t  a t t empt  t o  e xp la in  ' s e c -  
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ondary q u a l i t i e s . '  "The p r i n c i p l e  o f  e x p la na t ion  from which the
137
c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  began was t h e  idea  of  s o c i e t y . "  They drew t h e i r  
idea  o f  p a r t n e r s h i p  from the  ' s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t ' ,  t h e  ensuing o b l i g a -
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t i o n s ,  the  con d i t io n s  of  I t s  making,  the  ' f r e e  w i l l '  o f  the  p a r t i e s .
From t h i s  experi ence  o f  p a r t n e r s h i p ,  Collingwood wanted to  br ing
139
th es e  no t io ns  i n t o  a "harmony wi th  the  European use o f  words ."
The problem of  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  was t h e  l i m i t e d  o b j e c t i v e  o f  a "s tudy
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[ o f ]  t h e  so c ia l  e lements  in p o l i t i c a l  l i f e . "  While the  c l a s s i c a l
p o l i t i c i a n s  recognized  the  non - soc ia l  e lement  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  they
"did no t  p ro fe s s  to  e xp la in  t h i s  " n a u t r e , "  the  n e g a t iv e  p a r t n e r  of  
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any s o c i e t y .  Thus, " c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  g ives  a p o s i t i v e ,  d e t a i l e d ,
and adequate account  of  s o c i e t y ' .  " P o l i t i c s  i s  a p rocess  whereby one
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c ond i t io n  of  human l i f e  i s  convened i n t o  a n o th e r . "  "The g r e a t
m e r i t  of  the  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  i s  t h a t  i t  knows p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  t o  be
dynamic o r  d i a l e c t i c a l . "  "The l i f e  o f  p o l i t i c s  i s  t h e  l i f e  of  p o l i -  
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t i c a l  edu c a t io n . "
Coll ingwood's  account  of  the  r e c e p t i o n  of  t h e  theory  o f  the  
non-soc ia l  community by the  Germans i s  unusua l ;  he b e l i eved  the  German
-78-
r eade rs  o f  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  minunderstood the  na tu ra l  cond i t ion  of
mankind to  be the  oppos i t e  of  c i v i l i z a t i o n  or  savagery r a t h e r  than the  
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nu r se ry .  There were, according to  Collingwood, c e r t a i n  q u a l i f i ­
c a t i o n s  f o r  understanding c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  and t h a t  was some unde r­
s tand ing  o f  the  two s c iences :  the  theory  of  customary morals and the 
th eo ry  o f  law. The Germans had no experi ences  f o r  such an under­
s tanding  o f  the  two. I n s te a d ,  the  German's s u b j e c t ' s  experiences  were 
p r im a r i l y  n o n - so c i a l .
The su b je c t  l i v e d ,  moved, and had h i s  
being in  a non-soc ia l  community ordered  
and maintained p a r t l y  by what passed f o r  
the  immemorial t r a d i t i o n  o f  t h e  German 
people;  p a r t l y  f o r  the  d o c i l e l y  accepted 
despotism of  t h i s  o r  t h a t  p r in c e l i n g  and 
h i s  s t i l l  more d espo t i c  o f f i c i a l s .
The o th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  of the  German people was ances to r-worship or
146
a u to c r a t - w o r s h ip ,  ideas  which Collingwood termed "herd-worsh ip ."
This i s  a type o f  r e l i g i o n  express ing  th e  f e e l i n g  o f  man's power less ­
ness  in the  g r ip  of  a non-soc ia l  community. When the  Germans r e ­
d i scovered  Greek phi losophy ,  they r e j e c t e d  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  on Greek 
a u t h o r i t y  ( they though t) .  While Hobbes's ' a r t i f i c i a l l  Man' r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  j o i n t  soc ia l  w i l l ,  Kant and h i s  successo rs  saw the  s t a t e  n e i t h e r
as " a r t i f i c i a l  in o r ig i n  nor human in i t s  es sence ,  but  na tu ra l  in
147
o r i g i n  and d iv ine  in i t s  e s sence . "  For t h i s  r ea son ,  Hegel and
Marx could i n s i s t  upon an o b j e c t iv e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  
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s p i r i t .  Collingwood expressed the  b e l i e f  t h a t  the  Germans, from
th e  f i f t e e n t h  c e n tu ry ,  had p ra i sed  obedience in p reference  to  freedom
149
because o f  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n  of  he rd-worship .  The Reformation merely 
exchanged the  yoke of  Rome f o r  t h a t  of  the  P r in ce .  To Collingwood,
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t h i s  was a somewhat t r a g i c  s i t u a t i o n ;  t h e  Genv.ans could accep t  na tu ra l
sc ience  wi thou t  c o n f l i c t  a l though t r u t h  had a tendency to  be subor-
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d ina ted  to  a ques t  f o r  the  "g lo ry  o f  the  German p e op le . "  When the 
German people  began t o  deal with c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s ,  and to  t r a n s ­
l a t e  t h i s  i n to  s o c ia l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophy o r  t h e o r y ,  the r e s u l t  
can be viewed in Marx whose d o c t r i n e  o f  the  'w i the r ing  away of  the
s t a t e '  shows h i s  l ack  o f  a concept ion o f  the  ' r u l i n g  c l a s s ' ,  an idea
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meaning, in  Machiavel l ian te rm s ,  ' s t a t e . '  For Marx, the non-social
conmunity i s  t r a n s l a t e d  i n to  s t a t e ;  the  term,  c a p i t a l i s t s ,  becomes
the  opponent of  German he rd-worsh ip .  I t  i s  in t h i s  vein t h a t  Marx's
obsess ion with d i a l e c t i c a l  m a te r i a l i s m  can be understood .  Whereas
' d i a l e c t i c '  f o r  P l a to  meant a p e a c e f u l ,  f r i e n d l y  d i s c u s s io n ,  f o r  Hegel
i t  became a ' d i a l e c t i c  o f  words '  while  f o r  Marx, i t  became a ' d i a l -  
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e c t i c  of  t h i n g s . '  In Hegel ian te rm s ,  a d i a l e c t i c a l  world "argued
153
i t s e l f  i n t o  e x i s t e n c e . "  Thus,  a ' d i a l e c t i c  o f  words '  s e t  a p a t t e r n
f o r  a ' d i a l e c t i c  of  t h i n g s . '  This  scheme i s .  however, bankrupt  in
regard t o  h i s t o r i c a l  method.
The f ash ion  of  t ak ing  i t s  Marxian i n ­
vers ion s e r i o u s l y  s t i l l  f l o u r i s h e s ,  but  
i t  i s  no b e t t e r  based;  because neo-Marx­
ism has blown the  g a f f  by d e c la r in g  t h a t  
' t r u t h '  means h i s t o r i c a l  t r u t h ,  and 'bour ­
g e o i s ' ,  as usual in Marxis t  termino logy ,  
i s  merely an expre ss ion  o f  d i s g u s t ;  and 
the  whole d e c l a r a t i o n  means: ' d i a l e c t i ­
cal  m a te r i a l i sm  does not  l ead  to  h i s t o ­
r i c a l  knowledge.154
In Coll ingwood's  view, t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  a d i a l e c t i c a l  m a te r i a l i sm  
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The h e a r t  of  Coll logwood's New Leviathan l i e s  in P a r t  I I I  en ­
t i t l e d  " C i v i l i z a t i o n , "  where h is  s o lu t i o n  to  the  problem o f  o rder  and 
c i v i l i t y ,  an updating o f  Hobbes, i s  produced. Barbarism,  the  a n t i ­
t h e s i s  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  which i s  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  o f  The New Levia than , 
wil l  a l s o  be inco rpora ted  in to  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  I t  i s  the  premise o f  
Collingwood t h a t  humankind c r e a t e s  i t s e l f ,  both i n d i v i d u a l l y  and c o l ­
l e c t i v e l y ,  in comnunities  and s o c i e t i e s ,  u l t i m a t e l y  producing a u n i ­
que c i v i l i z a t i o n .  Before Collingwood began to  exp lo re  s o l u t i o n s ,  he 
delved in to  the  g ene r i c  meaning o f  t h e  term,  ' c i v i l i z a t i o n ' :
A word i s  a l i n g u i s t i c  h a b i t  o f  the  
comnunity using i t .  . . C i v i l i z a t i o n  
i s  a th in g  o f  the  mind; an i n q u i ry  i n to  
i t s  n a tu r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  belongs t o  the  
sc iences  of  the  mind, and must be pu r ­
sued by the  method proper  t o  those  
sc iences .T
C i v i l i z a t i o n ,  as a p a r t  of  the  sc ie nce  o f  mind, i s ,  l i k e  o t h e r  s c i e n c e s ,
based upon f a c t ;  in t h i s  c a se ,  f a c t s  a re  gleaned from "mental f a c t s
2
a s c e r t a i n e d  by r e f l e c t i o n . "  As th ink ing  " i s  done in  words" ,  then
i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  r e f l e c t  upon language.  Here, i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d
t h a t  Hugh Walpole has c r e d i t e d  to  Collingwood a high s e rv i c e  in the
3
area  o f  l i n g u i s t i c s .
"The New Leviathan" devotes  i t s  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  i n t e r e s t  t o  symbols — but  to  
t h a t  p e c u l i a r  c l a s s  o f  symbols used in 
" the  human s c i e n c e s . "  As c o n t r a s te d  
with the  phys ica l  and the  b io lo g ic a l  
s c iences  Collingwood sees  a s e p a ra te  
group which he c a l l s  " the  sc iences  of  
mind"; . . . These s c iences  a re  t r u l y  
s c i e n t i f i c  in method and purpose,  but  
share  c e r t a i n  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  t h a t  put  
them in a c l a s s  by themse lves .  Empir­
i ca l  data  and o b j e c t iv e  f a c t s  a re
-88-
germane to  the  p u r s u i t  but  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  t akes  on inc reased  imp­
o r t a n c e .  These human sc iences  are  
i n t r i n s i c a l l y  in f luenced  by t h e  f a c t  
o f  being s t u d i e d . 4
Etymolog ica l ly ,  in the  h i s t o r y  o f  the  term,  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i t  i s
a t e c h n ic a l  term o f  law. In the  sense of  a p ro ce s s ,  c i v i l i z a t i o n  i s
something which happens t o  a community. Such a process  always concerns
humans c o l l e c t i v e l y .  " C i v i l i z a t i o n  i s  an approximation t o  an idea l  
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S t a t e . "  The c o n t r a d i c t o ry  of  an idea l  s t a t e  i s  b a r b a r i t y .  C o l l in g ­
wood ' s e tymological  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n to  the  term poses t h r e e  sense 
usages to  t h i s  p o in t :  ( l ) I t  i s  a p roce s s ;  ( 2 ) I t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a
p ro ce s s ;  ( 3 ) I t  i s  e q u iv a l e n t  t o  c i v i l i t y .  When an inqu i ry  i s  made as 
t o  how the  process  d i f f e r s  from o t h e r s ,  the  t h r e e  c o n s t i t u t e n t s  of  
c i v i l i z a t i o n  a re :  ( a ) I t  i s  " c i v i l i z a t i o n  w i th in  the  community as 
a f f e c t i n g  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  any one member t o  any o t h e r " ;  ( 2 ) I t  i s  
" c i v i l i z a t i o n  o u t s id e  the  community as a f f e c t i n g  th e  r e l a t i o n  between 
members o f  t h e  community and th ings  in  the  world of  n a tu r e " ;  and
( 3 ) I t  i s  " c i v i l i z a t i o n  o u t s id e  t h e  community as a f f e c t i n g  the  r e l a t i o n
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between members o f  the  comnunity and members o f  o t h e r  communities ."
To behave c i v i l l y  t o  ano the r  means t o  r e s p e c t  h i s  f e e l i n g s  by: "ab­
s t a i n i n g  from shocking him, annoying him, f r i g h t e n i n g  him, o r  arousing 
in  him any passion  o r  d e s i r e  which might diminish h i s  s e l f - r e s p e c t . "
— in o t h e r  words,  t o  t h r e a t e n  h i s  freedom in regard  t o  cho ice .  While 
complete c i v i l i t y  i s  but  a "counsel of  p e r f e c t i o n , "  i t  i s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
a goal t o  be c o n s ta n t ly  kept  in mind. In r e s p e c t  t o  p o in t  two above, 
t h e  goal o f  c i v i l i t y  towards t h ings  in the  realm o f  n a tu r e ,  t h i s  con­
cept  stems from the  Renaissance wherein the  c e n t r a l  idea " is  t h a t  man
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can i n c re as e  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  g e t  what he needs ou t  o f  t h e  n a tu ra l  world 
by coming to  understand i t  b e t t e r ,  and t h a t  to  advance in such unde r­
s tand ing  o f  the  na tu r a l  world i s  t o  become more ' c i v i l i z e d '  in r e -  
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l a t i o n  to  i t . "  According to  Coll ingwood, t h e r e  a re  no " nec e s sa r i e s "
in t h a t  s tandards  a r e  c o n s t a n t ly  being a l t e r e d .  The d i f f i c u l t y  here
t s  t h a t  o f  d i f f e r i n g  s tanda rds  in o t h e r  communit ies.  In r e s p e c t  to
po in t  t h r e e  above, Collingwood averred  t h a t  " c i v i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  c i v i l
demeanour t o  whatever  i s  recognized  as possess ing  i t . "  " I f  f o re i g n e r s
a re  human, c i v i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  we should t r e a t  them c i v i l l y  . . .
I f  the  answer i s  ' n o ' ,  f o r e i g n e r s  a re  a p a r t  o f  the  n a tu r a l  world ,"
9
they  a re  then t h e r e  t o  be e x p lo i t e d  as s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  as  p o s s i b l e .
Yet ,  in even r e l a t i v e l y  high c i v i l i z a t i o n s ,  whi le  s t r a n g e r s  a re
t r e a t e d  with c i v i l i t y ,  t h e y  a r e  "murdered wi th  impunity and a c l e a r  
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consc ience . "  Common a c t io n  s e t s  up a so c ia l  consc iousness .  One
such a c t io n  i s  t h a t  o f  commercial a c t i o n .  Any a c t i o n  which does not
accord with the  demeanor o f  a c i v i l i z e d  man i s  movement o r  r e g r e s s io n
towards b a r b a r i t y .
According to  t h e  degree o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  
(o f  barbar ism) thus produced th e  commun­
i t y  w i l l  t r e a t  non-members with more o r  
l e s s  complete l ack of  c i v i l i t y ;  in  a l l  
c a s e s ,  more o r  l e s s ,  where c i v i l i t y  
could be used,  r ep l a c in g  i t  by f o r c e . 1'
This w i l l  invo lve  a more o r  l e s s  r u t h ­
l e s s  e x p l o i t a t i o n ;  o r ,  t o  be more e x a c t ,  
s c i e n ^ ^ f i c  o r  i n t e l l i g e n t  e x p l o i t a t i o n
Collingwood expla ined  t h a t  t o r t u r e  and c r u e l t i e s  i n f l i c t e d  upon 
s t r a n g e r s  or  non-community members could no t  be cons ide red  to  be ex­
p l o i t a t i v e .  When th e  argument i s  advanced t h a t  such a c t io n  i s  due to
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a "psychologica l  need to  i n f l i c t  s u f f e r i n g , "  he observed t h a t  passion
and d e s i r e  could be governed by the  w i l l  o r  be a p o l i c y  of  d e l i b e r a t e
cho ice .  A s a d i s t  i s  t o  be p i t i e d  but  t h i s  i s  not  c i v i l i z a t i o n ;  i t  i s  
13
barbarism.
In a non-soc ia l  community, t h e r e  i s  no hope t h a t  humankind can
l i v e  o t h e r  than e r i s t i c a l l y .  Such communities a re  not  held t o g e t h e r
by th e  c o l l e c t i v e  community excep t  through psychological  f o rc e s  or
14
‘i n s t i n c t s '  o r  b r u t e  fo rc e  g e n e ra t i n g  some type of  harmony. In a 
c i v i l i z a t i o n  approaching mental m a t u r i t y ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  t o  dec ide  
through w i l l  t o  c r e a t e  a s o c i e t y  of  q u i t e  ano ther  type  through a
15
d i a l e c t i c a l  p rocess  invo lv ing  th e  s e l f - a s s e r t i o n  of  i n d iv idua l  w i l l .
The mainspring  o f  t h e  process  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  i s  " the s p i r i t  o f  a g re e -
16
ment" based upon t h e  p r a c t i c a l  knowledge o f  custom and c i v i l i t y .
C i v i l i t y  as between man and man, members 
o f  t h e  same community, i s  no t  only what 
c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  c i v i l i z a t i o n  o f  t h a t  
comnunity r e l a t i v e l y  t o  t h e  human world ;  
i t  i s  a l s o  what makes p o s s ib l e  t h a t  
community's c i v i l i z a t i o n  r e l a t i v e l y  to  
t h e  n a tu r a l  w o r l d . 17
These r e f l e c t i o n s  pose the  q u e s t i o n :  How i s  c i v i l i t y  acquired?  
Coll ingwood's  answer appears  t o  be:  f i r s t ,  i t  i s  an h i s t o r i c a l  p rocess  
o f  slow development;  second,  i t  i s  t h e  sha r ing  r a t h e r  than hoarding o f  
t h e  e n t i r e  knowledge and inven t ions  of  the  community. To have a d i a ­
l e c t i c a l  community o r  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  t h e r e  must be those  who a re  w i l l i n g
18
t o  t each  and those  who a re  w i l l i n g  t o  l e a r n .  N e i the r  of  t h es e  de ­
s i r e s  has been l o s t ;  however, t h e r e  i s  the  r eve r se  d e s i r e ,  t h a t  o f  the
19
a b i l i t y  t o  gain  power through th e  monopolizat ion  o f  knowledge.
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This i s  t h e  o r i g i n  and essence  o f  
c i v i l i z a t i o n .  C i v i l i z a t i o n ,  even in  
i t s  c r u d e s t  and most  barbarous  form, 
in  p a r t  c o n s i s t s  o f  c i v i l i t y  and in  
p a r t  depends on c i v i l i t y :  c o n s i s t s  
on i t  so f a r  as i t  c o n s i s t s  in  r e l a ­
t i o n s  o f  man to  n a t u r e . 20
Hobbes, t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n ,  be l i eved  " t h a t  men were n a t u r a l l y  enemies o f
21
each o t h e r " ; while  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  th ey  a r e  f r i e n d s  as w e l l .
C o -ope ra t ion ,  r a t h e r  than r e s t i n g  upon a f e e b l e  foundat ion  o f  reason
as Hobbes th o u g h t ,  r e s t s  i n s t e a d  upon two c o n t r a r y  a p p e t i t e s ,  those
o f  p l e a s u r e  and pain towards humankind o r  t h e  tendency t o  l i k e  some
22
human beings and to  d i s l i k e  o t h e r s .  Col l ingwood, i t  w i l l  be r e ­
c a l l e d ,  expre ssed  th e  idea  t h a t  the  " s e l f  i s  c o r r e l a t i v e  to  t h e  n o t -
23
s e l f , "  t h a t  i s ,  o t h e r s  a re  regarded in  r e l a t i o n  to  o u r s e l v e s .  I t
i s  on ly  through th e  leve l  o f  w i l l  t h a t  we can escape o r  r i s e  above
t h e s e  two courses  and t h i s  i s  d e l i b e r a t e  c h o ic e .
Now Collingwood be l i eved  t h a t  a nega t ion  o f  f r e e  w i l l  l ay  in
the  l ack  o f  development o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o r  mental m a t u r i t y ,  in  the
dependence upon emotion r a t h e r  than r ea s o n .  These groups ach ieve
communal l i f e  only through a l e a d e r  o r  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  e s t a b l i s h m e n t
amongst t h e  community members. This type  community was t h e  "na tu ra l
c o n d i t io n  o f  mankind" accord ing  t o  Hobbes. For  t h e s e ,  l i f e  may be
24
" s o l i t a r y ,  poore,  n a s t y ,  b r u t i s h ,  and s h o r t  . . . " Even s o ,  t h e i r
tendency ,  as humans, would be toward g r e g a r io u s n e s s .  Humankind i s
25
i n h e r e n t l y  i m i t a t i v e .  Since i n d i v i d u a l s  do i m i t a t e  o t h e r s ,  i f  
such a community were surrounded by a t r u l y  s o c i a l  community, the 
promise o f  a soc ia l  community i s  e n la r g e d .  To a b s t r a c t  from a non­
s o c i a l  community in  t h i s  c a s e ,  from an th ro p o lo g ic a l  d i s c o v e r i e s .
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means to  a t tempt  t o  con tro l  the  process  o f  change, a bas ic  cha l lenge  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  thought .
26
At f i r s t ,  t h e  "will  to  c i v i l i z a t i o n  i s  j u s t  w i l l . "  To w i l l  
c i v i l i z a t i o n  means tak ing  charge o f  a s i t u a t i o n  c o rp o r a t e l y  and i n ­
d i v id u a l l y  to  reaon in  the  process  of  c i v i l i z i n g  humankind. A coirmun-
t t y  can become c i v i l i z e d  only when in d iv idua l  members a re  f r e e  and
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a l s o  possess  f r e e  w i l l .  A consciousness  o f  freedom stems from
s e l f - r e s p e c t  as wel l as r e s p e c t  f o r  o t h e r s .  Collingwood argued t h a t
the  two t e rm s ,  c i v i l i t y  and s e r v i l i t y ,  a r e  o f ten  confused.  While both
connote demeanor, c i v i l i t y  towards o th e r s  implies  t h e  demeanor of  a
s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g  person toward ano th er  who i s  a l s o  re s p e c te d  whereas
s e r v i l i t y  implie s  a non s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g  p e r s o n ' s  demeanor toward an-
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o t h e r  whom he f e a r s .  S e l f - r e s p e c t  i s  achieved by th e  e x e r c i s e  of
one ' s  w i l l .  C o n t r a r i l y ,  a w i l l  t o  barbar ism i s  the  w i l l  t o  t r e a t
o the r s  s e r v i l e l y  producing the  l ack  o f  r e s p e c t  f o r  o n e s e l f  as  wel l as 
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f o r  o t h e r s .  In t h i s  c a se ,  t h e  w i l l  o f  the  r u le d  has become s u i c i d a l .
C i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  was de f ined  as process  where­
in members become f r e e  agents  possess ing and e x e r c i s i n g  a f r e e  w i l l .
I t  i s  a l s o  " the  process of  convert ing  a non-soc ia l  community i n to  a
30
soc ie ty "  o r  the  porcess  o f  s o c i a l i z i n g .  C i v i l i t y  i s  the  idea l  con­
d i t i o n  of  s o c i a l i t y  whereby each community member " re spe c t s  himself
and a l l  h i s  fel low-members , t r e a t s  them acco rd in g ly ,  and expects  them
31
to t r r e a t  him l i k e w i s e . "  Yet the  idea l  c ond i t ion  i s  impossib le  to
achieve because "every p a r t i c u l a r  s o c ie t y  has about  i t  a t r a c e  of  the
32
non-soc ia l  community ou t  o f  which i t  emerged." The process  of  
s o c i a l i z a t i o n  i s  d i a l e c t i c a l  and " e x i s t s  in i t s  p u r e s t  form in the
-93-
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f am i ly . "  The fami ly  o r  p a r e n t s ,  as s o c i a l i z i n g  age n ts ,  i s  f a r
s u p e r i o r  to  our  modern p r a c t i c e  o f  us ing  s p e c i a l i s t s  f o r  two reasons :
( 1 ) " t h e i r  power over  the  c h i ld  i s  much g r e a t e r , "  and (2 ) " the p a re n t
as  educa to r  has the  r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s ,  the  v e r s a t i l i t y  of  the  non- 
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s p e c i a l i s t . "  The emotional  c o n t r o l  o f  pa ren t s  over  c h i ld r e n  i s
the  g r e a t  advantage enjoyed by them over  the  s p e c i a l i s t .  I t  p rovides
the  m otiva t ion  to  do something w e l l .
I t  i s  more than p i t i a b l e ,  i t  i s  g h a s t l y
to  s ee  P l a to ,  a f t e r  h i s  long and he ro ic
s t r u g g l e  a g a in s t  t h e  p r o fe s s io n a l  educa­
t o r s  o r  ' s o p h i s t s , '  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  
g iv ing  in  t o  them on what he knew to  be
the  v i t a l  i s s u e  o f  a l l  p o l i t i c s ,  t he  ca re
of  c h i l d r e n :  t ak ing  c h i l d r e n  out  o f  t h e i r  
p a r e n t s '  hands and t u r n i n g  them over  to  
s ta te -employed  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  . . .35
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The p a r e n t ,  as e d u c a to r ,  un l ike  the  p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  "has no f a i l u r e s . "
I f  Collingwood can be supported in h i s  pronouncement t h a t  humankind i s  
f a r  more i m i t a t i v e  than  Hobbes al lowed f o r ,  then h i s  theory  o f  edu­
c a t io n  o r  the  process  of  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  must not  be l e f t  up t o  the
p r o fe s s io n a l  educa to r  i s  s t r o n g .  Ch i ld ren ,  wishing t o  be l i k e  t h e i r
p a r e n t s ,  w i l l  l e a r n  t o  do many th in g s  well plus  having more t ime to  
exp lo re  t h e i r  unique se lv es  in  t h e  wor ld .  [ I t  must be r e a l i z e d  here 
t h a t  Collingwood a l s o  does not  view a world where pa ren t s  must spend 
so much o f  t h e i r  t ime away from home a c i v i l i z e d  s t a t e  e i t h e r . ]  I t  
i s  a m a t t e r  o f  r ec o rd ,  o f  course ,  t h a t  any s t a t e  employing devices  
o f  con tro l  must i n d o c t r i n a t e  the  young. Collingwood announced t h a t  
when a c i v i l i z a t i o n  tu rns  over  the  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  process  t o  the  p ro­
f e s s i o n a l ,  i t  i s  t i e d  to  a method, t o  a bureaucracy ,  and to  a ty ranny 
o f  t ime.
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What, t h e n ,  should become o f  those  t r a i n e d  as p ro fe s s io n a l  edu­
c a to r s ?  That  ques t ion  now has become a most  d i f f i c u l t  problem because 
people  no lo nger  have s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e  in  themselves  t o  do anyth ing 
Without  the  e x p e r t .  Yet t h e r e  i s  a v a s t  domain of  experi ence  which
has r e s i s t e d  p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n  such as p a s t t i m e s ,  e a t i n g ,  s l e e p i n g ,  
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and making love .  This l a t t e r  a rea  " inc ludes  almos t  t h a t  i s  e n joy ­
able  in  l i f e " ;  in  deed,  " l i f e  would be impoverished ,  b r u t a l i z e d ,
u g l i f i e d  i f  eve ry th ing  in  i t  were handed ove r  t o  e x p e r t s  and the
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s p i r i t  o f  i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  banned."  Collingwood reconmended to
p a re n t s  wi th  c h i l d r e n  the  fo l lowing  s o l u t i o n s :  ( l )Spend more t ime in
t h e  company of  your  c h i l d r e n ;  (2)Share  meals  and bedrooms; ( 3 ) I f  work
or  d i r t  appear  t o  prec lude  th e  c h i l d r e n ,  l e t  t h e  former go;  (4)Should
your  c h i ld r e n  g e t  on your  ne rve s ,  n e g le c t  them some; d o n ' t  t ake  them 
39
too s e r i o u s l y .  His s o l u t i o n  f o r  the  e d u c a t o r ' s  jo b  was: ( l ) L e t
him teach  those  who want t o  l e a r n ,  i n c l u s i v e  o f  pa ren t s  and c h i l d r e n ;
40
(2)Let  him go on r e s e a rc h in g .  Much of  Col l ingwood's  work p re se n t s  
an i m p l i c i t  o r  h e u r i s t i c  phi losophy o f  educa t io n  s in c e  he espoused a 
u n i ty  and a wholeness  in  the  l i f e  o f  the  mind, a growing u n i ty  as the 
person becomes conscious o f  h i s  own s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y .  The l i f e  of  the  
mind i s  l i a b l e  t o  e r r ;  adducing th e  erroneous w i th in  a s u b je c t - m a t t e r  
i s  the  growing edge in a p e r s o n ' s  e duc a t ion .  A c h i l d  must come to  
understand t h i s  process  and to  know t h a t  educa t io n  i s  f o r  ' r e a l '  as 
he i s  pe rm i t t ed  t o  r i s k  e r r o r  w i thou t  paying th e  p e n a l i t i e s  which 
might accrue l a t e r .  Collingwood b e l i eved  t h a t  "consc iousness  i s  
thought  in i t s  a b s o lu t e ly  fundamental and o r i g i n a l  shape.
-95-
Consciousness  owns to  i t s e l f  i t s  f e e l i n g s  al though a f a l s e  consc ious -  
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ness  disowns them. On th e  o t h e r  hand, consciousness  may a t t e n d  to  
a f e e l i n g  and ignore  i t  l ay ing  the  foundat ion f o r  a c o r ru p t io n  of  
c onsc iousness .  A c o r r u p t  consciousness  i s  an a bo r ted  c onsc iousness ;  
t t  cannot  accep t  a given  idea  nor  p e r seve re  in  t h e  p roces s .  This 
c o r r u p t io n  implie s  t h a t  t h e  imagina t ion  i s  l ik e w i s e  c o r r u p t ;  the  
c o r rup ted  consciousness  whether  o f  a person,  a s o c i e t y ,  o r  a c i v i l i z ­
a t i o n  a f f e c t s  a l l  d imensions of  i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p roduc t s .  The 
imagina t ion p lays  a key r o l e  in  Col l ingwood's  theo ry  o f  educat ion  s ince  
t t  t s  the  f i r s t  s t e p  in a growth of  knowledge; i t  i s  here  t h a t  en­
couragement must be given to  t h e  c h i l d  because through imagina t ive  
c o n s t r u c t i o n s  t h e  mind becomes embodied in  knowledge. Collingwood 
has d i scussed  knowledge and exper ience  as having ove r l aps  o r  l e v e l s .  
While in  no meaningful  sense  can a succeeding s t a g e  be s a id  t o  be 
determined by t h e  prev ious  one ,  a t  each l eve l  t h e  power o f  s e l e c t i v e  
a t t e n t i o n  permits  the  e n t i r e  f i e l d  o f  consciousness  t o  de termine  the 
next  l eve l  o r  a r e g r e s s i o n  o r  a " f a l s e  c o n s c iousne ss . "  While t h i s  
t akes  p lace  below the  l eve l  o f  choice  than t h a t  involved in "cons­
c ious"  cho ice ,  t h e r e  i s  a kind o f  freedom in t h a t  t h e  h igher  l e v e l s  
o f  consciousness  a re  no t  determined by the  lower.  F u r th e r ,  freedom 
i s  m a n i f e s t  in t h e  c r e a t i v i t y  which i s  involved in  t h e  p rogres s ion  
from lower l e v e l s  t o  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  because t h i s  p rog re s s io n  i s  made 
p o s s ib l e  through the  im ag in a t iv e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  e lements  and l i n k s .  
This  imagina t ive  c r e a t i v i t y  becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y  impor tan t  as one 
moves from one leve l  to  t h e  n e x t .
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The concepts  o f  Collingwood concern ing  educat ion  as a s o c i a l i ­
z a t i o n  process  f i t s  in  with se ve ra l  o f  h i s  o t h e r  t h e o r i e s ,  no tab ly  
t h o se  o f  language ,  o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  and o f  t h a t  a l r e ad y  mentioned,  
consciousness  and though t .  I t  i s  well  worth reviewing he re  s in ce  
p o l i t i c a l  thought  i s  seen as a d i a l e c t i c a l ,  c r i t i c a l ,  and con t inuous ,  
a p rocess  whereby t h e  s o c i a l i z e d  ( t h e  r u l e r s )  coopt  t h e  non-soc ia l  
community i n t o  t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s .  F i r s t ,  language i s  viewed as a 
c r u c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  and i s  a f u n c t i o n  in  t h e  mind 's  odyssey.  The 
s t a t e m e n t  has a l r e a d y  been made t h a t  language and t h in k in g  ove r l ap .
As a s p e ak e r ,  t h e  c h i l d  i s  h i s  f i r s t  l i s t e n e r  demonst ra t ing  the  overl ap  
and even tua l  fu s ion  o f  a c t i v i t y .  A c h i l d ' s  f i r s t  u t t e r a n c e s  a re  a 
form o f  unaddressed speaking u n t i l  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  made between 
speak ing  t o  t h e  s e l f  and to  t h e  n o t - s e l f .  Learning proceeds by 
making more and more c a r e f u l  d i s t i n c t i o n s .  For t h i s  r ea son ,  com­
p a r t m e n ta l i z e d  and fragmented o r  s p e c i a l i z e d  f a c t s  a re  no t  knowledge 
in  t h e  eyes o f  Col lingwood. I t  i s  an example o f  what a p ro fe s s io n a l  
e d u c a to r  w i l l  a t t em p t  to  do to  t h e  c h i l d .
In h i s  concepts  upon l anguage ,  t o  some degree Collingwood 
adumbrated the  work o f  Noam Chomsky in l i n g u i s t i c s .  Chomsky has 
c h a l l enged  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  in  t h r e e  genera l  ways: ( l ) i n  an a n t i -  
behav io ra l  s t a n c e ,  ( 2 ) in  e m p i r i c i s t - s t r u c t i o n a l i s t  themes,  and (3 ) in  
a s k e p t i c a l  s t a n c e  twoards c u r r e n t  concepts  o f  human n a t u r e .  I f  
t h e s e  c h a l l enge s  o f  Chomsky a r e  compared t o  Col l ingwood's  ideas  upon 
psychology,  upon e x p e r i e n c e ,  and upon s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  c e r t a i n  s im i ­
l a r i t i e s  p r e s e n t  themse lves .  F i r s t ,  Collingwood charged psychology
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wi th p r e t e n s e  when i t  c laimed to  be a "sc ience  o f  mind." Psychology
proper  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  the “sc ie nc e  of  s e n s a t i o n ,  a p p e t i t e ,  and the  emo-
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t i o n s  connected with them." Report ing upon h i s  encounte r  with the
study  o f  t h e  works o f  Freud, Collingwood wro te :
But when I came t o  s tudy  hi s works J  
was no t  unprepared f o r  the d i scovery  
they  they reached a very h i g h - s c i e n ­
t i f i c  l eve l  when dea l ing  wi th  problems 
in psychotherapy,  bu t  sank beneath con­
tempt when they  t r e a t e d  of  e t h i c s ,  p o l i ­
t i c s ,  r e l i g i o n ,  o r  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e . 44
Chomsky, in hi s  a t t a c k  on behavior ism,  concen t ra ted  upon the  ex­
ten s io n  o f  psycho logical  l e a r n in g  theo ry  to  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior :
. . .  i f  t h e  conc lu s ions  I a t t empted  to  
s u b s t a n t i a t e  i n  t h e  review a re  c o r r e c t ,  
as I b e l i e v e  they a r e ,  then S k i n n e r ' s  work 
can be regarded a s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  a r e d u c t io  
ad absurdum o f  b e h a v i o r i s t  assumptions . . .
I do no t  . . . see  any way in  which h i s  
proposa ls  can be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  improved 
w i th in  the  gene ra l  framework o f  b e h a v i o r i s t  
o r  n e w -be hav io r i s t ,  o r ,  more g e n e r a l l y ,  
e m p i r i c i s t  o r  ideas  t h a t  has dominated 
much of  modern l i n g u i s t i c s ,  psychology,
and ph i lo sophy .45
The passage by Chomsky might  have been w r i t t e n  by Collingwood excep t
t h a t  t h e  s ta temen t  was w r i t t e n  tw e n ty - f iv e  ye a r s  subsequent  to  the
dea th o f  Collingwood! Chomsky goes on t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  both behavior ism
and empir ic ism a re  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  l i b e r a l  ideology  because i t  i s  in
th e s e  terms t h a t  the  l i b e r a l  ideology has been fo rm ula ted .  These two
w r i t e r s ,  a l though a genera t ion  a p a r t ,  a re  po in t ing  to  the  n e c e s s i t y
o f  a new v i s ion  o f  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  human n a tu r e .  Chomsky's c r i t i q u e  i s
t h a t  l i b e r a l  i d e o lo g y ' s  i n t e n t  i s  to  con tro l  but  t h a t  what i s  necessa ry
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i s  a r ad i c a l  e x t i r p a t i o n  o f  mind. Collingwood regarded pos i t i v i s m  
and u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  as examples o f  ph i lo soph ica l  dogmatism, a c r i t i q u e  
he lodged in Speculum M en t i s . As p resen ted  by Collingwood, po s i t i v i s m
r tm
as well  as " logicism" a re  merely formalisms which a r e  but  examples
o f  an "at tempt  to  reduce the  f low o f  concre te  e x i s t e n c e  to  mere ab-  
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s t r a c t t o n . "
P os i t iv i sm  i s  t h e  name o f  a p h i l o ­
sophy g r e a t l y  favoured in  the  n i n e ­
t e e n th  cen tu ry  whose motives  were a 
good deal l i k e  those  of  e ig h t e e n t h -  
cen tu ry  m a te r i a l i s m .  I t s  ce n t r a l  
d o c t r i n e  was t h a t  the  only v a l id  
method o f  a t t a i n i n g  knowledge i s  the  
method used in t h e  n a tu ra l  s c i e n c e s ,  
and hence t h a t  no kind o f  knowledge 
i s  genuine un less  i t  e i t h e r  i s  na tu ra l  
sc ience  o r  resembles  n a tu ra l  sc ience  
in method.48
I t  did not  m a t t e r  t o  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t s  t h a t  " thought  had occurred but
what did m a t t e r  was whether  i t  " s a t i s f i e d  the  s c i e n t i f i c  c r i t e r i o n  
49
o f  v a l i d i t y , "  The problem, f o r  Col lingwood,  was t h a t  he be l i eved  
t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  i n q u i r y  f e l l  i n to  two s t a g e s :  ( l ) t h e  asce r ta inm en t  
o f  f a c t s ,  (2 ) the  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  f a c t s .  Fac ts  were only those  ob­
s e rv a b le  upon which a hypothes i s  was then framed. Collingwood 
q u a r r e l l e d  with t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  f a c t :  f i r s t ,  i t  was based upon the
s e n se s ,  an e r r o r  born in the  Middle Ages, and secondly ,  f a c t  more
50
t r u l y  belongs t o  the  "vocabula ry o f  h i s t o r i c a l  t hough t . "  Even he re ,
th e  e r r o r  became compounded because p o s i t i v i s t s  main ta ined t h a t  every
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"not ion i s  a c l a s s  o f  obse rvab le  f a c t s . "  This i s  tantamount  to 
say ing t h a t  s c ience  i t s e l f  has no p resuppos i t ions  because t h e  "func t ion  
o f  thought  i s  to  c l a s s i f y  observed f a c t s "  and y e t  t h e r e  must be f a c t s  
f o r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  be fo re  thought  can begin.  To observe f a c t s  as h i s ­
t o r i c a l  th in k in g  i s  not  only complex but  i t  a l so  invo lves  numerous 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  Thus, the  p o s i t i v i s t  was a g a in s t  metaphysics  a l though
-99-
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he indulged in metaphysfcs: under the  r u b r i c  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th in k in g .
Col l tngwood's  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t s  t s  r e l a t e d  to  h i s  o th e r
no t ions  upon language and a c t i v i t y  as  phenomena o f  mind and thought .
Imaginat ion ,  f a i t h ,  a b s t r a c t  and c o n c re te  t h in k i n g ,  when taken as a
whole, a r e  implied in a l l  though t .  When t h i s  process  i s  a b s t r a c t e d
from the  r e s t  as a s e p a r a t e  s t a n d p o i n t ,  i t  then becomes an e r r o r ,
About nine ye a r s  a f t e r  the  dea th  o f  Collingwood, Michael
Oakeshot t  was express in g  p o l i t i c a l  educat ion  as a c t i v i t y  and as a
conc re te  whole:
For t o  unders tand  an a c t i v i t y  i s  t o  know 
i t  as a c o n c re te  whole;  i t  i s  to  r e ­
cogn ize  t h e  a c t i v i t y  as having some source 
o f  i t s  movement w i th in  i t s e l f  . . .  In the  
unders tanding o f  some people ,  p o l i t i c s  i s  
what may be c a l l e d  an empir ica l  a c t i v i t y .
This unders tand ing  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  
may be c a l l e d  p o l i t i c s  w i thou t  p o l i c y  . . . 
t o  understand p o l i t i c s  as an empir ica l  
a c t i v i t y  i s  t o  misunders tand  i t ,  because 
empir ic ism by i t s e l f  i s  no t  a concre te  
manner o f  a c t i v i t y  a t  a l l  . . .54
This  quote  has been made f o r  se ve ra l  r easons :  f i r s t ,  t hose  who lean
upon c u l t u r e ,  h i s t o r y ,  e t c .  have been l a b e l l e d  "humanists"  o r  as t hose
p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i s t s  who can be pu t  i n t o  a humanist  framework by 
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Michael Weinstein .  Secondly,  Hanna Fenichel P i tk i n  has l a b e l l e d
Oakeshot t  as a c o n s e r v a t iv e  a l though  t h i s  au th o r  has p r a i s e d  him f o r
being a b le  t o  teach  "much about  . . . ' t h e  need f o r  r o o t s '  . . .  He
sees  t h e  damage done to  people  when t h e i r  l i v e s  become fragmented and 
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c h a o t i c  . . . "  P i tk i n  sums up O a k e s h o t t ' s  Ra t iona l ism in P o l i t i c s  
by showing t h a t  t r a d i t i o n  can se rve  as a b a s i s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s io n s  
through:
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F i r s t ,  do no t  in t roduc e  p r i n c i p l e s  
o r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a l i e n  t o  the  i n d i ­
genous t r a d i t i o n s .  Second,  s t r i v e  
always to  enhance coherence w i th in  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  t r a d i t i o n ( s )  ; where the  
e x i s t i n g  p a t t e r n s  c o n f l i c t ,  a c t  so as 
t o  reduce t h a t  c o n f l i c t .  T h i rd ,  do 
no t  hope t o  f in d  answers in any ab­
s t r a c t  p r i n c i p l e ,  but  immerse y o u r ­
s e l f  in  c onc re te  knowledge o f  your  
community.57
While t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  does pretend  to  c r i t i q u e  e i t h e r  Oakeshot t  
o r  P i t k i n ,  t h e  f a c i l e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  found in  Weinstein and in  P i t k i n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t h e  t h i r d  reason given  in t h e  above quo te ,  demons tra te  
q u i t e  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  complaints  of  both Chomsky and Collingwood s in c e  
i t  appears  t h a t  Col lingwood, Chomsky, and Oakeshot t  a r e  a l l  t h r e e  ex­
p r e s s in g  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  wi th our  manner o f  knowing, empir ic ism.
In the  same v e in ,  Collingwood cha l l enged  a n o th e r  empir ical  
s tu dy ,  t h a t  o f  economics. In an a r t i c l e ,  "Economics as  a Ph i lo soph ica l  
S c i en c e , "  w r i t t e n  in  1925, wherein he explored  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be­
tween economics and va lue ,  Collingwood held t h a t ,  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,
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economics cannot  be understood a p a r t  from moral a c t i o n .  While a l l
"moral a c t i o n  . . .  has w i th in  i t  a sub o rd in a te  e lement  o f  economic
59
a c t i o n , "  t h i s  does not  appear  t o  be the  case with economic a c t i o n .
There a r e  t h r e e  forms o f  a c t i o n :  impulsive a c t i o n ,  economic a c t i o n ,
and moral a c t i o n .  In a l l  a c t i o n ,  " impulse o r  d e s i r e  play  a p a r t "  and,
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in  some se n se ,  " a l l  a c t ion  i s  im p u l s iv e . "  "In economic a c t i o n ,
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impulse i s  . . . subord ina te  to  d u t y . "  Economic a c t s  u s u a l ly
a s s e r t  a r e l a t i o n  between two t h i n g s :  the  immediate a c t  and the  
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media te  a c t .  An immediate a c t  i s  the  means and i t  i s  cons idered  
usefu l  o r  p ruden t ;  a mediate  a c t  i s  t h e  end, possess ing  d e s i r e d n e s s .
Cont rary to  the  usual  economic language,  ph i losophy a s s e r t s  t h a t  "al l
economic exchange i s  an exchange between a person and h im se l f .  I f
t h e  appeal i s  made to  more than one person in such a d i s c u s s io n ,  the
r e j o i n d e r  i s  t h a t  a d e s i r e d  a c t i v i t y  cannot  be t r a n s f e r r e d .
Now because ,  in an economic a c t ,  I am 
answerable  t o  myse l f  only f o r  d r iv in g  
with myself  a ba rga in  which s h a l l  s a t i s ­
fy  m yse l f ,  i t  fol lows t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
appeal  from t h i i s  a c t :  t h e r e  i s  no 
f i x i n g  th e  r i g h t  p r i c e  of  anything 
excep t  by f in d in g  ou t  the  p r i c e  which, 
a t  the  moment o f  purchase ,  the  purchase r  
i s  w i l l i n g  to  p a y .63
Thus, demand as i t  i s  used by empi r ica l  economicsts i s  not  synonymous
wi th d e s i r e .  The no t ion  t h a t  p r i c e  i s  dependent  upon demand i s
f a l l a c i o u s  in i t s  assumption because "I r e a l l y  pay f o r  . . .  my ea t ing
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o f  t h i s  pi ece  o f  b read ; "
P r ic e s  a re  thus f i x e d  a f r e s h  by every 
s i n g l e  a c t  o f  exchange t h a t  t akes  
p l a c e .  Every such a c t  i s  a de te rmina­
t i o n  of  v a lu e ;  and va lue  in  t h e  econ­
omic sense  of  t h e  word cannot  be d e t e r ­
mined in  any o t h e r  way.65
The formula "buy in  the  cheapes t  market  and s e l l  in  the  d e a re s t "  i s
a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  buying and s e l l i n g ,  g ene ra t ing  a c o n f l i c t  w i th in  the
a c t  between t h e  means and t h e  end. Each economic a c t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,
a t t empts  to  evade o r  t o  minimize the  means. In o t h e r  words,  i t  i s
a c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t .  In t h i s  c a s e ,  i t  i s  imposs ib le  f o r  p r i c e s
to  be f ix e d  wi th  r e f e r e n c e  to  j u s t i c e  o r  to  moral concep t ions .
Collingwood has condemned the  idea  of  "consumerism" and "bargaining"
in the  labour  marke t .  These a re  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  in t erms.  When a
moral motive i s  imputed in to  an economic q u e s t i o n ,  the  demand i s
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then a g i f t .  Yet t h e  demand f o r  a J u s t  wage or  p r i c e  has both an un­
sound and a sound motive.
. . .  the  demand f o r  a j u s t  wage . . . 
t s  a r a t i o n a l  demand and deserving  of  
r e s p e c t f u l  a t t e n t i o n  i f  i t  i s  based on 
the  b e l i e f  t h a t  s p e c i a l  c i r cumstances ,  
which ought  not  t o  e x i s t ,  induce c e r ­
t a i n  wage-earners  t o  accep t  a lower wage 
than t h a t  which they  would accep t  i f  
t h e s e  circumstances  were removed. I f  
such c ircumstances e x i s t ,  they ought
t o  be removed, f o r  i n s t a n c e  by l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  . . .60
What l e g i s l a t i o n  should do, as Collingwood env is ioned i t ,  i s  to  amend
a cond i t ion  of  s o c i e t y ,  no t  t o  f i x  wages. On the o t h e r  hand,  when
th e  demand f o r  a j u s t  wage i s  merely a d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  wi th  e x i s t i n g
wages,  a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  not  a s e r io u s  propounding o f  a
s tanda rd  but  i s  merely a demand f o r  more, an i r r a t i o n a l  demand. Yet
i t  i s  p r e d i c t a b l e  of  economic a c t i o n .  ".  . . i t  i s  only when we cease
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t o  barga in  t h a t  we cease  t o  d i s s a t i s f i e d  with our  b a r g a i n s . "  "Con­
f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  c om pe t i t ion ,  t h e  w i l l  t o  d r iv e  a hard b a rg a i n ,  i s
th e  essence  o f  economic a c t i o n ,  and a s o c i e t y  in which economic a c t io n
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has no p lace  i s  c e r t a i n l y  a u t o p i a . "  Cooperation i s  necessa ry  in
any economic system. The u top ian  dreams, however, a r e  no t  t o  be con­
demned "ag a in s t  the  worship of  ga in  and the  acquiescence  in a com-
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p e t i t i v e  system . . . "  Since empi r ica l  sc ience  reduces a l l  concepts  
t o  the  leve l  o f  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  important  t o  a c i v i l i z a t i o n  to
see  exchange as wel l as t h e  ba lance  o f  means a g a in s t  ends.
The foregoing d i sc u s s io n  i l l u s t r a t e s  Col l ingwood's  c r i t i c i s m  
of empir ic ism,  h i s  no t ions  of  a c i v i l i z e d  community, and the  l e t t e r ' s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  the  na tu r a l  world .  A c i v i l i z e d  community, he s a i d ,
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has now lea rned  to  " e x p l o i t  the  n a tu r a l  world in a s c i e n t i f i c  and i n -  
70
t e l l i g e n t  way." Our needs of  the  n a tu r a l  world a r e  c o n s t a n t ly  in
in f l u x .  Then what i s  t h e  meaning o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n ?
Wealth i s  a comparat ive te rm ;  i t  must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from 
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r i c h e s .  "The a d j e c t i v e  'w e a l thy '  a p p l i e s  p r im a r i ly  t o  a community
and only in  a secondary sense t o  i t s  ind iv idua l  members" whereas
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' r i c h '  i s  more a p p l i c a b l e  to  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Collingwood be l i eved
t h a t  i t  was in t h i s  sense t h a t  Adam Smith conceived The Wealth of
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Nat ions .  A comparat ive term involves  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a s tandard in
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t h a t  i t  measures up to  a s tanda rd  o f  goodness . A r e l a t i v e  term i s
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c o n t r a s t e d  "with i t s  own c o r r e l a t i v e . " While terms may be both 
r e l a t i v e  and comparat ive,  those  which a r e  pu re ly  r e l a t i v e  have no 
s tanda rd .
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  the  c o n t r a s t  between 
r i c h  and poor  i s  an o f fe nc e  a g a in s t  
the  ideal  of  c i v i l i t y ;  f o r  i t  involves  
the  c o ns ta n t  use o f  one kind of  fo rc e  
by the  r i c h  in a l l  t h e i r  d e a l ings  wi th  
the  poor;  economic f o r c e ;  t h e  fo rce  
whose essence  i t  i s  to  compel the  poor 
to  accep t  o r  give  u n j u s t  p r i c e s  in a l l  
t h e i r  d e a l ings  with the  r i c h . 76
Even though Collingwood a s s e r t e d  t h a t  a " c o n t r a s t  between r ic h  and
poor i s  an of fence  a g a i n s t  t h e  idea l  o f  c i v i l i t y , "  he dec la red  t h a t
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i t  was not  n e c e s s a r i l y  an of fence  a g a i n s t  a p a r t i c u l a r  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  
Even s o ,  " those  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  
c i v i l i z a t i o n  . . . must recognize  . . . t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a con­
t r a s t  between r i c h  and poor ,  even a s l i g h t  c o n t r a s t ,  i s  an element  of  
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b a r b a r i t y  in  i t , "  Perhaps a s l i g h t  c o n t r a s t  could be considered 
a c ce p tab l e  provided t h a t  the  r i c h e r  e lement  pays in s e rv i c e  to  the
- 104 -
e n t i r e  community. A wise community "wil l  examine i t s  economic l i f e "
c a r e f u l l y  to  see  t f  t h e  c o n t r a s t  can be j u s t i f i e d  w i thou t  too much
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in road  on i t s  c a p i t a l . The o n ly  reason f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a body
p o l i t i c  i s  t o  p e rp e t u a t e  A r i s t o t l e ' s  "good l i f e " ,  which i s  c a l l e d  
80
c i v i l i z a t i o n .
To accumulate  weal th  i n  o r d e r  t o  c r e a t e  
by i t s  means a c o n t r a s t  between r i c h  
and poor  i s  to  use i t  f o r  the  d e s t r u c t i o n  
o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  o r  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  b a r ­
barism.®'
C i v i l i z a t i o n ,  g e n e r i c a l l y ,  impl ie s  a process  under way in a
community; i t  i s  a p rocess  o f  becoming in a double  sense :  f i r s t ,  t h a t
o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  wi th  h i s  fe l lows  and the  abseence o f
th e  use o f  fo rce  and ,  second,  t h a t  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p
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to  t h e  n a tu ra l  world showing i n d u s t r y  and i n t e l l i g e n c e .  These two
ideas  a r e  l in k e d  by a d i a l e c t i c a l  p r o c e s s ,  t h a t  o f  th in k in g  upon t h e
same s u b je c t  wi th o t h e r s  and then a r r i v i n g  a t  agreement with them
withou t  t h e  use o f  f o r c e .
Being c i v i l i z e d  means l i v i n g ,  so f a r  
as p o s s i b l e , d i a l e c t i c a l l y  . . .  in 
a c o n s t a n t  endeavor  t o  conve r t  every 
occas ion o f  non-agreement  i n to  an 
occas ion o f  agreement .
The f i r s t  example o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  which has been given has 
been t h a t  o f  t h e  educa t ion  o f  c h i l d r e n  o r  the  ru le d  c l a s s ,  the  non­
s o c i a l  e lement  in  t h e  community and th e  importance o f  the  f am i ly ;  
the  second comment upon c i v i l i z a t i o n  has been concerned with wealth 
w i th in  a community and i t s  necessa ry  d i f f u s i o n  throughout  the  com­
munity so t h a t  both poverty  and r i c h e s  a r e  a b o l i s h e d .  C i v i l i z a t i o n  
can be viewed in  t h e  f i r s t  example as a t a s k  and in the  second
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example as a p roduct .
In the  European community, the  r u l e  o f  law has been viewed as  a 
necessa ry  element  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  The r u l e  o f  law c on ta in s  f o u r  im­
p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  European c i v i l i z a t i o n :  ( l ) t h a t  law i s  made, ( 2 ) t h a t  
those  under the  law "can f i n d  ou t  what i t  i s , "  ( 3 ) t h a t  cour t s  must be
e s t a b l i s h e d  where judgments can be given accord ing  to  law,  (4 ) t h a t
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" th e r e  must be e q u a l i t y  be fo re  t h e  law."  The European comnunity 
became accustomed t o  a s tanda rd  o f  law under Rome as a p a r t  o f  the  
d i a l e c t i c a l  p rocess .  Law has c a r r i e d  t h e  i m p l ic a t i o n  t h a t  l i t i g a t i o n  
d i s p e l l e d  t h e  blood feud and the  e r i s t i c a l  argument .  In t h e  t w e n t i e th  
c e n tu r y ,  we have encouraged t h e  no t ion  t h a t  going to  law i s  an e r i s ­
t i c a l  process  r a t h e r  than a d i a l e c t i c a l  p r oce s s .  Law has meant peace 
and o r d e r  t o  the  people coming under  the  sway o f  t h e  Roman c i v i l i z a ­
t i o n .  Force has been used f o r  t h e  sake of  ag reanen t .  Law and o r d e r
has come to  mean "what c i v i l i z a t i o n  demands o f  you j u s t  as peace and
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p le n ty  have become "a f a m i l i a r  name f o r  the  f r u i t s  of  c i v i l i z e d  l i f e . "
The va lue  in h e r e n t  in  t h e  r u l e  o f  law i s  j u s t i c e ;  t h i s  va lue  i s  i n ­
t r i n s i c .  Peace and p l e n t y ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand,  i s  what the  s tandard
o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  promises you. This  l a t t e r  can be had wi thou t  t h e  r u l e  
o f  law. Yet law and o r d e r  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  a communal l i f e .  As
a by -p roduc t ,  a community o f  law and o rde r  " i s  a l i f e  o f  peace and 
86
p l e n t y . "
S u r e ly ,  we can remark t h a t ,  in t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  the  tw e n t i e th  
c e n tu r y ,  not  only i s  t h e  r u l e  of law an e r i s t i c a l  p ro ce s s ,  i t  seldom 
i s  l ikew ise  a d i a l e c t i c a l  p r oce s s .  Have we reve r sed  th e  process  o f  
c i v i l i z a t i o n ?  The q u e s t i o n ,  under  the  under the  s c r u t i n y  o f  Col l ingwood's
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s t a nda rd  o f  ph i lo soph ica l  s c h o l a r l y  s t a n d a r d s ,  would appear  to  be a 
n e ga t ive  r e p l y .  While we a r e  t au g h t  to  th in k  o f  the  law as an i n s t i -  
u t to n  s e rv ing  the  e n t i r e  community, i t  has become In c re a s in g ly  d i s ­
comfort ing to  d i sc o v e r  t h a t  the  law i s  both w r i t t e n  and enforced in 
a manner which has been deemed r a c i s t ,  c l a s s - c o n s c io u s ,  and sex-  
b ia se d .
The meaning o f  nf -ue and p len ty  means e x e r t io n  in a c t i v i t y .
Peace i s  dynamic; i t  i s  both i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l .  The former means
th e  suppress io n  o f  c i v i l  war ,  a complex and s t renuous  t a s k .  Civi l
war,  which s h o u l d n ' t  happen i f  the  ru led  c l a s s  does i t s  job w e l l ,  can
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be s e t t l e d  only through r e p r e s s i o n  and c o n c i l i a t i o n .  Represen ta t ive
o f  t h e  r e p r e s s i v e  type  i s  t h e  g a ngs te r  who b r ings  problems of  c i v i l
d i s o r d e r ;  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  t h e  c o n c i l i a t o r y  type  o f  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r  is
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t h e  man who f e e l s  he has been u n j u s t l y  used. I f  being c i v i l i z e d
means to  l i v e  d i a l e c t i c a l l y ,  t h i s  means t h a t  a p e r s o n ' s  passions  and
d e s i r e s  have been overcome through an a s s e r t i o n  o f  o n e ' s  f r e e  w i l l ;
t h i s  i s  t o  l i v e  a t  a r a t h e r  "high and arduous leve l  o f  mental a d u l t -  
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n e s s . "  Gangster ism i s  the  breakdown o f  mental m a tu r i t y ;  t h i s  type
can p re tend  to  be c lo thed  in  t h e  garment o f  g r ievance .  The t e s t  o f
such an a c t  i s  each p e r s o n ' s  am enab i l i ty  towards agreement.
In communities where t h e  r u l e r s  q u a r r e l ,  should the quarre l
l ea d  to  v i o l e n c e ,  t h e  community i s  e i t h e r  i l l - g o v e r n e d  or  i t  has the 
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e r i s t i c  h a b i t .  I t  i s  v i t a l l y  impor tan t  to  see t h a t  i f  the  e n t i r e  
burden o f  keeping th e  peace i s  l e f t  up t o  the  s t a t e ,  t h i s  means t h a t  
t h e  s t a t e  i s  pe rce ived  by the  populace as being i n e f f i c i e n t  so t h a t  
the  Third  Law o f  P o l i t i c s  does not  o p e r a t e ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  no sha re  o f  >
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th e  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  process  i s  shared by th e  r u l e d .  The t r a d i t i o n  in
Engl ish law has been t h a t  each person kept  h i s  own peace .  To take
educat ion from the  hands of  the  pa ren t s  and t o  put  in  i n to  the  hands
of  the  s t a t e  i s  t o  ensure t h a t  t h e  job  o f  s o c i a l i z a t i on cannot  be ade-
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qu a te ly  be done. A community wherein "peace i s  adequate ly  kept"
and q u a r r e l s  a re  ave r t ed  be fore  they  happen " i s  c a l l e d  a w e l l -
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mannered community." This i s  due t o  t r a d i t i o n  and custom.
"Plen ty means a l i f e  o f  mutual ad jus tment  between the  p o s i t i v e
o r  commodity-creating elements of  the  economic process  and the  nega-
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t i v e  o r  commodity-destroying e lem en ts . "  To keep a c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  a
balance must be s t r u c k  which enables  a person to  m ain ta in  h im se l f ,
t ake  ca re  o f  the  educat ion o f  c h i l d r e n ,  and to  m ain ta in  h e a l th  as
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well as to  p repare  t h e  e n t i r e  community from enemy a t t a c k .  Commod­
i t y - c r e a t i n g  elements  a re  those  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  consumption bu t  t h i s
does not  inc lude  keeping p r i c e s  up nor  to  promoting a l i f e  of  mere 
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consumption.  P len ty  can be main tained by c o n t r o l l i n g  both d i s t r i ­
bu t ion  and consumption.  Commodity-destroying elements a re  those  p r o ­
moting power and d i s p l a y  as consumption. There i s  a l s o  t h e  element  
o f  t h r i f t  d i sp layed  by both t h e  i nd iv idua l  and t h e  c o l l e c t i v e .  To 
d i s t i n g u i s h  between the  " k in g ' s  t h r i f t "  and " p r i v a t e  t h r i f t "  s t i l l  
means seeing t h a t  every person has peace and p l e n ty  so t h a t  he can 
provide hi s  own t h r i f t .
In c o n t r a s t  t o  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  t h e r e  a re  two ways o f  being un-
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c i v i l i z e d ;  t h a t  o f  barbar ism and t h a t  of  savagery .  Savagery,  
n e g a t i v e l y ,  connotes  being c i v i l i z e d  only t o  a c e r t a i n  p o i n t ;  b a r ­
bar ism impl ies  h o s t i l i t y  towards c i v i l i z a t i o n .  These a re  importan t
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d i s t i n c t i o n s .  I f  the  c o r r e c t  meaning of  verbs  ending in ' i z e  i s  sought ,
in  t h e  Greek r e f e r e n c e ,  t h e s e  were d e r i v a t i v e  from a r e f e r e n c e  to  imi-  
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t a t i v e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  Two-other c la s se s ,  then d e r iv e  from ' i z e '  ve rbs :
"denot ing an a c t  o f  i m i t a t i o n , "  and ' 1s t ' ,  "denot ing an imi-  
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È a t o r ."  Searching f o r  t h e  ground of  meaning in t h e  terms c i v i l i z e d
versus  u n c i v i l i z e d ,  Collingwood found t h e  da ta  as " the  sen t iment  of
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approval  o r  d i s a p p r o v a l . "  Now sen t iment  i s  both emotional  and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l .  " I t  begins  in an emotional  form as an impulse . . .  ;
i t  ends with what may be c a l l e d  a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  the  same emo­
t i o n a l  impulse,  v iz  a reasoned case f o r  going in  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  or  
TO!
t h a t . "  Although th e  term r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  must today  be used cau­
t i o u s l y ,  t h e r e  a re  moral sen t iments  y e t  a t t a c h e d .  A sen t im en t  is
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s o c i a l  when i t  concerns "ac t s  done by a s o c i e t y . "  In s o c ia l  sen­
t im en t  ( a c t io n )  ( r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ) ,  the  aim i s  t o  con t ro l  the  t h in g s  
^  do. The moral e lement  he re  l i e s  in  i t s  concern f o r  f r e e  a c t i o n ,
" ac t ion  f o r  which every member o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  in q u e s t io n  i s  j o i n t l y  
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r e s p o n s i b l e . "  The pr imary aim o f  s en t iment  as i t  ope ra te s  in
s o c i e t a l  members' minds i s  t o  c i v i l i z e .
When t h e  sen t iment  i s  ne a r  the  
emotional end o f  i t s  s c a l e ,  the
agent  in  whom i t  works I s  r e l a ­
t i v e l y  unaware of  i t s  working;  he 
does what i t  b ids  but  without  
th in k ing  t h a t  he a c t s  a t  the  b i d ­
ding o f  s en t im e n t ,  l e t  a lone  a sen­
t iment  which i s  c i v i l i z i n g  h i s  a c t i o n s . '04
When th e  sen t iment  approaches t h e  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  end of  i t s  s c a l e ,  the  
agent  in whom i t  works i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
aware o f  i t s  working;  he does what 
i t  b ids  no l e s s  and no more than he 
d id ,  but  he does so in the  awareness
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t h a t  he a c t s  under  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  
s en t im en t ,  and t o  t h i s  may be added 
the  f u r t h e r  consciousness  t h a t  t h i s  
in f lue nce  i s  a c i v i l i z i n g  i n f l u e n c e . 105
The former method i s  an i n f a l l i b l e  
s ign o f  p o l i t i c a l  incompetence in 
r u l e r s  and f e r t i l e  source  o f  weakness 
in t h e i r  r u l e . 106
Barbarism works in r e v e r s e ;  i t  works n e g a t i v e l y  nea r  the  emotional
end of  t h e  s c a l e .  I f  a b a r b a r i s t  i s  ben t  upon d e s t roy ing  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,
he knows what c i v i l i z a t i o n  i s .
The p rocess  o f  s o c i a l i z i n g  th e  non­
s o c ia l  community i s  t h e  p rocess  of  
c i v i l i z i n g  i t . 107
The advantage of  t h e  b a r b a r i s t  l i e s  in  the  unpreparedness  o f  h i s  
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opponent.  Yet t h e  even tual  d e f e a t  o f  barbar ism i s  a s su red  because 
t h e r e  always remains p a r t i s a n s  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n s .  The very term b a r ­
barism impl ie s  a q ua r r e l  between h im se l f  and any c i v i l i z e d  person;
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q u a r r e l s  a r e  o f te n  pushed to  t h e  p o i n t  o f  war.
A c o ns ta n t  theme running th roughout  t h i s  e f f o r t  to  i n v e s t i g a t e  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophy o f  Collingwood and the  " D i a l e c t i c s  o f  P o l i ­
t i c a l  Choice" has been th e  complexi ty  o f  Col l ingwood 's  thought  as wel l 
as the  a b s o lu t e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  see t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  the  whole.  
Another underly ing theme, perhaps no t  s t r e s s e d  enough, has been the  
d i r e c t l y  opposing viewpoints  o f  commentaries upon t h e  work o f  C o l l i n g ­
wood; some o f  the  reviewers  o f  h i s  work have r e fu sed  to  approach him 
in  an e n t i r e l y  s c h o la r ly  manner due t o :  ( l ) r e v i e w in g  h i s  work p i e c e ­
meal o r  ( 2 )be labour ing  a p o i n t  in  o r d e r  t o  support  a more popular  
p o s i t i o n ,  (3 )missing e lements ,  such as  the  importance o f  his
phi losophy  of  mind o r  t h e  ' d i a l e c t i c '  concept  so t h a t  the  whole is  
' s k e w e d ' .
Rather  than d e t a i l i n g  an account  o f  t h e  f o u r  barbar isms p r e ­
sen ted  by Collingwood a t  t h e  conc lus ion  o f  The New L e v ia tha n , two 
im por tan t  t h e o r i e s  o f  Collingwood i n h e r e n t  in  them, s in c e  they  a re  
based upon h i s t o r y ,  a r e  h i s  ' i d e a  o f  h i s t o r y '  and h i s  ' d i a l e c t i c ' .
In o r d e r  t o  deal with ' t h e  idea  o f  h i s t o r y '  s u c c i n c t l y ,  two s ho r t  
a r t i c l e s  by Louis 0 .  Mink and Leon J .  Go lds te in  p lus  some comments 
by Lionel  J .  Rubinoff  w i l l  be u t i l i z e d .  Some a u thors  who a re  more 
c r i t i c a l  o f  Col l ingwood's  work than a r e  t h e s e  t h r e e  au thors  may 
o b j e c t  t o  an a p p a re n t ly  "b iased"  s e l e c t i o n ;  however, t h e s e  reviewers  
have defended t h e i r  more s u ppo r t ive  p o s i t i o n  o f  Collingwood q u i t e  
c a r e f u l l y .  For example,  G o l d s t e i n ' s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  Col l ingwood's  r e ­
viewers  i s  t h a t  they  have;  ( l ) r e f u s e d  t o  "approach h i s  view on h i s
own t e rm s ,"  (2)made "no e f f o r t  . . .  t o  p lac e  The Idea o f  H is to ry  in
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i t s  own p roper  c o n t e x t . "  Mink contends t h a t :  ( l ) " t h e  growing
c r i t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  on Col l ingwood's  phi losophy o f  h i s t o r y  has taken
i t s  proof  from The Idea o f  H is to ry  . . . [ a l though ]  few a t tempts
[have been made] t o  range Col l ingwood 's  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n s
a g a i n s t  h i s  own ac tu a l  p r a c t i c e  as a working h i s t o r i a n  o f  Roman 
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B r i t a i n  . . . "  Mink makes the  p o i n t  t h a t  the  ' r e c e s s i v e '  ideas  
o f  Collingwood have almost  escaped n o t i c e  so t h a t  a t t e n t i o n  has been 
r i v e t e d  on 'dominant '  i d e a s .  The answer s u p p l i e d  by Golds te in  t o  
th e  charges  o f  c r i t i c s  o f  Col l ingwood's  concerns t h e  concept  of  
" r e t h in k i n g  o r  r e - e n a c t in g  p a s t  thought"  and t h a t  o f  human a c t i o n .
-111-
an impor tant  idea  in the  phi losophy of  Collingwood and one which i s  
very p e r t i n e n t  t o  the  idea  o f  a ' d i a l e c t i c  o f  c h o i c e ' .  Golds tein 
has taken  ca re  t o  provide  severa l  examples in o rde r  to  prove h i s  
p o i n t ;  t h e s e  examples w i l l  no t  be r e l a t e d  he re .  The l inkage  between 
th e  concept  o f  r e th i n k in g  o r  re-enactment  o f  p a s t  t hough t ,  a c t i o n ,  
and i t s  p lace  in  t h e  phi losophy o f  Collingwood has a l s o  been emphasized 
by Lionel  Rubinoff in h i s  s tu d y ,  Collingwood and th e  Reform o f  Meta­
p h y s i c s . Rubinoff emphasizes the  s t r e s s  pl aced by Collingwood on 
looking a t  a body o f  knowledge in  a pure ly  d e s c r i p t i v e ,  o r  on a sub ­
j e c t i v e  and narrow lev e l  Cab i n t r a )  and t h a t  on a normative o r  meta­
phys ica l  l eve l  which i s  then d iv ided  in to  t h r e e  f u r t h e r  on to log ica l  
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l e v e l s  (ab e x t r a ) .
The g i s t  o f  Col l ingwood's  concept  o f  h i s t o r y ,  as  expressed  by 
G o ld s te in ,  in a r e b u t t a l  t o  Col l ingwood's  c r i t i c s  i s  as fo l lows :
( 1 ) H i s t o r i c a l  events  a re  human a c t i o n s .
(2)Thought  i s  t h e  i n s i d e  o f  an a c t i o n .
( 3 ) Re-enactment  i s  r e th in k in g  r e l e v a n t  p a s t  thought  which is  
provided in  abody o f  h i s t o r i c a l  evidence because:
( a ) c u l t u r a l  t r a d i t i o n s  a re  unconsciously c a r r i e d  on in 
o n e ' s  t h in k i n g ,
(b)human a c t i o n  i s  no t  b e h a v io r i s t  in Col l ingwood's  terms;  
human a c t i o n  stems from the  f a c t s  plus  the  thought  of  
t h e  a c t o r  as based upon ( a ) . 116
In Mink's account  o f  Col l ingwood's  phi losophy o f  h i s t o r y ,  he 
p o s t u l a t e s  the  fo l lowing l i s t  o f  f a c t o r s  to  keep in mind:
( 1 ) H i s t o r i c a l  knowledge i s  d i a l e c t i c a l .
( 2 ) Hi s t o r y  i s  a s c ie nc e  o f  mind; psychology i s  no t .
( 3 )H is to ry  i s  a form o f  consciousness  r e f l e c t i n g  " r a t io n a l  and
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d e l i b e r a t e  i nd iv idua l  a c t i o n  ( r e - e n a c te d  in the  'mind o f  the  
h i s t o r i a n '  as  e x a c t ly  as p o s s ib l e  as i t  was enacted and 
known to  be enacted  by the  a g e n t ) ,  but  a l so  process  o f  change 
o f  which no p a r t i c i p a t e  could have given the  account  which 
h i s t o r i c a l  inq u i ry  can g i v e . l  17
(4 )H is to ry  i s  t h a t  " ' t h o u g h t '  which h i s t o r i c a l  i n q u i r y  seeks
to  r e - e n a c t  does no t  exclude bu t  inc ludes  emot ions,  d e s i r e s ,  
motives ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  and a c t s  o f  w i l l  — a l l  those  non- 
r a t i o n a l  a s p ec t s  o f  human l i f e  which Collingwood has been 
thought  by c r i t i c s  o f  h i s  ' idea l  ism^ to  have f o r c i b l y  ex­
p e l l e d  from th e  f i e l d  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  k n o w l e d g e . " ^ T 8
(5)Collingwood used the  term h i s t o r y  e m p i r i c a l l y  to  " r e f e r  to  
the  s p e c i f i c  c l a s s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  and p roduc ts  o r d i n a r i l y  
c a l l e d  by t h a t  name, bu t  a l s o  o f ten  phi losophy t o  r e f e r  to  
a form o f  consc iousness ;  "Collingwood's  phi losophy o f  mind 
i s  not  an e n t i t y  bu t  i s  a s e t  o f  " a c t i v i t i e s  e f f e c t i v e  o f  
consciousness  . . ."119
Mink's l o g ic a l  r ep ly  t o  those  who c r i t i c i z e  Coll ingwood's  idea  of
h i s t o r y  must begin with "Collingwood's  d i a l e c t i c a l  phi losophy which
a w a i t s  t h e  unsparing c r i t i c i s m  which i s  i t s  due and which i t  has not  
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y e t  r e c e iv e d . "
' Collingwood drew a d i s t i n c t i o n  between h i s t o r y  and 'pseudo-
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h i s t o r y .  ' H i s to ry  concerns ' ' n a r r a t i v e s  o f  purposive  a c t i v i t y " ;
122
in  p se u d o -h i s to ry ,  " the re  is  no concept ion o f  purpose ."  He ex­
p ressed  t h i s  "new concept ion o f  h i s t o r y "  in the  phrase :  ' a l l  h i s t o r y
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i s  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h o u g h t ' .  We can know the  h i s t o r y  o f  a thought  
through language o r  in one o f  the  many forms o f  e x p re s s iv e  a c t i v i t y .
I f  Col l ingwood's  ideas  upon h i s t o r y  a r e  l inked  with h i s  e f f o r t s  in 
metaphys ics ,  the  no t ion o f  a r e l a t i v e  p re s u p p o s i t i o n  appears  im­
p l i c i t l y  in ques t ions  a r i s i n g  about  evidence which presupposes  know­
led g e .  An abso lu te  p r e suppos i t ion  i s  something which goes u n v e r i f i e d ,  
unques t ioned ,  and undi scovered.  Donagan t akes  a po r t io n  o f
Coll ingwood's  meaning to  be t h a t  any s e r i e s  o f  ques t ions  and answers
would be " l o g i c a l l y  imposs ible"  excep t  f o r  a b so lu te  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ;
he then i n t e r p r e t s  " lo g i c a l  i m p o s s ib i l i t y "  in terms o f  deduct ive
lo g ic  so t h a t  a r e f u t a t i o n  of  t h e  no t io n  a r i s e s  from th e  f a c t s  so
t h a t  "no p r e suppos i t ion  can be s e l f - e v i d e n t l y  a necessary  t r u t h  o r  a
c o n t r a d ic t io n "  as wel l as t h e  idea  t h a t  "any abs o lu t e  p resuppos i t ion
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can be converted i n to  a r e l a t i v e  one ."  Collingwood, however,
argued t h a t  "no two p ro p o s i t io n s  can c o n t r a d i c t  one ano the r  unless
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they a re  answers t o  the  same q u e s t i o n . "  I f  knowledge in  h i s t o r y  
i s  ques t ioned ,  we have no f u r t h e r  knowledge and our  ques t ion  becomes 
one o f  mere su sp ic ion .  Three importan t  f a c t o r s  have c o n t r i b u t e d  to  
Coll ingwood's  no t ion o f  r e t h i n k in g .  F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  h i s  concept  of  
h i s t o r y  as a whole; second i s  h i s  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  the  theo ry  o f  h i s ­
t o r i c a l  imaginat ion by which one can i n t e r p o l a t e  between known f a c t s  
to  produce the  whole;  t h i r d  t h e r e  i s  the  idea  t h a t  the  h i s t o r i a n  must 
t r e a t  as s e p a ra te  e n t i t i e s  what happened in the  p a s t  in terms o f
thought  and what happened in  terms o f  the  evidence and what t h e  h i s -  
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Contngwood's  New Leviathan i s  concerned with the'  ep is temolo -  
g ica l  problem o f  a general  theo ry  o f  human a c t i o n .  A fundamental 
assumption t h e r e i n  i s  t h a t  to  be concerned with t h e  i nd iv idua l  in the  
soc ia l  world impl ies  concern f o r  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  the  "person",  
t he  " soc ia l  world" ,  and " c i v i l i z a t i o n " .  To do t h i s  with the  r ig o u r  
expected by Collingwood means t h a t  a soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t  must be con­
cerned with phi losophy,  with the  phenomena o f  the  " s e l f "  and the  "no t-  
s e l f "  o r  the  soc ia l  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y .  To p roper ly  ach ieve  
t h i s  g o a l ,  the  whole must be grounded in the  phenomena o f  mind with in  
an h i s t o r i c a l  focus .  Coll ingwood's  phenomenological p h i lo soph ica l  
approach has fou r  f e a t u r e s :  i t  i s  hermeneut ic ( th e  l o g i c  of  ques t ion
and anwer);  i t  i s  e x p e r i e n t a l ,  o r  mind and thought  a re  i d e n t i c a l  to
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a c t  as expressed ;  i t  i s  d i a l e c t i c a l ;  i t  i s  h i s t o r i c a l .
There i s  an ambiguity in the  term "ac t ion"  because i t  has a 
t ime r e f e re n c e  such as an on-going course o f  an a c t i o n ' s  development , 
the c u r r e n t  development ( ep is tem olog ica l  framework) o f  the  i nd iv idua l  
and o f  h i s  s o c i e t y ,  and the  r e f l e c t i o n  (phi losophy in Collingwoodian 
terms) upon the completed a c t .  Act ion may be p resen ted  in t ime r e ­
f e rences  such as c u r r e n t ,  f u t u r e ,  and te rm in a ted .  Act ion o r  an a c t  is  
subjec t -bound .  Act ion or  a c t ,  considered  phenomenological ly as 
Collingwood has done, and meaning a re  i n t e g r a l  in t h e i r  ep is temic  
fu n c t io n .  That i s ,  meaning i s  bound to  the  very concept ion of  a c t i o n  
and i s  v i t a l  to  i t s  formation .  F u r th e r ,  ac t ion  i s  s i t u a t e d  in  a world 
o f  o t h e r s .  The human r e a l i t y  is  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ,  p e r s o n a l ,  and h i s ­
t o r i c a l .  An a n a ly s i s  o f  so c ia l  a c t i o n  cannot  be l im i t e d  to  the  sphere 
o f  contemporar ie s .  Collingwood has rooted a c t ion  in an epis t emolog ica l
framework involving  the  person in a phenomenological,  e x i s t e n t i a l
experi ence  which i s  d i a l e c t i c a l .  Al f red  Schütz wrote:  "Whoever
. . . wishes to  analyze the  b a s ic  concepts  o f  the  s oc ia l  s c iences
must be w i l l i n g  t o  embark on a l a b o r ious  ph i lo soph ica l  journey ,  f o r
the  m ean ing -s t ruc tu re  o f  the  soc ia l  world can only be deduced from
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the  most p r i v a t e  and general  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  consc iousness ."
Coll ingwood's  f i r s t  sen tence  in Speculum Mentis i s :  "All
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thought  e x i s t s  f o r  the  sake o f  a c t i o n . "  He combatted any c a te g o r i c a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between th ink ing  and a c t i n g  o r  between the  t h e o r e t i c a l  
and the  p r a c t i c a l .  Both th in k in g  and a c t i n g  a re  s tages  of  a s i n g l e ,  
cont inuous p rocess .  Mind i s  an a c t i v i t y .  Col l ingwood's  forms of  
experi ence  o r  forms o f  consciousness  a re  modes o f  a c t i o n .  To r e c a p i ­
t u l a t e ,  Col l ingwood's  bas ic  e x p o s i t io n  o f  mind, we f i n d ,  f i r s t ,  the  
leve l  o f  mind where a c t ion  o r i g i n a t e s  in pure f e e l i n g ,  an un loca l iz e d  
an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  awareness o f  an o rgan ic  s t a t e .  Consciousness  
o r i g i n a t e s  when a person becomes aware o f  a s t a t e  o f  f e e l i n g .  C o l l in g ­
wood d id  not  regard  mind as an e n t i t y ;  r a t h e r ,  mind i s  an a c t i v i t y  
wi th  e x p re s s iv e  f u n c t i o n s .  In Speculum M en t i s , Collingwood began by 
d e f in in g  pe rcep t ion  as the  s t a n d p o in t  wherein an ind iv idua l  becomes 
aware o f  an o b j e c t ;  hwoever, pe rcep t ion  " . . .  i s  no t  a b s t r a c t  immed­
iacy ( se n s a t io n )  but  con ta ins  i m p l i c i t l y  an element  o f  mediation
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(though t)  . . . "  Pe rcept ion i s  fundamental ly  mediat ion or  i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n  s ince  each s t a r t i n g  po in t  o f  though must a l r e ady  be the  pro-
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duct  of  though t .  Pe rcept ion  in t h i s  sense must be understood as 
r ea son ,  not  unders tand ing .  When Donagan contends t h a t  pe rcep t ion  im­
p l i e s  r eason ,  he has misconstrued Coll ingwood's  s c a l e  of  forms as
l e v e l s  o f  pe rcep t ion  equated with r eason ing .  Collingwood d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t e d  between p e rc e p t io n ,  r ea son ,  and unders tand ing .  The pe rcep t ion  
to  which Collingwood r e f e r r e d  in Speculum Mentis was not  l a t e r  r e ­
j e c t e d  in The Idea o f  H i s to r y . The moot p o i n t  t h a t  Collingwood made 
was t h a t  h i s t o r y  i s  s epara ted  from pe rc e p t ion  as reason ing  because i t  
i s  a t  the  s c a l e  l eve l  o f  h i s t o r y  t h a t  the  mind pe rc e ive s  unde rs tand ing 
as opposed to  r eason ing .
Taken as a whole, imag ina t ion ,  f a i t h ,  a b s t r a c t  and conc re te  
t h in k in g  a re  a l l  impl ied by any given a c t  o f  thought  a l though each 
may be a b a s i s  f o r  a s e p a r a te  s t a n d p o in t .  In any a c t  o f  knowing, 
t h e r e  must always be a conc re te  i d e n t i t y  between my mind and i t s  ob­
j e c t  in t h a t  my mind pe rce ives  the  o b j e c t  only as  I know i t .  The e sse
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o f  mind i s  de hac r e  c o g i t a r e . For t h i s  rea son ,  the  mind i s  i d e n t i ­
cal  with i t s  though ts .  Collingwood combined th e  ep is t em olog ica l  doc­
t r i n e  t h a t  a l l  knowledge i s  media t ion with the  metaphysical  d o c t r i n e  
o f  the  conc re te  u n i v e r s a l .  The ev idence o f  the  conc re te  un ive r sa l  
i s  no t ab l e  in Col l ingwood's  c laim t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  mind 
i s  on ly  one moment in a t o t a l i t y  i n c l u s i v e  o f  the  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  
o t h e r  minds. The pe rcep t ion  o f  an o b j e c t  i s  dependent upon the  e x i s ­
t ence  o f  a l l  o t h e r  moments. Each person c o n t r i b u t e s  to  the  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e r e  is  a world o f  ideas  and i d e a l s  f o r  o th e r s  bu t  a l s o ,  as  w e l l ,  
each person i n d i c a t e s  h i s  peresence as a knowing s u b j e c t  who d e s i r e s  
t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a world whereby the  o t h e r  has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  a c t  
in s i m i l a r  ways. This i s  a dual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  the  con­
d i t i o n  o f  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y .
In Rel igion  and Ph i lo sophy , Collingwood e l a b o r a t e d  upon the
i d e n t i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s ;
Any t r u t h  o r  idea l  o f  conduct  expre sses  
i t s e l f  under i n f i n i t e l y  va r ious  a s p e c t s .
A s i n g l e  t r u t h  never  means q u i t e  the  same 
th ing  to  d i f f e r e n t  minds; each person i n ­
ve s t s  i t  wi th an emphasis ,  an a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
p e c u l i a r  to  h im se l f .  This does not  mean 
t h a t  i t  i s  no t  the  same t r u t h ;  the  d i f f e r ­
ence does no t  d e s t ro y  the  i d e n t i t y  any
more than i d e n t i t y  de s t roys  d i f f e r e n c e .
I t  i s  only in the  i d e n t i t y  t h a t  the  
d i f f e r e n c e  a r i s e s . ^
The on to log ica l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  the  s e l f ,  i t s  source o f  i d e n t i t y ,  comes 
from s p e c i f i c  a c t s  through which the  mind r e l a t e s  i t s e l f  and thence ,  
c o n s t i t u t e s  i t s e l f ;  a t  the  same t ime,  t h e s e  a re  the  a c t s  whereby the 
mind d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  i t s e l f .
Col l ingwood's  system o f  l e v e l s  o f  consciousness  was developed 
by about  1933 wi th  the  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  An Essay on Ph i lo soph ica l  Method.
In d e a l ing  wi th  ques t ions  o f  moral ph i losophy,  Collingwood worked out
a s e r i e s  o f  mental f u nc t ions  r e l a t i n g  th e  forms o f  emotion,  a c t i v i t y ,  
and va lue  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  consc iousness .  These s t r a n d s  a re  
involved  in an a n a ly s i s  o f  a c t i o n .  In The New Leviathan and The 
P r i n c i p l e s  o f  A r t , Collingwood a l s o  p re s e n ted  the  connect ions  between 
the  l e v e l s  o f  consciousness  as a s e r i e s  o f  c o g n i t i v e  a c t i v i t y .  P rac ­
t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  and c o g n i t i v e  a c t i v i t y  a re  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  i n to  four  
l e v e l s  o f  consc iousness .  In l eve l  one, t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  not  y e t  
d i s t i n c t  while  a t  l e v e l s  two and t h r e e ,  a l though they a re  i n te r co n n e c te d ,
th ey  may be s e p a r a t e l y  ana lyzed.  At the  f o u r t h  l e v e l ,  a re -un ion  
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occu rs .  The rea de r  i s  r e f e r r e d  to  Chapter  I I  on "Man: A Philosophy 
o f  Mind."
According to  Louis 0. Mink, The process  o f  a b s t r a c t i o n  i s  . . .
_1?A.
the  o r i g i n a t i v e  power o f  consc iousness  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  . . .  one w i l l  
not  understand Collingwood i f  he t h in k s  o f  a b s t r a c t  concepts  as  p r o ­
duc ts  o f  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  p rocess  c a t e g o r i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from "non-
r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a p p e t i t e  and imag ina t ion ,  d e s i r e ,  and p e r -  
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c e p t i o n . "  For example, t h e  t e rm s ,  " a t t e n t i o n "  and " s e l e c t i v e  
a t t e n t i o n "  a re  the  f i r s t  s imple products  o f  a b s t r a c t i o n  from u n d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t e d  f e e l i n g .
S a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  t h e  form in which value 
appears  a t  t h e  second l e v e l ;  bu t  a l ­
though a p p e t i t e  can be s a t i s f i e d ,  i t  i s  
not  aware o f  i t s e l f  as s a t i s f i e d .  I t  
can be recognized  as such only by an 
a c t  o f  t h i r d - l e v e l  consc iousness .  To 
complete the  s e r i e s :  t h i r d - l e v e l  cons­
c iousness  has t h e  concept  of  s a t i s f a c ­
t i o n ,  but  i s  no t  aware o f  i t s e l f  as 
having t h i s  o r  any concep t .  The con­
c e p t  o f  a concept  i s  a f o u r t h - l e v e l  
a b s t r a c t i o n ,  and th e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  
t h i r d - l e v e l  consciousness  a b s t r a c t i n g  
the  concept  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  from 
second- leve l  a p p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t y  i s  
i t s e l f  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  f o u r t h - l e v e l  ab­
s t r a c t i o n  from t h i r d - l e v e l  a c t i v i t y . 13
Collingwood was convinced t h a t  a l l  t h in k in g  ( i . e .  a c t i v i t y )
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depended upon moral q u a l i t i e s  as much as upon i n t e l l e c t u a l  q u a l i t i e s .
In the  complexity  o f  Col lingwoodian though t ,  moral and e t h i c a l  q u a l ­
i t i e s  a r e  bound up wi th  knowledge in a s p e c i f i c  f a sh ion  as in the  
case o f  r e l i g i o n ,  the  second l eve l  o f  knowledge ( in  Col l ingwood's  con­
cep tual  scheme) and h i s  r a t h e r  famous p o s i t i o n  upon "abso lu te  p resup ­
p o s i t i o n s " ,  r e l a t e d  to  knowledge o r  ep is temology.  In Re l ig ion  and 
Ph i lo sophy , E.W.F. Tomlin p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  Collingwood r a i s e d  "almost
a l l  t he  problems with which dur ing the  next  t h r e e  decades [he] was to  
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concern h im s e l f . "  The aim o f  t h i s  volume was to :  ( l)show t h a t
--125-
r e l i g i o n  was a form of  knowledge, (2)prov ide  the source o f  C o l l in g ­
wood's d i f f e r e n c e s  wi th t h e  new sc ience  o f  psychology,  and ( 3 ) r e l a t e
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th e  in te rconnec tedness  of  emotion and knowledge.
Collingwood def ined  r e l i g i o n  as a necessa ry  mode o f  human cons­
c iousness .  In o rde r  to  examine the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  r e l i g i o n  to  the 
o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  consciousness ,  Collingwood posed the  fol lowing 
ques t ions :
1. What i s  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r e l i g i o n  "and the i n t e l l e c t ,  
t h a t  a c t i v i t y  o f  the  mind by which we th in k  and know . . ."?>7
a. Ceremony i s  based upon creed .
b. Truth and conduct  a re  r e l a t e d ;  conduct  and knowledge 
a re  not  d i v o rc e d .18 i f  ceremony o r  a c t i o n  i s  based 
upon creed stemming from b e l i e f ,  "a m o ra l i ty  a s s i s t e d  
by creed i s  m ora l i ty  founded upon the  i n t e l l e c t ,  f o r
to  judge something as t r u e  i s  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
func t ion  o f  the  i n t e l l e c t . "18
c. "There i s  no emotion which does not  e n t a i l  t he  a c t i v i t y  
o f  t h e  o t h e r  s o - c a l l e d  f a c u l t i e s  o f  the  mind. Rel igion 
. . .  i s  not  emotion in the  a b s t r a c t  a p a r t  from o th e r  
a c t i v i t i e s . "20 F u r th e r ,  t h e  term f e e l i n g  g e ne ra l ly  
denotes  "not  a p a r t i c u l a r  kind o f  a c t i v i t y  but  any s t a t e  
o f  mind o f  a somewhat vague, i n d e f i n i t e ,  o r  i n d i s t i n c t  
c h a r a c t e r  . . .  But r e l i g i o n  as a whole i s  not  d i s t i n ­
guished from o th e r  th ings  by i t s  vagueness and i n d e f i n ­
i t e n e s s . "21 At t im es ,  the  word f e e l i n g  i s  used as ab­
s o l u t e  conv ic t io n  "coupled with i n a b i l i t y  to  o f f e r  
proof  o r  exp lana t ion  o f  the  c o n v ic t io n .  In t h a t  case ,  
to  " f e e l "  the  t r u t h  o f  a s ta tement  would merely mean the  
same as to  know i t ;  and t h i s  use o f  the  word t h e r e f o r e
a lr eady  a s s e r t s  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  con ten t  o f  r e l i g i o n  . .
2. " .  . . r e l i g i o n  cannot  e x i s t  wi thou t  a d e f i n i t e  b e l i e f  as 
t o  t h e  na tu re  o f  God . . . [ a ]  s ta tement  o f  b e l i e f  . . . 
i s  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  con ten t  o f  r e l i g i o n . "23
3. " I f  r e l i g i o n  as creed is  i d e n t i c a l  with theo logy,  . .
and i f  " the  phi losophy o f  any s u b je c t  means care fu l  r e f l e c t i o n  
upon t h a t  s u b j e c t , "  then we have a "philosophy of  a r t ,  of
conduct ,  o f  s c i e n c e ,  and so on."  For example, committing a
crime i s  a c t i o n  while  r e f l e c t i n g  upon the  crime i s  e t h i c s ,  
conduct ing an argument i s  sc ience  and r e f l e c t i n g  upon i t  i s  
l o g i c ,  "Consciousness o f  t r u t h s  i s  common to r e l i g io n  and 
a l l  o t h e r  kinds o f  thought ;  . . ."24
-126-
The conc lusion from the  above arguments i s  t h a t  phi losophy i s  to  be
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from o t h e r  forms o f  knowledge by i t s  l ack o f  method and
25
i t s  employment o f  t h e  f r e e  a c t i v i t y  o f  c r i t i c a l  thought .  In t h i s  
sense o f  the  word, phi losophy and r e l i g i o n  a re  r a t h e r  i d e n t i c a l  be­
cause " the  aim o f  each a l i k e  [ i s ]  to  t ranscend  p a r t i c u l a r  po in t s  of
26
view, to  overcome th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  ind iv idua l  i n t e r e s t . "  The
u l t i m a t e  ques t ions  o f  phi losophy are  those  o f  r e l i g i o n ,  s c ie n c e ,  and
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a l l  forms o f  e x i s t i n g  knowledge.
Act ion i s  no t  s e pa ra b le  from thought  o r  knowledge un less  i t  i s  
some type o f  automatism s p r ing ing  from the  unconscious ;  a c t i o n  i s  
cus to m ar i ly  based upon a number o f  judgments ,  e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  
Collingwood has argued t h a t  t h e  "converse i s  e qua l ly  t r u e " ;  i f  know­
ing i s  a c t i v i t y ,  i f  t h ink ing  r e q u i r e s  e f f o r t ,  i f  t h e s e  a re  the o u t ­
come o f  cho ice ,  then " th e r e  can be no a c t i v i t y  o f  thought  a p a r t  from
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a c t i v i t y  o f  the  w i l l . "  On t h i s  premise,  the  " d i s t i n c t i o n  between a
l i f e  o f  thought  and a l i f e  o f  a c t i o n "  i s  f a l s e .  I f  thought  and a c t ion
a re  necessary  to  each o t h e r ,  and i f  r e l i g i o n  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  as having
a compound of  ph i losophy  and m o r a l i t y ,  phi losophy always involves
m ora l i ty  and t h u s ,  a l l  o f  l i f e  "shows the  composi te c h a r a c t e r  which
i s  t h e  mark o f  r e l i g i o n . "  Col l ingwood's  b e l i e f  as e s t a b l i s h e d  by
t h es e  arguments was t h a t  knowing and a c t in g  cannot  be s e p a r a te  nor  two
p a r t s  o f  the  mind because " the  whole s e l f  w i l l s ,  and the  whole s e l f  
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t h i n k s . "
. . . consciousness  and v o l i t i o n  . . . a l ­
ways e x i s t  s id e  by s id e  . . . a l l  consc ious ­
ness i s  v o l i t i o n a l ,  and . . . a l l  v o l i t i o n  
i s  conscious  . . . t he  mind i s  what i t  does ; 
i t  i s  no t  a th ing  t h a t  t h i n k s ,  but  a cons­
c iousne ss ;  no t  a th ing  t h a t  w i l l s ,  but  an
a c t i v i t y . 30
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r e f e rence  to  r e a l i t y  . . .  In con­
duct g e n e ra l l y  we have c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s ,  
ind iv idual  o r  s o c i a l ,  designed to  a t t a i n  
the  ends o f  m o ra l i t y ,  u t i l i t y ,  o r  the  
l i k e ;  psychology wi l l  s tudy  th es e  a c t i o n s  
wi thout  asking whether  they  a r e  r i g h t  o r  
wrong, but  t ak ing  them merely as th in gs
done .33
Coll ingwood's  a t t a c k  on psychology denied the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a 
psychological  s c ience  of  mind whose conc lus ions  t ake  t h e  form o f  gen­
e ra l  hypo the t ica l  s .  He did not  deny the  v a l i d i t y  o f  psychology as a 
s tudy  o f  f e e l i n g .  In h i s  Autobiography, he def ined  psychology as " the
sc ience  o f  s e n s a t io n ,  a p p e t i t e ,  and th e  emotions connected wi th  them"
34
and a l s o  a t  t imes with "psychopathology and psychotherapy."  His 
a t t a c k  upon psychology as a pseudo-sc ience  o f  the  mind would no t  i n ­
v a l i d a t e  the  more contemporary views o f  psychology as an experimental  
s c ience  o f  behaviour .  I f  Col l ingwood's  d i a l e c t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  mind 
i s  viewed as providing  a r e q u i s i t e  background f o r  unders tanding r e ­
f l e c t i v e  thought  a t  the  l eve l  o f  w i l l  and c ho ice ,  i t  i s  e a s i e r  to  
comprehend h i s  a t t a c k  upon psychology and psychotherapy.  Exper ience,  
accord ing  to  Collingwood, a t  the  f i r s t ,  second, and t h i r d  l e v e l s  o f  
consciousness  is  a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  temporal sequences.  For example, 
a p p e t i t e  and imagination a re  modes o f  consciousness  o f  f e e l i n g .  At 
the  t h i r d  l e v e l ,  d e s i r e s  and pe rc e p t ions  a re  a c t i v i t i e s  wi thou t  ob­
j e c t s .  At the  f o u r t h - l e v e l ,  consciousness  forms a s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l  
s e r i e s  so t h a t ,  whi le  the  lower leve l  s t a t e s  remain,  they a re  now 
modif ied .  Psychoana ly t ic  theo ry  main ta ins  t h a t  many a c t io n s  a r e  sym­
b o l i c  enactments o f  the  a c t o r ' s  unconscious d e s i r e s  and t h a t  reasons  
given then a r e  " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s " .  T w  o b je c t io n s  to  the s ta tements
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In h i s  d i sc u s s io n  o f  r e l i g i o n  and f e e l i n g  o r  emotion, C o l l in g ­
wood had to  be concerned with the  s tudy  o f  psychology.  While the  
p h i lo soph ica l  sc iences  such as l o g i c ,  e t h i c s ,  e t c . ,  a l so  at tempt  to  
s tudy t h e  mind, they  are  no t  p syc ho log ic a l .  I f  psychology as a s c ience  
cannot  be s e t  a p a r t  from phi losophy as a s tudy  o f  mind by i t s  s u b je c t  
m a t t e r  o r  by i t s  inc lu s io n  o f  conduct  (a t i t l e  a l r eady  claimed by 
e t h i c s ) ,  then the  p e c u l i a r  na tu re  o f  psychology i s  due to  i t s  method; 
Collingwood des c r ib ed  the  method as fol lows :
The psychology o f  knowing d i f f e r s  from 
l o g i c  o r  the ph i losoph ica l  theo ry  of  
knowledge in t h a t  i t  t r e a t s  judgment - -  
t he  a c t  o f  knowing something — as an
event  in  the  mind . . . I t  does not  go
on to  determine the  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h i s
mental event  t o  the  "something" known,
the  r e a l i t y  beyond the  a c t  which th e  mind 
in t h a t  a c t ,  apprehends.  Such a f u r t h e r  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  would be metaphysical  in 
c h a r a c t e r  and i s  t h e r e f o r e  avoided by 
psychology.  Now t h i s  formula can be u n i ­
v e r s a l i z e d ,  and thus gives  us the  d e f i n ­
i t i o n  o f  psychological  method. Take the 
mental a c t i v i t y  as a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  f a c t ;  
r e f u s e  . . .  t o  t r e a t  o f  i t s  metaphysical 
a s p e c t ,  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with r ea l  th ings  o t h e r  
than i t s e l f ;  and you have psycho logy .31
Coll ingwood 's  complaint  was t h a t  psychology re fused  to  r a i s e  u l t im a te
q u e s t i o n s ;  t h u s ,  he claimed t h a t  psychology was " ex te rna l "  meaning
t h a t  the  " a i r  o f  conc re teness  and r e a l i t y "  assumed by psychology was
a de lus ion  because t h e  psycho log i s t  "dec l ines  t o  j o i n  in the  ques t ion
whether  i t  i s  t r u e "  and thus c u t s  h imse lf  o f f  from p a r t i c i p a t i o n  or
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even the  s u b je c t  o f  s tu dy ,  the  mental l i f e  and i t s  exper iences .
. . .  in  s c i e n t i f i c  thought  as s tu d i e d  by 
l o g i c  we have a judgment in which the  mind 
knows r e a l i t y ;  psychology,  t r e a t i n g  the  
judgment as mere even t ,  omits i t s
o f  psychology from th e  Collingwood s t a n d p o i n t  a r e :  ( l ) w h i l e  some ex­
p l a n a t io n s  o f  behaviour  such as t i c s  s tammers,  e t c .  may be the  o u t ­
come o f  phys ica l  p r o c e s s e s ,  t h e  theo ry  more c r u c i a l  f o r  p o l i t i c s  i s  
t h a t  r egard ing  purposive  a c t i o n  wherein p s yc hoana ly t i c  th eo ry  holds  
t h a t  what an agent  t h in k s  he i s  doing may not  be what he i s  r e a l l y  
doing.  I f  t h i s  p o in t  i s  conceded,  i t  i s  not  p o s s i b l e  to  d i sc o v e r  
what i s  the  purpose w i thou t  d i sc o v e r in g  f i r s t  what t h e  agen t  b e l i e ves  
h im s e l f  to  be doing o r  one could no t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  a c t  t o  be e xp la ined ;  
C2)in F reud ' s  no t ion  o f  the  p reconsc ious  o r  unconscious ,  t h e r e  appears  
to  be unconscious ly  purposive  a c t s  o f  which the  agen t  i s  unaware or  
In which t h e r e  i s  no r e f l e c t i v e  thought  in  the  Coll ingwoodian sense .
In modern e x i s t e n t i a l  p sy c h o an a ly s i s ,  t h e  concept  o f  t h e  unconscious 
i s  r a t h e r  r e j e c t e d  and a c t i o n  i s  regarded  as a chosen course by the  
a c t o r .  This th eo ry  i s  compa t ib le  with Col l ingwood 's  theo ry  o f  mind
a l though  the  theo ry  o f  mind i s  no t  more developed than t h a t  p resen ted  
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by Collingwood.
N. K. O 'S u l l iv a n  in " I r r a t i o n a l i s m  in P o l i t i c s "  has expla ined  
Col l ingwood 's  extreme s tand  upon psychology;  Collingwood f e l t  t h a t  
t h e  s c ie nc e  of  psychology had been understood in  too  narrow a sense .
In a c t u a l i t y ,  ph i losophy  s in c e  t h e  seven teen th  c e n tu r y ,  " inc luding
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moral and p o l i t i c a l  ph i lo sophy ,  has been psychology in  t h i s  s e nse . "  
Those who have e l e v a t e d  psychology to  t h e  mas te r  d i s c i p l i n e  include :  
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, J . S .  M i l l ,  and Freud.  Psychology,  an i r r a t i o n ­
al i sm in the  Collingwoodian p e r c e p t i o n ,  has " p en e t ra t ed  to  the  h e a r t
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o f  our  p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n "  due to  i t s  theo ry  o f  knowledge;
- i o n
We have now to  cons ide r  f i r s t  how and when, 
and secondly w i th  what degree o f  succes s ,  
psychology decided to  abandon I t s  s t a t u s  
as a mere sc ience  o f  f e e l i n g  and to  cap tu re  
f o r  I t s e l f  the  bus iness  fo rm erly  done by 
the  sc iences  o f  t h o u g h t . 38
In t h e  theory  o f  knowledge the  same r e v o l t  
was a t  work. Here i t  took th e  form o f  
main ta in ing  t h a t  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
o r  ope ra t ions  o f  though t ,  were nothing 
but  aggrega t ions  and complexes o f  f e e l i n g s  
and thus  spec ia l  cases  o f  s ensa t ion  and 
emotion. Theore t ica l  reason or  knowledge 
was only  a p a t t e r n  o f  s e n s a t io n s ;  p r a c t i c a l  
reason o r  w i l l ,  only a p a t t e r n  o f  a p p e t i t e s .
J u s t  as the  aim o f  m a t e r i a l i s t i c  biology 
was to  wipe out  the  o ld  bio logy  with i t s  
guiding not ion o f  purposive  fu n c t io n ,  so 
the  aim o f  what I w i l l  c a l l  ' m a t e r i a l i s t i c  
ep is temology'  was to  wipe out  the  old 
sc iences  o f  though t ,  l o g i c  and e t h i c s ,  with 
t h e i r  guid ing no t io ns  o f  t r u t h  and e r r o r ,  
good and e v i l . 39
O 'S u l l ivan  b e l i e ves  t h a t  Collingwood has s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  " i r r a t i o n a l i s m
produced by t h i s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  psychological  with ph i lo soph ica l
method has a d i s a s t r o u s  consequence f o r  p o l i t i c s :  s in c e  a l l  argument
i s ,  from the  Collingwoodian psychological  po in t  o f  view, merely the
express ion  o f  f e e l i n g  o r  emotion,  i t  de s t roys  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f
40
ra t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  argument ."  Pub l ic  d i scuss ions  of  p r i n c i p l e s ,
o f  f a c t s ,  pub l ic  deba te ,  e t c . ,  have been " replaced by a s t y l e  o f
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p o l i t i c s  in  which t h e  tendency i s  t o  choose l e a d e r s . "  While 
O 'S u l l i v a n ' s  po in ts  a re  a c cu ra te  and poignant  f o r  democratic  p o l i t i c s ,  
what Collingwood has argued has a wider  impact and scope than t h a t .
I t  has to  do with the  s c i e n t i f i c  paradigm as the fash ion f o r  a l l  
knowledge, with r e l a t i v i t y  t h e o r i e s  doing away with concepts o f  j u s t i c e  
which can be re s p e c te d ,  with the  concept o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  in h i s t o r y .
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with t h e o r i e s  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  and so on. For t h i s  reason ,  C o l l ing ­
wood's work i s  well worth r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The above arguments can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by Coll ingwood's  b e l i e f  
t h a t  man makes h im se l f ,  by the  growth o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m  in the  n in e ­
t ee n th  cen tu ry ,  and the  r e c e n t  r e c u r r i n g  doubt  t h a t  our  methodology 
w i l l  so lve  much more than we a l r e ady  have been ab le  to  solve with 
i t ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  a g r e a t  source o f  l i m i t a t i o n  as well  as c r e a t i v i t y .  
The s tu d i e s  o f  myths a re  i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  c o v e r t  value  judgments which 
determine  th e  l i m i t s  o f  human self -making  and human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
These have been termed " s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g "  p rophec ies .  Some which have 
been c u r r e n t  in t h e  tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry  a re :  ' r a t i o n a l  man' ,  ' i r r a ­
t io n a l  man' ,  man as a t a b u l a  r asa  whose n a tu r e  and c h a r a c t e r  a r e  e n ­
t i r e l y  products  o f  the  environment ,  the  ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' man who begins 
as a 'no th in g n e s s '  and,  f i n a l l y ,  t h a t  now under a t t a c k ,  the  myth of  
the  v a l u e - f r e e  soc ia l  sc ie nc es  because they  a re  ' s c i e n t i f i c ' .  I t  
could be a s s e r t e d  t h a t  they  have become s c i e n t i f i c  in  o rd e r  to  appear  
to  be va lue  f r e e !  Michael E. Kirn has voiced t h i s  concern in his
d i s c u s s io n ,  "Behavioral  ism, Pos t-Behaviora l  ism, and the  Phi losophy of
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Sc ience :  Two Houses, One P lague ."  Kirn voices  a Collingwoodian
complaint  some f o r t y  o r  more yea rs  a f t e r  Collingwood:
I t  i s  the  c e n t r a l  argument o f  t h i s  essay t h a t  
t h i s  phenomenon — the  appeal by p o l i t i c a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f ,  and the  r e ­
s u l t i n g  dependence on,  va r ious  s tu d i e s  o f  the 
na tu r a l  sc iences  - -  t ends  to  o b s t r u c t  the  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the p h i lo soph ica l  and 
s oc ia l  foundat ions  of  the  sys tem at ic  s tudy 
o f  p o l i t i c s ,  and to  h inder  the  a r t i c u l a t i o n  
o f  an adequate  concept  of  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e . 43
Kirn p o i n t s  to  a c e n t r a l  t e n e t  o f  Collingwood,  t h a t  o f  " c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
r e s u l t i n g  from ph i lo soph ica l  and empir ica l  s t u d i e s  o f  what one i s
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a c t u a l l y  doing,  o f  what p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  l i e  behind o n e ' s  work . .
He f i n a l l y  a s s e r t s  the  c e n t r a l  importance o f  t h i s  work o f  Collingwood 
through h i s  concern with method, ph i lo sophy ,  h i s t o r y ,  and t h e  l i k e l i ­
hood t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  s c ience  i s ,  as y e t ,  p r e -pa ra d igm a t ic .
Only through d e t a i l e d  p h i lo s o p h i c a l ,  
h i s t o r i c a l  and s o c io l o g ic a l  i n q u i r i e s  
can progress  be made toward under­
s tand ing  the  ph i losoph ica l  and soc ia l  
func t ions  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e .
Perhpas the  problem i s  to  determine 
in  what s p e c i f i c  sense  p o l i t i c a l  s c ience  
i s  a p re -pa rad igm a t ic  sc ie nc e .
These ques t ions  — methodolog ica l ,  h i s ­
t o r i c a l ,  s o c io l o g ic a l  — have y e t  t o  be 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  and thorough ly  i n v e s t i ­
ga ted .  So long as p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  
p e r s i s t  in assuming t h a t  the  na tu ra l  
sc iences  provide  a model f o r  a l l  s c i e n ­
t i f i c  i n q u i r y  they  w i l l  remain t o  be 
s tu d i e d .  So long as p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n ­
t i s t s  con t inue  t o  engage in  r i t u a l i s t i c  
invoca t io ns  of  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  one o r  
more schoo ls  o f  the  phi losophy o f  s c ie nc e  
when ques t ions  o f  method a re  r a i s e d ,  t h e  
ph i losoph ica l  and methodological  founda­
t i o n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  inqu i ry  w i l l  remain 
obscure . . .45
These o b se rva t ions  made by Kirn have a l s o  been a s s e r t e d  by Hans-
Georg Gadamer:
The lo g i c a l  s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n s  which accom­
panied the  development o f  the  human 
sc iences  in the  n in e t e en th  cen tu ry  i s  
wholly dominated by the  model o f  the  
na tu ra l  sc iences  . . .  The word G e i s t e s -  
wis senschaft en  was made popular  c h i e f l y  
by the  t r a n s l a t o r  o f  John S t u a r t  M i l l ' s  
Logic . . . From t h i s  very co n te x t .  . . 
i t  i s  apparent  t h a t  i t  i s  not  a ques t ion
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of  recogn is in g  t h a t  t h e  human sc iences  
have t h e i r  own l o g i c  bu t  . . . to  show 
t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  i n d u c t iv e  method, bas ic  
to  a l l  e x p e r i e n t i a l  s c i e n c e ,  which alone  
i s  v a l i d  in  t h i s  f i e l d  too .  In t h i s  
Mill s tands  in an Engl ish  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
which Hume has given most e f f e c t i v e  
formula t ion  . . .46
But, ob j e c t e d  Gadamer, the  s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l  world cannot  be r a i s e d
to  a s c ience  by such a procedure .  For one t h in g ,  " h i s t o r i c a l  r e sea rch
does no t  endeavour  t o  grasp th e  conc re te  phenomenon as an i n s t a n c e  
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o f  a general  r u l e . "  Thus, the  p e c u l i a r  c h a r a c t e r  o f  the  soc ia l
sc ie nc es  i s  the  p r a c t i c e  o f  induc t ion  which i s  t i e d  to  p a r t i c u l a r
psycho logical  c ond i t ions  r e q u i r i n g  t a c t ,  a w e l l - s to c k e d  memory, the
acceptance  o f  a u t h o r i t i e s  in c o n t r a s t  to  the  " s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  in fe renc e s
o f  t h e  n a tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t  [which] depend e n t i r e l y  on the  use o f  h i s  
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own r eason ."
Gadamer i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r t i n e n t  to  Col l ingwood's  c r i t i q u e  
o f  t h e  cond i t ion  o f  p o l i t i c s  in t h e  tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry  and t h e  l e t t e r ' s  
e f f o r t  to  begin anew " c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s "  as i t  had been i n h e r i t e d  
from Hobbes through Rousseau, e s p e c i a l l y  in r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  an under­
s tand ing  o f  cho ice  and freedom in a c t i o n .  Gadamer put  the  epis t emo- 
l o g i c a l  ques t ion  thus ;
. . . h i s t o r y  does no t  belong to  us ,  but  
we belong to  i t .  Long be fo re  we under ­
s tand  ou rse lves  through the  process  of  
s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n ,  we unde rs tand  ou r se lve s  
in a s e l f - e v i d e n t  way in the  f am i ly ,  soc ­
i e t y  and s t a t e  in which we l i v e .  The focus 
o f  s u b j e c t i v i t y  i s  a d i s t o r t i n g  m i r ro r .
The s e l f -aw areness  o f  the  ind iv idua l  i s  
only a f l i c k e r i n g  in t h e  c lo sed  c i r c u i t s  of  
h i s t o r i c a l  l i f e .  That  i s  why the  p r e j u d ­
ices  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l ,  f a r  more than h i s
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Judgments,  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a l -
t ty  of  his being.49
Gadamer f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  " d iv i s io n  o f  p r e j u d i c e s  i n t o  those  of  au th o r ­
i t y  and those  o f  ' o v e r - h a s t i n e s s ' ,  . . .  i s  obviously  based on the  
fundamental p resu p p o s i t i o n  o f  the  en l igh tenm en t ,  accord ing  to  which a
m ethodolog ica l ly  d i s c i p l i n e d  use o f  reason can sa feguard  us from a l l  
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e r r o r . "  The deformation o f  the  concept  o f  a u t h o r i t y  in the  en­
l igh tenment  per iod  posed the  concept  o f  a u t h o r i t y  as reason and f r e e ­
dom o p p os i t e  t h a t  based upon pe rsons .  A u th o r i t y ,  o b j e c t s  Gadamer,
cannot  be bestowed; i t  must be acqu ir ed  through knowledge r a t h e r  than 
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th rough obedience.
Gadamer provides  the  l i n k  to  Col l ingwood 's  a t t a c k  upon the 
denial  o f  r e l i g i o n  as a form o f  knowledge o r  a c t i o n ,  to  h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  
ph i losophy,  t o  h i s  premises  upon a b s o lu t e  " p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , "  and to  
h i s  charge o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m .  The e s sence  o f  mind as a c t i o n  i s  ' h i s ­
t o r i c i t y ,  ' n e i t h e r  pure u n i v e r s a l i t y  nor  pure p a r t i c u l a r i t y  but a 
c onc re te  s y n th e s i s  o f  both.  H i s t o r i c a l  unders tand ing  i s  necessa ry  to  
each experi ence  and i s  expressed  in a body o f  c a t e g o r i c a l  and s i n g u l a r  
judgments .  They a r e  c a t e g o r i c a l  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the  s u b je c t  
judgment i s  concerned with something a c tu a l  and because th ink ing  about 
the  s u b j e c t  must be concerned with s i n g u l a r  e v e n t s .  Only as the  i n ­
d iv id ua l  i s  an embodiment o f  the  un iv e r s a l  can he be a genuine i n d i v i d ­
u a l .  A u n i v e r s a l ,  in Col lingwoodian terms and as  opposed to  t h a t  o f
Ryle, i s  a "common n a tu r e  t o  a number o f  t h in g s  so t h a t  i t  i s  the
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r a t i o  essendi  o f  the  c l a s s  as such ."  in t h i s  s t a t e m e n t .  Col l i n g -  
wood i n t e r p r e t e d  u n i v e r s e l s  as a b s t r a c t  and pu re ly  idea l  when they
d e a l t  wi th  cases  in na tu re  such as those  oc cur r ing  in sc ience  wherein 
a t t em pts  to  r e l a t e  them a re  h y p o th e t i c a l .  When dea l ing  with mind, 
un i v e r s a l s  were c onc re te  o r  a s y n th e s i s  o f  " in d iv id u a l "  concre te  
u n i v e r s a l s ,  then d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  which, in t u r n ,  presuppose s t a t e ­
ments whose o b j e c t  is  the  un iversa l  i t s e l f .  When i m p l i c i t  un iv e r ­
s a l i t y  i s  rendered e x p l i c i t ,  h i s t o r y  i t s e l f  i s  t ranscended in to  p h i lo ­
sophy. This would imply t h a t  phi losophy i s  h i s t o r y  a t  a h igher  level  
of  t h in k in g ,  knowing, o r  a c t i n g ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s ince  Collingwood viewed 
phi losophy as the  sc ience  o f  mind qua mind. I f  the  mind i s  viewed 
as mind qua c o nc re te  mind, then the  ph i losoph ica l  s t a n dpo in t  i s  t h a t  
o f  the  ind iv idua l  ph i lo sopher .
Many o f  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  amongst reviewers  o f  Col l ingwood's
concept  o f  The Idea o f  H is to ry  l i e  he re :
The vague phrase t h a t  h i s t o r y  i s  knowledge 
o f  t h e  i nd iv idua l  c laims f o r  i t  a f i e l d  a t  
once too wide and too narrow: too wide, 
because the  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  perce ived  ob­
j e c t s  and n a tu ra l  f a c t s  and immediate ex­
per i ences  f a l l s  o u t s id e  i t s  sphere ,  and 
most o f  a l l  because even the  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  
o f  h i s t o r i c a l  events  and pe rsonages,  i f  
t h a t  means uniqueness ,  f a l l s  e q u a l ly  o u t ­
s id e  i t ;  too narrow,  because i t  would ex­
clude u n i v e r s a l i t y ,  and i t  j u s t  the  u n i ­
v e r s a l i t y  o f  an event  o r  c h a r a c t e r  t h a t  makes 
i t  a proper  and p o s s ib l e  o b j e c t  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
s tu dy ,  i f  by u n i v e r s a l i t y  we mean something 
t h a t  ove r s t e ps  the  l i m i t s  of  merely loca l  and 
temporal e x i s t e n c e  and possesses  a s i g n i f i ­
cance v a l i d  f o r  a l l  men a t  a l l  t im es .  These 
too a re  no doubt vague p h rase s ;  bu t  they a re  
a t t em pts  to  d esc r ibe  something r e a l :  namely 
the  way in which thought ,  t ranscend ing  i t s  
own immediacy, su rv ives  and r ev ives  in o th e r  
c o n te x t s ;  and to  express  the  t r u t h  t h a t  i n ­
d iv idua l  a c t s  and persons appear  in  h i s t o r y  
not  in  v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  as such.
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but because t h a t  I n d i v i d u a l i t y  Is  the veh ic le  
o f  a thought  which,  because i t  was a c t u a l l y  
t h e i r s ,  t s  p o t e n t i a l l y  e v e r y o n e ' s . 53
These ideas  a re  immediately involved with Coll ingwood's o t h e r  ideas 
so t h a t  s tand ing  a lone ,  the  above quote ,  i s  not  e a s i l y  i n t e r p r e t a b l e .  
Collingwood was a d i s t i n g u i s h e d  h i s t o r i a n .  I f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the  
example o f  h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  s tudy o f  t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  r e l i g i o n  
( C h r i s t i a n i t y  in the Western world)  i s  u t i l i z e d  to  e x p l i c a t e  the  
concepts o f  Collingwood upon h i s t o r y .  The Idea o f  His to ry  becomes 
c l e a r e r .  The h i s t o r i c a l  a s p ec t  o f  r e l i g i o n  was sub jec ted  to  the  new 
techn iques  o f  h i s t o r y  from about  1883 onward. This h i s t o r i c a l  move­
ment took two c h i e f  forms: t h a t  o f  comparat ive r e l i g i o n  and t h a t  o f  
h i s t o r i c a l  theology.  To Collingwood,  " the danger . . .  i s  not  so much
t h a t  the  r e l i g i o u s  importance o f  h i s t o r y  may be f o rg o t t e n  as t h a t  i t
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may be ove r r a te d  . . . "  This  importance l ed  to too much expec ta t ion  
on the  p a r t  o f  theo log ians  as  well  as  the  tendency to  f in d  h i s t o r i c a l  
methods the  only way to  r e l i g i o u s  t r u t h .  Yet h i s t o r i c a l  p o s i t i v i s m ,  
accord ing  to  Collingwood,  in troduced  by analogy with Comte's thought ,  
seemed to  imply an a n t i - p h i l o s o p h i c a l  skep t i c i sm ,  a nega t iv ism i n ­
c lu s i v e  o f  two p o s i t i o n s :  comparat ive r e l i g i o n  and h i s t o r i c a l  t h e o ­
logy,  Comparative r e l i g i o n  has the  aim o f  determining the  p r e c i s e  
b e l i e f s  o f  a people o r  a s e c t ;  t h i s ,  however, involves  the  comparison 
o f  va r ious  human types and o f  determining  the  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  of  
i n d iv i d u a l s  as ind iv idua l  members o f  c l a s s e s ,  s e c t s ,  o r  n a t i o n s .  I t  
thereby  becomes a type o f  psychology o f  r e l i g i o n .  Psychology t r e a t s  
judgment as an even t  in the  mind no t  going to  the r e a l i t y  beyond the 
a c t  because to  go beyond would be a metaphysical i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  To
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c l a s s i f y  b e l i e f s  as  congruent  with a c t i o n  designed with moral conduct
in mind i s  a r e fu sa l  to  come to  g r ip s  w i th  t h e  consciousness  o f  the
ind iv idua l  mind involved .  On the  o t h e r  hand,  h i s t o r i c a l  theo logy  by
c a ta logu ing  th e  h e re s i e s  o f  e a r l y  C h r i s t i a n i t y  has not  extended some
degree o f  sympathy with the  problems t h a t  t h e  heresy was to  s o lve ;  the
problem i s  always a ph i lo soph ica l  one. For example,  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l
Jesus  does not  e x i s t  o u t s id e  an idea in  theo logy  and an unde rs tand ing
and sha r ing  o f  h i s  consc iousness .  Thus,  " h i s t o r y  cannot  e x i s t  wi thou t
ph i lo sophy;"  to  be a c c u r a t e ,  h i s t o r y  must proceed wi th  ph i losoph ica l
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  h igh ly  complex in c h a r a c t e r  in  o rd e r  t o  d e s c r ib e
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h i s t o r i c a l  a c t i o n  whose meaning i s  f i x e d  by e t h i c a l  thought .  I t  i s
here t h a t  Col l ingwood's  no t ion  o f  the  u n iv e r s a l  and th e  p a r t i c u l a r  as
n e c e s s a r i l y  e x i s t i n g  a t  once t o g e t h e r  becomes p e r t i n e n t ;
H i s to r y ,  i t  i s  sometimes s a i d ,  i s  know­
ledge  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r ,  ph i losophy  know­
ledge o f  the  u n i v e r s a l .  But t h e  p a r t i ­
c u l a r  i s  no mere p a r t i c u l a r ;  i t  i s  a p a r ­
t i c u l a r  o f  t h i s  o r  t h a t  u n i v e r s a l ;  and 
th e  un ive r sa l  never  can e x i s t  a t  a l l  e x ­
c e p t  in the  form o f  t h i s  o r  t h a t  p a r t i ­
c u l a r .  "The u n i v e r s a l "  and " the  p a r t i ­
c u la r "  cons id e red  as s e p a r a t e  conc re te  
th ings  a re  f i c t i o n s ;  . . .56
Louis 0 . Mink has summed up a concep t  o f  Col l ingwood's  Idea o f
H is to ry  which a l so  se rves  as a r e p l y  t o  those  who have been c r i t i c a l
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o f  c e r t a i n  ideas  conta ined  w i th in  i t .
. . . i f  one cons ide r s  what The Idea of  
His to ry  does ,  as wel l as what i t  s a y s ,  i t  
i s  c l e a r  t h a t  in t r a c i n g  the  h i s t o r y  o f  the  
idea  of  h i s t o r y  Collingwood i s  g iv ing  an 
account  o f  the  development throughout  the  
h i s t o r y  of  Western c i v i l i z a t i o n  o f  a p a r t i ­
c u l a r  concept  whose s t a g e s  o f  development
_-l 3ft-
a re  no t  on ly  exempl if ied  in the  thought  o f  
i nd iv id u a l  h i s t q r l s n s  and ph i lo sophe rs  bu t  
a r e  a t  t h e  same t ime c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the  
way in which whole s o c i e t i e s  and segments 
o f  s o c i e t y  have thought  about - themselves  
in r e l a t i o n  to  what they  understood as t h e i r  
p a s t  and t h e i r  knowledge o f  i t . 58
The e s s e n t i a l  p o in t  here  i s  t h a t  what men th in k  o f  in regard to  t h e i r  
world and themselves r e f l e c t s  a c o n s t e l l a t i o n  o f  a b so lu te  p r e suppos i ­
t i o n s ,  varying from s o c i e t y  to  s o c i e t y  and from epoch to  epoch which
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i s  i n c l u s iv e  o f  an a p r i o r i  concept  o f  h i s t o r y .  In con junc t ion
with t h i s ,  Collingwood a l s o  developed an h i s t o r i c a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  the
concept  of  n a tu re  so t h a t  t h i s  i s  in i t s e l f  a h i s t o r y  but  t h e r e  i s
a n o th e r ,  t h e  concept  o f  n a tu r e  i t s e l f  which i s  a l s o  a h i s t o r y .  Mink
f u r t h e r  po in t s  ou t  t h a t  i t  i s  he re  t h a t  Col l ingwood's  c r i t i c i s m  o f
Spengler ,  Toynbee, o r  Marx emerges: they  do no t  see t h e i r  ideas  in
terms o f  what they e xp la in  as a l s o  being a process  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
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change.  Both Mink and Gadamer l i n k  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  ideas  o f  C o l l i n g ­
wood to  h i s  theo ry  o f  a b s o lu t e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  and,  in h i s t o r i c a l  
a n a l y s i s ,  t h ese  appear  as  the  fo l lowing argument;
1. P os i t iv i sm  i s  to be understood in terms o f  a c o n s t e l l a t i o n
o f  ab s o lu t e  p r e s u ppos i t ions  app ly ing e qua l ly  to  concepts 
o f  h i s t o r y  and n a t u r e . 51
a. Absolute  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  a re  not  " i d i o s y n c r a t i c  or  
pe rsona l "  but  a re  thoughts  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s . 52
b. Absolute  p r e s u p pos i t ions  correspond with the  d i f f e r ­
ences to  be found in the  f a b r i c  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n . 53
c.  Absolute  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  provide a l i n k  between the
thought  o f  an ind iv idua l  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  because 
the  l a t t e r  a r e  c o n s t ru c te d  by i n d i v i d u a l s .  (Herein
■ occurs  the  concept  o f  h i e r a r c h y  as well  as c o m p e t i t i o n ) . 54
d. Conceptual systems which a re  a p r i o r i  a r e  p r im a r i l y  
co rpo ra te  in n a t u r e . 55
—    ^
(1 ) Economic theo ry  i s  f i l l e d  with both p h i lo s o p h i ­
cal and "em pi r i ca l"  concep ts ,  i . e . ,  w ea l th ,  ex­
change, supply and demand are  ph i losoph ica l  while 
money and c r e d i t ,  c a p i t a l  and manufacture  are  
e m p i r i c a l .  Again,  the  d i f f e r e n c e  here  i s  t h a t  
ph i lo soph ica l  concepts  a re  un iver sa l  while  em­
p i r i c a l  concepts  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s e s  o f  a c t s .
( 2 ) P o l i t i c a l  theo ry  i s  ano ther  s tudy  comparat ive
to  economic th e o ry ,  i . e . ,  in Col lingwoodian terms,  
" c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s "  would r e f e r  to  those  p h i l o ­
soph ica l  concep ts  whereas empir ica l  s t u d i e s  would 
be p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s e s  such as v o t e r  p r e fe re n c e s ,  
e t c .  The source o f  t h e  un iversa l  i s  the  con­
s t e l l a t i o n  o f  a b s o lu t e  p resu p p o s i t i o n s .  For 
example,  Kan t 's  th eo ry  knowledge made e x p l i c i t  
Newtonian s c i e n t i f i c  ab s o lu t e  p r e s u p pos i t ions  
in  r e l a t i o n  to  Western i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  law and 
r e g u l a r i a n  p o l i t i c s .
2. The pr imary f u n c t io n  o f  thought  i s  p r a c t i c a l  a c t io n  and i t s  
d e r i v a t i v e  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  which i s  the  a c t i v i t y  o f  asking 
and answering q u e s t i o n s .  Mink exp la ins  t h e  idea by C o l l i n g ­
wood ' s  concept  o f  a c t i o n :
Hence th e  conceptua l  schemes in terms o f  which 
men come t o  unders tand t h e i r  own a c t i o n s  a re  
a l s o  the  conceptual  schemes presupposed in a l l  
o b j e c t i v e  i n q u i r y ;  and changes in p r a c t i c a l  
consciousness  t h e r e f o r e  b r ing  in t h e i r  t r a i n  
changes in the  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  
th ough t .  The u t i l i t a r i a n  concept ion o f  ac t ion  
has the  same p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  as the  t e l e o l o g i -  
cal  concept ion o f  na tu r e ;  and the  r e g u la r i a n  
concept ion o f  a c t i o n  has the  same p resuppos i ­
t i o n s  as the  concept ion o f  n a tu r e  governed by 
un ive r sa l  l a w s .66
3. Gadamer exp la in s  t h e  l o g i c  o f  ques t ion  and answer in hermen­
e u t i c a l  terms:  (The r ep ly  a l so  exp la ins  the  h i s t o r i c a l - p h i l o ­
sophica l  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . )
He c l e a r l y  saw what was missing in  naive hermen­
e u t i c s  founded on the  p r e v a i l i n g  ph i lo soph ica l  
c r i t i q u e  . . .  t he  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  Collingwood 
found in  Engl ish  u n i v e r s i t i e s  o f  d i sc uss ing  
' s t a t e m e n t s ' ,  . . . obviously  f a i l e d  to  take 
account  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l i t y  t h a t  is  p a r t  o f  
a l l  unders tand in g .  Collingwood argues thus :
We can unders tand a t e x t  only when we have
1 /in
understood the  ques t ion  to  which i t  i s  an ans ­
wer. . . s ince  t h i s  q u e s t ion  can be de r ived  
s o l e l y  from th e  t e x t  and ac co rd in g ly  the  appro­
p r i a t e n e s s  o f  the  r e p l y  i s  the  methodological 
p r esuppos i t ion  f o r  the  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  the  
q u e s t ion ,  any c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h i s  r ep ly  from 
some o t h e r  q u a r t e r  i s  pure m o c k - f ig h t in g .67
What Gadamer i s  r e f e r r i n g  to  i s  t h e  rapprochement  between phi losophy 
and h i s t o r y  but  i t  a p p l i e s  as well to  the  rapprochement  between p h i l o ­
sophy and mysticism and the  idea o f  ph i losophy as t r a n sc ende n ta l  know­
ledge revea led  in the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  mind as pure a c t .  The only way 
to  understand t h a t  u l t im a te  t r u t h s  can be apprehended by i n t u i t i o n  i s  
to  recognize the  mediat ive  q u a l i t y  o f  what passes  f o r  i n t u i t i o n .  That 
i s ,  t h e  mind does not  know how i t  reached t r u t h .  Collingwood con­
tended t h a t  i t  was the  bus iness  o f  both s c i e n t i f i c  and ph i l soph ica l  
thought  to  " lay  bare  t h i s  concealed p r oce s s ,  to  r ender  e x p l i c i t  the
mediat ion which in the  myst ical  exper ience  i t s e l f  was only i m p l i c i t  
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. . . " Herein a l so  l i e s  the rapprochement  between f a i t h  and reason .
When the  mind a s p i r e s  to  t r u t h ,  the  t r u t h  t o  which i t  a s p i r e s  
i s  only a system o f  appearances but  t h e  t ranscendence o f  phi losophy 
r e f e r s  to  the  process  of  change which,  in c onc re te  l i f e ,  i s  a cease­
l e s s  a c t  o f  ach iev ing ba lance .  The mind as  "pure a c t "  i s  a s e l f -  
c r e a t i n g  a c t i v i t y  whose essence  i s  to  change as commitments formerly 
made a re  l a t e r  conceived to  be founded upon some type o f  e r r o r  so 
t h a t  the  mind t ranscends  i t s e l f  to  apprehend a new t r u t h .  Collingwood 
demonstrated t h i s  no t ion in h i s  d i sc u s s io n  o f  a r t :
Art  as a whole . . . i s  the  pure a c t  of  
imagina t ion ,  and t h i s  a c t  has i t s  l i f e  
in a process  o f  s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and 
s e l f - c o n c e n t r a t i o n  . . . which genera te s
th e  v e n o n s  forms and phases o f  a e s t h e t i c  
a c t i v i t y  w i th in  t h e  u n i ty  o f  the  imagina­
t i o n  i t s e l f  . . .  The a c t  does not  f ind  
a m a t e r i a l ,  given from w i th o u t ,  t o  un i fy  
which i s  the  problem o f  i t s  l i f e ;  i t  gener ­
a t e s  t h e  m a te r i a l  ou t  o f  i t s e l f  and thus  
s e t s  i t s e l f  the  problems which i t  l i v e s  
by s o lv in g .  In t h e  same way the  l i f e  o f  
the  s p i r i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  i t s e l f  i n to  a r t ,  
r e l i g i o n ,  and the  r e s t  in o rd e r  t h a t  i t  
may e x h i b i t  i t s  own u n i ty  in t h i s  d i v e r s i t y ;
o r  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  i t  may through t h i s  d i v e r ­
s i t y  br ing  in to  e x i s t e n c e  a u n i ty  which i s
not  t h e  bare  u n i ty  with which i t  began but  a 
u n i ty  enr i ched  by a l l  t he  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s  
through which i t  has p a s s e d .69
The process  o f  d i scovery  i s  a l r e ad y  the  beginning o f  c r i t i c i s m .
Coll ingwood's  metaphysical a n a ly s i s  i s  the  process  of  d i scover in g  
what ques t ion  i s  presupposed and t h i s  i s  a method o f  c r i t i c i s m .  On 
the  bas i s  o f  a t o t a l  e xpe r ienc e ,  in the  l i g h t  o f  t h e  given p ro p o s i t io n  
from which we begin has meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  we can develop i t s  
im p l ic a t ions  and d i sc o v e r  what we have presupposed.  This process  by 
which confusions  a r e  c l a r i f i e d  i s  a sy s te m a t ic  s t r u c t u r e  o f  exper ience .  
As a b so lu te  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  change,  the  s e r i e s  o f  changes i s  continuous
so t h a t  c r i t i c a l  though t  i s  d i a l e c t i c a l .  The s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the
ph i lo soph ica l  un ive r sa l  i n to  overl app ing  c l a s s e s  always t ake s  the  form 
o f  an ascending s c a l e  so t h a t  overlapping  c la s s e s  a re  not  mere d i f f e r ­
ences in degree nor  kind.  When th e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  combined ( t h a t  
i s ,  i f  they o v e r l a p ) ,  we have a gene r i c  concept  s p e c i f i e d  i n to  a s c a l e  
o f  forms such t h a t  each embodies a v a r i a b l e  e lement  in a s p e c i f i c  de­
g ree ,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n s  between th e  spec ie s  o ccu r r ing  a t  c r i t i c a l  
po in t s  on the  s c a l e  o f  g r a d a t io n s .  Then the  v a r i a b l e  e lement  and the  
g ene r i c  essence a re  the  same th in g  and the  s c a l e  i s  one th roughout
30 t h a t  t t ie -genepte  e^s,eRce 1s s u c c e s s iv e l y  d i sp layed  by the  s p e c i f i c  
forms In con t inuous ly  I n c r e a s in g  f u l l n e s s .  The s p e c i f i c  forms a r e ,  
then ,  both o p p o s i t e s  and d i s t i n c t s ,  so t h a t  t h e  s c a l e  c o n s i s t s  o f  a 
g rada t ion  o f  forms, each embodying th e  ge ne r i c  essence  more f u l l y  
than th e  one b e fo re  but  each as  d i s t i n c t  from every o t h e r  and each 
the  oppos i t e  o f  I t s  p r ed e c e s so r  In t h e  s c a l e .  I . e . ,  as Collingwood 
main tained t h a t  goodness and badness a r e  a t  once d i s t i n c t  and oppos i t e  
moral c o n d i t i o n s .  E te rna l  ph i lo s o p h ica l  problems a re  r e l a t i v e  to  
ph i lo soph ica l  u n l v e r s l a s  which become s p e c i f i e d  IrT a s c a l e  o f  forms.
What has been t r a c e d  In t h i s  c h a p te r  thus f a r  i s  a d i a l e c t i c  
o f  a c t i o n  as pu rpos ive a l though  changing In succes s ive  h i s t o r i c a l  
pe r iods  due to  a c o n s t e l l a t i o n  of  a b s o lu t e  p re s u p p o s i t i o n s  upon 
which human beings hang t h e i r  b e l i e f s  and p r e ju d ic e s  and which form 
t h e i r  s u b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y  in  an h i s t o r i c a l  epoch w i th in  a c u l t u r e  o r  
c i v i l i z a t i o n .  The moot q u e s t io n  remaining I s :  What has been the  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h i s  l i n e  o f  thought  and o f  The New Leviathan to  the  
d i s c i p l i n e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophy?  N. K. O 'S u l l ivan  has began the  
answer to  t h i s  ques t ion  In h i s  review,  " I r r a t i o n a l i s m  In P o l i t i c s , "  
when he a s s e r t e d  with E rnes t  Barker  t h a t  " the re  could no t  be b e t t e r  
th ink ing  than t h e r e  I s  in  the  f i r s t  two p a r t s  o f  The New Lev ia than";  
O 'S u l l ivan  added t h a t  I t  I s  a l s o  " the  only major  t r e a t i s e  on tw e n t i e th -  
cen tu ry  p o l i t i c s  c o n s t r u c te d  w i th in  t h e  convention of  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i ­
t i c a l  ph i losophy,  according  t o  which th e  concern of  the  p o l i t i c a l  
ph i lo sophe r  Is  not  merely the  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  concepts and the  e l u c i ­
da t ion o f  our  o rd in a ry  p o l i t i c a l  vocabula ry but  r a t h e r  the  s tudy  of  
t he  form o f  p o l i t y  b e s t  s u i t e d  t o  an age, the  o b s ta c l e s  h inder ing  I t s
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r e a l i z a t i o n ,  and the c ond i t ions  n eces sa ry  f o r  i t s  achievement."
I f  O 'S u l l ivan  i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h i s  i s  no mean achievement  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
when i t  i s  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  The New Leviathan has been l a r g e l y  ignored 
s in c e  i t s  appearance in 1942 and i n t e r e s t  in i t  has not  revived ex­
cep t  as  i t  has p e r t a in e d  to  Col l ingwood's  "more general  ph i lo soph ica l  
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i d e a s . "  John L a i rd ,  in 1943, a l s o  accorded the  work d i s t i n c t i o n  in 
"both m a t te r  and manner . . .  and has gone a long way towards em­
phas iz ing  c e r t a i n  s t r u c t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n d i s p e n s ab le  to any p o l i -
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t i c a l  th eo ry  worth the  name." C l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophy has
been de f ined  by both t h es e  rev iewers  as t h a t  "founded by Hobbes" much
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as " c l a s s i c a l  phys ics"  was founded by Newton." Lai rd be l i eves  t h a t
" c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i e s  . . . remain s u b s t a n t i a l l y  . . .  the
" soc ia l  c o n t r a c t "  th eo ry  de r ived  from the  Roman concept ion o f  s o c i e t a s
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and adapted to  modern n a t i o n - s t a t e s . "  A. J .  M. Milne po in ts  t o  two
o f  the  leading ideas  o f  Collingwood in p o l i t i c a l  theo ry  as:  ( l ) f r e e -
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dom and p r a c t i c a l  reason and ( 2 ) t h e  body p o l i t i c .  Milne con t inues :
Coll ingwood's  ideas  in e t h i c s  and p o l i t i c a l  
theo ry  need to  be c r i t i c i z e d ,  r e v i s e d ,  and 
r e f o r u l a t e d ,  i f  what i s  o f  v a lu e ,  and I 
t h in k  t h e r e  i s  much o f  va lu e ,  in h i s  account  
o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  . . .76
In r e b u t t a l  to  M ilne 's  e s sa y ,  i t  appears  t h a t  Milne was not  wel l a c ­
q ua in ted  with Coll ingwood's  works and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  p o l i t i c a l  
t heo ry  in  t h e i r  e n t i r e t y .
Perhaps the  f i r s t  p o in t  to  be made concern ing  The New Leviathan 
i s  t h a t  the  aim o f  i t s  au tho r  was concern with c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i t s  
danger  o f  c o l l a p s e ,  and the  phenomena o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m .  In the
Prologue to  Speculum Mentis ,  he wrote  concern ing  th e  demise o f
c i v i l i z a t i o n :
Today we can be as  a r t i s t i c ,  we can be 
as p h i l o s o p h i c a l ,  we can be as r e l i g i o u s  
as  we p l e a s e  bu t  we cannot  eve r  be men a t  
a l l ;  we a r e  wrecks and fragments o f  men, 
and we do no t  know when to  t ake  hold o f  
l i f e  and how to begin looking  f o r  the 
happiness  we do no t  p o s s e s s . 77
Lionel Rubinoff  in The Pornography o f  Power has made a summary o f  the
c o r r u p t io n  o f  c u l t u r e  which i s  p e r t i n e n t  to  the epidemic Collingwood
d esc r ibed :
But whether  we can,  as Commager urges  us 
t o ,  " square  our  conduct with p r i n c i p l e s  of  
law and o f  m o ra l i t y  t h a t  w i l l  w i th s ta nd  the  
s c r u t i n y  o f  pu b l i c  opinion  everywhere and 
th e  t e s t s  o f  h i s t o r y  as  wel l"  . . .  In i t s
most dangerous form, t h e  propaganda o f  i r ­
r a t i o n a l i s m  br ings  about  the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
o f  the  pseudo-m ora l i ty  o f  power and ex­
pediency f o r  the  genuine m o ra l i t y  o f  honor 
and t r u t h f u l n e s s .  I t  i s  a l s o  the  dynamism 
which feeds  what Lewis Mumford has c a l l e d  
t he  ' f o r c e s  o f  a n t i - l i f e  now swarming 
through our  i n n e r  wor ld,  p roclaiming  t h a t  
mechanical  automation i s  s u p e r i o r  to  p e r ­
sonal  autonomy, t h a t  empty confusion is  
a u t h e n t i c  de s ig n ,  t h a t  garbage i s  nour ish ing  
food ,  t h a t  b e s t i a l i t y  and h a te  a r e  the  only 
hones t  exp re s s ions  o f  the  human s p i r i t . 78
From t h i s  quo te ,  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i s t s  a r e  i n to  very f a m i l i a r  i s s u e s :
the  n a tu re  o f  human consciousness  as exposed by Marx and Freud,  now
e la b o r a t e d  by Theodore Roszak and thence the  meaning of  l i b e r a t i o n ;
c r i t i c a l  i s s u e s  in soc io logy  as p resen ted  by Alvin W. Gouldner and the
problem o f  " o b j e c t i v e  t r u t h " ;  t h e  compla int  o f  " a b s t r a c t n e s s "  and
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"mass" as  i t  i s  to  be found in  t h e  t a r g e t  o f  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s .
For Col l ingwood, the  major  phenomenon underly ing  i r r a t i o n a l i s m  
and p reven t in g  i t s  s o l u t i o n  was " the  m is t s  o f  sent imenta l i sm"  o r  the
r e a l i s t  method wi th  i t s  underly ing assumptions and a n a l y t i c a l  method 
which, to  him, c a r r i e d  t h e  seeds  o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m .  Real ism has a l ­
ready been descr ibed  as t h e  d o c t r i n e  propagated by 6. E. Moore, 
P r icha rd ,  R usse l l ,  Alexander ,  and Whitehead, t h a t  the  known i s  i n ­
dependent  o f  t h e  knower. The teach in g  o f  such a d o c t r i n e  co r rup ted  the 
ru led  c l a s s  because t h e r e  was no connect ion between theory  and p r a c t i c e  
and i t  rendered p o l i t i c a l  theo ry  nuga tory .  I t  f u r t h e r  promoted an 
a i r  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  detachment  so t h a t  a p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d  frame o f  mind 
acknowledging a common good was denied .  I t  f u r t h e r  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  a l l  
goods were p r iv a t e  and undermined the  c i v i c  sense  necessa ry  to  a demo­
c r a t i c  pa r l i am en ta ry  system. This d oc t r ine  a l s o  undermined the  p o s i ­
t i o n  o f  T. H. Green and g ra d u a l ly  i n f e c t e d  the  t i s s u e  o f  everyday 
l i f e .  Most o f  t h i s  account  i s  t o  be found in Coll ingwood's  Autobio­
graphy . In t h a t  work, he gave a s e r i e s  of  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f  what he 
considered the  d i se a s e  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n :  ( l ) t h e  l o s s  o f  meaning in
f a c t s  in the  Daily Mail when i t  a cqu ired  an amusement c h a r a c t e r  of  
f a c t s  and f i c t i o n s ;  (2 ) th e  adopt ion o f  methods o f  soc ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
which encouraged the  e l e c t o r a t e  to  seek t h e i r  own good r a t h e r  than 
t h a t  of  the  community as a whole.
Collingwood fol lowed the  above a t t a c k  in h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f
Essay on Metaphysics . T he re in ,  he descr ibed  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
f e a t u r e s  o f  a c i v i l i z a t i o n  sha r ing  the  common f e a t u r e s  o f :  a b e l i e f
in  t r u t h ,  in  s c i e n t i f i c ,  s y s te m a t ic ,  o rd e r ly  t h in k i n g ,  in t h e  value
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o f  pursuing these  a c t i v i t i e s  with energy,  s k i l l ,  and c a re .  A 
"few examples" o f  the  c i v i l i z a t i o n ' s  most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e s  
would be somewhat t h e  fo l lowing:
Relig ion  would be predominant ly  a worship 
o f  t r u t h  in which, t h e  god i s  t r u t h  i t s e l f ,  
the  worshipper  a s eeke r  a f t e r  t r u t h ,  and 
t h e  god 's  presence to  t h e  worsh ipper  a 
g i f t  o f  mental l i g h t .  Phi losophy would be 
predominant ly  an e x p o s i t io n  no t  merely of  
t he  na tu re  o f  t hough t ,  a c t i o n ,  e t c . ,  but  
o f  s c i e n t i f i c  thought  and o r d e r l y  ( p r i n ­
c i p l e d ,  though t-ou t)  a c t i o n ,  with spec ia l  
a t t e n t i o n  to  method and to  t h e  problem o f  
s tandards  by which on r e f l e c t i o n  t r u t h  can 
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from fa l sehood .  P o l i t i c s  
would be predominant ly  t h e  a t t em pt  to  bu i ld  
up a common l i f e  by the  methods o f  reason 
( f r e e  d i s c u s s io n ,  pub l ic  c r i t i c i s m )  and 
s u b je c t  t o  the  s anc t ion  o f  reason ( i . e .  the  
u l t im a te  t e s t  being whether t h e  common l i f e  
aimed a t  i s  a reasonab le  one, f i t  f o r  men 
who, no m a t te r  what d i f f e r e n c e s  d iv ide  them, 
agree to  th ink  in an o r d e r l y  way). Education 
would be predominant ly  a method f o r  inducing 
h a b i t s  o f  o r d e r ly  and s y s te m a t ic  th in k in g .
Social  s t r u c t u r e  would be predominant ly  of  
such kind as t o  p lace  the  most honourable  and 
commanding p o s i t i o n  those  who were i n t e l l e c t ­
u a l l y  the  e l i t e  . . . Economic l i f e  would 
come i n to  l i n e  with the  p r e v a i l i n g  h a b i t  o f  
mind by convert ing  customary methods o f  p ro­
du c t io n ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  e t c . ,  i n to  
' s c i e n t i f i c '  ones;  t h a t  i s ,  by apply ing the  
not ion  o f  o r d e r l y  and s y s te m a t ic  th in k in g  to  
economic m at te r s  no l e s s  than to  any o t h e r s . 81
In a s o r t  o f  f a n t a s y ,  Collingwood imagined the  development o f  a c i v i ­
l i z a t i o n  which had been long in e x i s t e n c e ,  which could apply i t s  
fundamental p r i n c i p l e s  in a r a t h e r  e l a b o r a t e  development. I f ,  f o r  
example, the " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  economic l i f e "  had acqu ired  such 
p rop o r t io n s  t h a t  popu la t io ns  could e i t h e r  no t  be kept  a l i v e  o r  only 
could e x i s t  b a re ly  through a c e a s e l e s s  e x e r t i o n  o f  many s c i e n t i s t s ,  
what would happen i f  t h i s  c i v i l i z a t i o n  r e j e c t e d  the  fundamental p r i n ­
c i p l e s  o f  i t s  c i v i l i z a t i o n ?  I t  would be, a s s e r t e d  Collingwood, some­
th ing  l i k e  an epidemic d i se a s e  r e s u l t i n g  in  a w i the r ing  in the  b e l i e f
in t ruth,  and in a denial  o f  the  o b l i g a t i o n  to  a c t  in a sy s tem at ic
and o r d e r l y  way. I t  would i n f e c t  r e l i g i o n  u n t i l  i t  was no
longer  a worship o f  t r u t h  but  one of  emotion o r  emotional  s t a t e s .  I t
would i n f e c t  educat ion u n t i l  t h e  ru le d  would abandon t h e  h a b i t  o f
o r d e r l y  th in k in g .  I t  would i n f e c t  p o l i t i c s  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  f o r  the
idea l  o f  o r d e r ly  t h in k in g  immediate and emotional t h in k i n g .  I t  would
s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  the  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r  one who p e r s o n i f i e d  mass emotions
in to  an "emotional communion with him." I t  would s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  the
d i a l e c t i c  s t y l e  o f  p o l i t i c s  the  pe rsuas ion  o f  conformity  t o  p a t r i o t i s m
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by an emotional o r  t e r o r i s t i c  means. Should t h e r e  be r e s i s t a n c e  to
the  d i s e a s e ,  the  " r e s u l t  w i l l  be t h a t  the  i n f e c t i o n  can progress  only
by concea l ing i t s  t r u e  c h a r a c t e r  behind a mask o f  conformity  to  the
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s p i r i t  o f  the  c i v i l i z a t i o n  i t  i s  a t t a c k i n g . "  The d i se a s e  could
s t i l l  p reva i l  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  i t  were "done in  an academic s o c i e t y
where s c i e n t i f i c  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  i s  so taken f o r  g ran ted  t h a t  no one
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dare c r i t i c i z e  the  work o f  a man in ano the r  f a c u l t y . "  F i n a l l y ,  
Collingwood suggested t h a t  h i s  r eaders  ask themselves  t h e  fo l lowing 
q u e s t ions :
1. Has t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  r e l i g i o n  . . .  in t h e  p a s t  been a 
worship . . .  o f  a t r u t h  which has been regarded as  in 
p r i n c i p l e  the  same f o r  a l l  human beings?
2. Has the  t r a d i t i o n a l  phi losophy  o f  our  c i v i l i z a t i o n  in 
the  p a s t  expounded i d e a l s  o f  r a t i o n a l  t h in k in g  and 
r a t i o n a l  a c t i n g  . . . which a re  c a l l e d  forming and 
c a r ry ing  ou t  a po l ic y  o r  a c t i n g  l i k e  a man o f  p r i n c i p l e  
. . . ?
3. Has the  p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  o f  our  c i v i l i z a t i o n  been 
based on the  idea o f  a p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  l i v e d  according 
to  a plan whose c h i e f  recommendation has been i t s  c la im 
to reasonableness?85
1 A O
Should the  r ea de r  answer a f f i r m a t i v e l y ,  Collingwood p o s tu l a t e d  the
s ta t em en t  t h a t :  c t v t l t z a t i o n s  can p e r i s h  due to  t h e  armed a t t a c k  o f
e i t h e r  enemies from without  o r  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  w i th in  but  never  from
t h i s  cause a lo ne .  I t  can p e r i s h  only " i f  the  people  who share  a
c i v i l i z a t i o n  a r e  no longer  on the  whole convinced t h a t  t h e  form of
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l i f e  which i t  t r i e s  to  r e a l i z e  i s  worth r e a l i z i n g  . . . "  I f  only 
one consequence i s  c o ns ide red ,  t h a t  a f f e c t i n g  economic l i f e ,  a number 
o f  t e c h n i c i a n s  could be compelled to  r e t a i n  the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e i r  i n ­
q u i ry ;  t h es e  sould then become h e lo t s  and " t e r r o r  would make them
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incapab le  o f  th in k in g  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y . "
Collingwood addressed  h i s  r e p a i r  o f  the  i n f e c t i o n  he descr ibed  
in An Essay on Metaphysics with h i s  New Leviathan wherein he at tempted  
t o  supply c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s  wi th  the  th eo ry  i t  l a c k e d ,  t h e  theory  o f  
the  non- soc ia l  community. Hobbes had provided no method whereby men 
o r  humankind in a s t a t e  o f  n a tu r e  a t t a i n e d  a moral and psychological  
c o nd i t ion  p e rm i t t in g  them t o  leave  a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e .  The th eo ry  was, 
in  t h a t  c a se ,  s t a t i c .  What was needed was the  d i f f u s i o n  o f  c i v i l i z e d  
va lues  through a t r a n sm is s ion  p rocess .  Col l ingwood's  theo ry  o f  p o l i ­
t i c a l  educat ion i s  dependent  upon a theo ry  o f  f r e e  w i l l .  I t  was here 
t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  as i t  e x i s t e d  in the  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  the  
tw e n t i e th  cen tu ry  d i s t u r b e d  Collingwood;  the  " f a v o u r i t e  nightmare o f
the  tw e n t i e th  century"  was "our  power lessness  in t h e  g i a n t  g r ip  of
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economic and soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s . "  Free w i l l  i s  a l so  
d i a l e c t i c a l  in t h a t  choice a l s o  ascends a s c a l e  o f  knowledge or  
r a t i o n a l i t y .  Col l ingwood's  choice  of  examples ,  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n ,  the  
r e g u l a r i a n ,  and t h a t  o f  duty have a l r e ady  been d i sc u s s e d ;  they  have
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been roundly  a t t a cke d  by Milne.  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  a theory  o f  duty 
c a r r i e s  with i t  an idea o f  n e c e s s i t y  which can be but  an excuse o f  an 
i r r a t i o n a l  o r  an un f ree  agen t .  In t h i s  c a se ,  as  e lsewhere in h i s  
w r i t i n g s ,  Collingwood assumed t h a t  h i s  concept  o f  duty had a l ready  
rece ived  a wider  aud ience .  In Fa i th  and Reason, he had a l r e ady  ex­
p la ined  th e  concept  o f  "good w i l l "  and "duty".
I t  seems to  be a necessa ry  axiom of  e th i c s  
t h a t  on any given occas ion th e r e  can be only 
one duty.  For duty means what a man ought 
to  do; and i t  cannot  conceivably be a duty 
to  do something imposs ib le .  Therefore  i f  I 
have two d u t i e s  a t  the  same t ime,  i t  must be 
p o s s ib l e  f o r  me to  do both . . .  t he  d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  between "ought  to  do" and "ought not  to  
do" i s  no t  a q u e s t ion  o f  degree . . .  I f  i t  i s  
t r u e  t h a t  my duty can never  c o n t r a d i c t  i t s e l f ,  
i t  i s  e q u a l ly  t r u e  t h a t  my duty cannot  con­
t r a d i c t  anyone e l s e ' s  . . . A rea l  duty . . . 
i s  a good no t  f o r  t h i s  o r  t h a t  man, but  fo r  
t h e  whole w o r ld . " "
"Man's l i f e , "  a s s e r t e d  Collingwood,  " i s  a becoming; and not  on ly  be­
coming, bu t  s e l f - c r e a t i o n  . . .  The fo rc e  t h a t  shapes him i s  h i s  own 
w i l l .  All h i s  l i f e  i s  an e f f o r t  to  a t t a i n  t o  rea l  human na tu re  . . .
This s e l f - c r e a t i o n  must a l s o  be self -knowledge  . . .  the  examinat ion
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o f  t h e  s e l f  t h a t  i s  to  be ."
Perhaps because he was no t  p r im a r i l y  a p o l i t i c a l  ph i lo sophe r ,  
Collingwood had l i t t l e  t ime t o  c o n s id e r  t h e  problems of  p o l i t y  as 
power and a u t h o r i t y  a l though  he recognized these  as being t h e r e ;  they 
were not  d i scussed  excep t  i n c i d e n t a l l y  in h i s  o t h e r  works. His 
w r i t i n g s  upon the  problem o f  e v i l  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r t i n e n t  to  the  
p o l i t i c a l  sphe re .  Power has not  appeared in  Col l ingwood's terms ex­
c ep t  as a d i a l e c t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  and y e t ,  power appears t o  be
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almost  wi thout  a h i s t o r y  al though i t  r e p e a t s  i t s e l f  r e ve a l ing  the  p a ra ­
dox o f  ev i l  in choice  upon which. Collingwood did dwel l .  In p o l i t i c a l  
terms,  Collingwood o f ten  spoke o f  t h i s  as  t h e  paradox of  r a t i o n a l i t y  
ve rsus  i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  The "good" o f  the  community o r  the  fundamental 
wi l l  o f  people in a c u l t u r e  as e x p r e s s ib l e  through th e  ru l i n g  c l a s s  
appears ,  in h i s t o r y ,  to  f o s t e r  e v i l  in  two ways: p o l i t i c a l  power and 
i t s  c o r o l l a r y ,  economic e x p l o i t a t i o n .  Collingwood provided a p h i l o s ­
ophical  beginning f o r  a framework to  c ons ide r  economics and p o l i t i c s  
o u t s i d e  the  usual channels  o f  s e p a r a te  d i s c i p l i n e s .  The s o l u t i o n ,  as 
Collingwood perce ived  i t ,  lay in the  i nd iv idua l  and the  s o c i a l i z i n g  
process  ( the  development o f  c i v i l i t y ) .  The r u l i n g  c l a s s ,  in C o l l in g ­
wood's account ,  has not  func t ioned  e f f e c t i v e l y  s in c e  t h e  l a t e  n in e ­
t ee n th  cen tu ry .  While the  problem has been i d e n t i f i e d  as ly ing  in the  
" th r e e  laws o f  p o l i t i c s " ,  a necessa ry  t a s k  now i s  to  t a c k l e  r a t i o n a l ­
i t y  wi th in  the  p o l i t y  as a p o l i t i c a l  e v i l .  Collingwood conc en t ra te d ,  
in most o f  h i s  works, upon the  i nd iv idua l  and h i s  development Through 
c i v i l i z a t i o n .  In the  per iod of  t ime s in c e  Collingwood w ro te ,  t h e  aim 
must be to  unders tand p o l i t i c s  as an overa rch ing  r e a l i t y  s in c e  human 
choice  i s  e i t h e r  expanded o r  l im i t e d  in t h a t  sphere .
The Collingwoodian t r a d i t i o n  l i e s  w i th in  t h a t  e x p l i c a t e d  by 
A r i s t o t l e ,  Rousseau, and Hegel;  i t  goes back to  the  r o o t s  of  Western 
c i v i l i z a t i o n  to  the  Greek and Roman no t ions  to  form a ph i lo soph ica l  
d ialogue  with h i s t o r y ,  the  roo ts  o f  ou rse lves  and our  h e r i t a g e ,  and 
the  n e c e s s i t y  to  cont inue  to  develop success ive  s tages  o f  the  d i a l e c t i c  
as well  as the  " lo g i c  o f  ab s o lu t e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s " ,  t o  expose these  
l a t t e r  as the  new frameworks appears .  Collingwood denied t h i s
t r ad i t ion ,  and those  in t h e  process  o f  c r e a t i n g  anew wi th in  i t  in the  
c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  e s p e c i a l l y  when what was c re a te d  was 
l e s s  than t h a t  encompassing both the  un ive r sa l  and the  p a r t i c u l a r .
What Collingwood has pe rseve red in  p re se n t ing  to  us i s  a v i s ion  o f  
man's becoming,. The s oc ia l  c o n t r a c t  u n d e r l i e s  the  bas ic  equa t ion ;  i t  
i s  no t ,  as Hobbes b e l i e v e d ,  the  exchange o f  savage l i b e r t y  f o r  s e c u r i t y  
but  t h e  passage in to  c i v i l  e x i s t e n c e  through the  development o f  c i v i l i t y .  
Collingwood has l ikew ise  promoted a concept  o f  h i s t o r y  not  only p h i l o ­
sophica l  but  he rm eneu t ica l .  What he did not  do was t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  
s p e c i f i c  e v i l s  f o s t e r e d  by p o l i t i c a l  power. His i n s i s t e n c e  upon the  
l i n k  of  m ora l i ty  with a l l  a c t i o n  as thought  i s  ano the r  impera t ive  f o r  
s c h o la r sh ip .  Yet the  problem o f  p o l i t i c a l  e v i l  cannot  be reduced,  as 
Collingwood a ve r r e d ,  to  a socio-economic e v i l ;  t h i s  i s  merely i l l u s i o n .
An e s s e n t i a l  a rea  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  i s  the  dynamics o f  t h e  d i a l e c t i c s  o f  
t h e  persons who make up the  p o l i t y .  The c e n te r  of  the  soc ia l  c o n t r a c t  
idea remains freedom founded in  r a t i o n a l i t y .  Collingwood has demon­
s t r a t e d  t h a t  democracy cannot  be reduced to  a melange o f  scep t i c i sm  
and r e l a t i v i s m .  Freedom, r e s p o n s ib le  a c t i o n ,  r e s p e c t  f o r  the  i n d i v i d ­
ual a re  pa r t s  o f  the  l i b e r a l  h e r i t a g e  to  which Collingwood subsc r ibed ,  
based as those values  a re  upon formal procedures  o f  a c e r t a i n  kind.  
Perhaps these  procedures  a re  no t  so e s s e n t i a l  to  t h e  d i a l e c t i c  as 
o t h e r  aspec ts  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  which coll ingwood mentioned such as « 
community, the  idea l  o f  e q u a l i t y  o r  c i v i l i t y ,  the  no t ion  o f  the  "common 
good"; what has been lack ing  i s  group subs tance .  I t  i s  to  Col lingwood's 
c r e d i t  t h a t  he has po in ted  ou t  the  r e l a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  o f  a c t i n g ,  
p a t t e r n s  of  o rde r  and s t a b i l i t y  so t h a t  an ordered  un i ty  and wholeness
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appears  tn  t h e  l i f e  of  the  mind. The l i b e r a l  premise has degenerated 
i n to  a n i h i l i s m  o r  n e ga t ive  freedqm.
The conc lusion  o f  N. K. O 'S u l l iv a n  appears  t o  be a p p ro p r i a t e
enough f o r  a summary o f  Col l ingwood's  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n :
. . .  i t  must be based upon those  important  
e lements  in h i s  v i s i o n  of  a f r e e  and r a t i o n ­
a l l y  o rgan ized  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  which were 
l e s s  a f f e c t e d  by th e  shadow o f  Nazism. These 
would inc lude  h i s  d iagnos i s  o f  the  general  
na tu re  o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m  as c o n s i s t i n g  in  the  
confusion  o f  phi losophy wi th  psychology;  h i s  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  r e a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
phi losophy as t h e  source  o f  t h e  d ivorce  be­
tween th eo ry  and p r a c t i c e  t h a t  has l ed  con­
temporary p o l i t i c a l  ph i lo sophy  to  abandon i t s  
t a s k  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  the  t h r e a t s  which con f ron t  
t h e  modern body p o l i t i c  and s t a t i n g  the  cond i ­
t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  removal;  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the 
va r ious  s tages  through which r a t i o n a l  conduct  
p a s se s ;  and above a l l ,  h i s  p i n - p o i n t i n g  o f  the  
major  d e f i c i e n c y  o f  the  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i t i c s ,  v i z .  
i t s  f a i l u r e  to  provide a dynamic p o l i t i c a l  theory  
which would p revent  the  spread  o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m  
by making adequate  p r o v i s io n  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  edu­
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The conc lus ion  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  Collingwood, 
through a l i f e - t i m e  o f  d i s c i p l i n e d  e f f o r t ,  began a d ia lgue  about  
p o l i t i c s  as choice involv ing  a c t i o n  as  knowledge o r  mind. His 
s p e c i f i c  c ha l l enge  to  those  who c o n s id e r  themselves  members o f  the  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  community i s  to  improve,  e l a b o r a t e ,  and to  make p r a c t i c a l  
t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  a d i a l e c t i c s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  choice based upon a 
theo ry  o f  f r e e  w i l l  so t h a t  rapprochement  between theo ry  and p r a c t i c e  
i s  thereby  e f f e c t e d .
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY — phi losophy o f  pure a c t ,  e q u iv a l e n t  to  abso lu te  
knowledge (Speculum Specul i )
ABSOLUTE PRESUPPOSITIONS — a l l  q ue s t ions  r e s t  on a foundat ion of  
a b s o lu t e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  A change in the  s e t  o f  abso lu te  
p re suppos i t ions  r a i s e s  new ques t ions  and v ice  ve rsa .
ABSTRACTION — "to a b s t r a c t  i s  to  cons ide r  s e p a r a t e l y  th in g s  t h a t  a re
in se pa rab le  . . .  One cannot  a b s t r a c t  without  f a l s i f y i n g . "  (SM 160)
APANAGE — simple consciousness  in  the  form o f  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  f e e l i n g .
BARBARISM — h o s t i l i t y  towards c i v i l i z a t i o n
CLASSICAL POLITICS — p o l i t i c a l  ph i lo sophers  from Hobbes to  Rousseau.
CONCEPTUAL THINKING — second leve l  o r  above, consciousness  wherein 
f e a t u r e s  in the  o b j e c t i v e  f i e l d  o f  consciousness  a re  d i s ­
c r im in a ted  by s e l e c t i v e  a t t e n t i o n .
CONCRETE IDENTITY IN DIFFERENCE - -  the  same as immanence-transcendence,
( l ) t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between God and man and (2 ) the  d o c t r in e  
o f  the  un iver sa l  and th e  p a r t i c u l a r .
CONCRETE UNIVERSAL — a s y n th e s i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  exp res s ions  as t h i s  
occurs  a t  the  t h i r d  on to log ica l  l e v e l .
CONSCIOUSNESS — the  gene r ic  name f o r  mental fu n c t io n s  regarded as
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a given l e v e l .  Simple consciousness  r e f e r s  to  
f e e l i  ng .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM — the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  r u l i n g  c l a s s ,
the  ru le d  c l a s s ,  and the  upward p e rm e ab i l i ty  between the  two.
The ru led  c l a s s  r e f e r s  t o  mature a d u l t s  capab le  o f  f r e e  wi l l  
and cho ice .
CORRUPT CONSCIOUSNESS — a c o r ru p t io n  o f  the  imaginat ion which a l so  
co r r u p t s  the  forms o f  knowledge.
DIALECTIC — the  s t r e s s e s  and s t r a i n s  o f  an e x i s t e n t i a l  o r  l og ica l  
n a tu re  g iv ing  r i s e  to  a new s t a n d p o in t .  The d i a l e c t i c  in 
Col lingwood's usage i s  a complex i d e a ,  model led a f t e r  t h a t  
of  Hegel , r e p r e s e n t in g  an e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  concept of  
development . . . a p p l i c a b l e  to  p rocess ,  i . e . ,  t h e r e  is  no 
d i a l e c t i c  of  n a tu re  a l though t h e r e  can be a d i a l e c t i c a l  
h i s t o r y  o f  the  concept  o f  n a tu re .
EPISTEMOLOGY — t h a t  branch o f  phi losophy which i n v e s t i g a t e s  the
o r i g i n ,  s t r u c t u r e ,  methods, and v a l i d i t y  o f  knowledge. The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between psychology (behaviora l  s c iences )  and 
epistemology i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t im a te  s in ce  both a r e  con­
cerned with c o g n i t iv e  processes  such a s :  p e rc e p t i o n ,  
memory, imag ina t ion ,  concep t ion ,  and reason ing .
ERISTICAL - -  an argument made f o r  t h e  sake o f  winning r a t h e r  than f o r  
s e t t l i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s .
EXPERIENCE — primary ( immediate ,  unsys tem at ic ,  unmediated) 
secondary (mediate ,  r e f l e c t i v e )
FAITH — r e l i g i o u s  consc iousness .  Collingwood desc r ibed  f a i t h  as
" t h e o r e t i c a l ,  p r a c t i c a l ,  and emot io na l" ;  t h i s  does not  imply 
i r r a t i o n a l i t y .
FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS — r e f u s a l  t o  pay a t t e n t i o n  to  the  e n t i r e  f i e l d  o f  
consciousness ,
FREEDOM — the  sp o n ta n e i ty  o f  consc iousness  a t  any leve l  in g iv ing  r i s e  
to  a c t i v i t i e s  through s e l e c t i v e  a t t e n t i o n .
GOOD — any o b j e c t  o f  d e s i r e  — an a b s t r a c t i o n  from the  a c t i v i t y  of  
d e s i r i n g .
HERMENEUTICS — s tages  in  t h e  p rocess  o f  in q u i r y  o r  o f  a c t i v e  thought  
in ge n e ra l .  This i s  cons id e red  the  a r t  and s c ience  o f  i n ­
t e r p r e t i n g  e s p e c i a l l y  in a u t h o r i t a t i v e  w r i t i n g s ,  e q u iv a l e n t  
t o  e x e g e s i s .  Paul Ricoeur  has exp lo red  hermeneut ics  as  a 
theory  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  unders tanding  using a h i s t o r i c a l  method 
which i s  both c r i t i c a l l y  o b j e c t i v e  and s u b j e c t i v e .  Obviously,  
the  term i s  bound up with p h i lo logy  and r h e t o r i c  as  w e l l .
I t  i s  with Gadamer and Ricoeur in h i s  l a t e r  work t h a t  hermen­
e u t i c s  appears  as Collingwood expressed  i t  in a type  of  
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y  wherein communication becomes a d ia logue  
so t h a t  the  r e s u l t  i s  d i a l e c t i c .  For a d i sc u s s io n  o f  t h i s  
see Thomas M. Seebohm, "The Problem o f  Hermeneut ics ,"  P h i l ­
osophy and R h e t o r i c , Volume 10, ( F a l l ,  1977) ,  pp. 263-275.
HUNGER — the  a p p e t i t e  t o  be omnipotent .
IMAGINATION — a e s t h e t i c  consciousness  o r  the  second leve l  o f  t h e o r e -
t h e o r e t i c a l  consciousness  prompted by the  conversion  o f  f e e l i n g  
to  s e l e c t i v e  a t t e n t i o n
IMMANENT-TRANSCENDENT DOCTRINE — the  d o c t r i n e  understood in  t e r n s  of  
a metaphysics  o f  c o n c re te  u n i v e r s a l i t y ,  a l s o  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between God and man. (Any p a r t i c u l a r  mind 
mind can show th e  n a tu r e  o f  God as  well  as any o t h e r . )
In t h i s  d o c t r i n e ,  Collingwood argued t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  
types  o f  un ive r sa l  judgment  which,  a l though a p p ro p r i a t e  to  
s c ie n c e ,  a r e  no t  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  ph i losoph ica l  a n a l y s i s .
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  t h a t  de r ived  as  a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  from i n ­
s t a n c e s ;  second,  t h e r e  i s  the  concept  o f  the  un iver sa l  as a 
genus;  t h i r d ,  t h e r e  i s  the  judgment which f in d  th e  un ive r sa l  
e lement  which binds a sp e c i e s  t o g e t h e r  (a v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  
second .)  To a r range  a l l  o f  t h e s e  judgments on a s c a l e  i s  
to  frame a s y n th e s i s  which i s  ' c o n c r e t e  i d e n t i t y  in d i f f e r ­
ence ' ,
IRRATIONALISM (PROPAGANDA OF) — an epidemic w i the r ing  o f  b e l i e f  in 
the  idea o f  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  t h in k  and a c t  in a s y s te m a t ic  
and o r d e r l y  f a s h i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h e  p re fe re nc e  f o r  t ec hn ica l  
and voca t i ona l  t r a i n i n g  as educa t io n  o r ,  in p o l i t i c s ,  t he  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  o r d e r  f o r  v i r t u e .
INTERSUBJECTIVITY — th e  t ranscendence  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t - o b j e c t  dichotomy 
wherein genuine freedom occu rs .  This would be a c t i o n  beyond 
duty.  Collingwood expressed  t h i s  idea in Speculum M en t i s , 
on pages 304-05. In a b s o lu t e  e t h i c s ,  an agen t  i d e n t i f i e s  
" h im se l f  wi th  the  e n t i r e  world o f  f a c t , "  and then p repares  
t o  a c t  in a unique s i t u a t i o n  in  f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  as 
" i d e n t i f y i n g  h im se l f  w i th  t h e  a b s o lu t e  mind"; thus h i s  a c t  
becomes one o f  pure s e l f - c r e a t i o n .  I t  i s  " id e n t i c a l  with 
self -knowledge" so t h a t  t h e  a b s t r a c t  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  
w i l l  and t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  t ranscended .
LAW OF PRIMITIVE SURVIVALS — su rv iv a l  o f  a former s t a t e  in an ascend­
ing s c a l e .
LOGICAL EFFICACY — power o f  causing  a q u e s t ion  to  a r i s e .
LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER — Col l ingwood 's  metaphysics  wherein he 
r a i s e s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  q u e s t i o n s ;  in  Kuhn's t e rm s ,  the  p a ra ­
d igmatic  framework.
LOGIC OF OVERLAP OF CLASSES - -  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  but  no t  e x te r n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  on an overl app ing  s c a l e  o f  forms.
LOVE — a form o f  a p p e t i t e  and d e s i r e  such as  the  consciousness  o f
a p p e t i t i v e  love  r e s u l t i n g  from hunger  and changing in to  f e a r .  
The a b s t r a c t  concept  o f  c o n t r a s t  between the  s e l f  and th e  not- 
s e l f .
METAPHYSICS (dogmatic)  — the  v i n d ic a t i o n  o f  exper ience  o r  the  d i s ­
covery o f  i t s  a b s o lu t e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  and the  experi ence  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n s  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s  to  o t h e r  s e t s  o f  p r o ­
p o s i t i o n s ,  a s y n th e s i s  o f  d e s c r i p t i v e  and normative 
a c t i v i t i e s .
METAPHYSICS (genuine)  — v i n d ic a t e s  exper ience  on t h r e e  o n to lo g ica l  
l e v e l s .  Collingwood contended t h a t  metaphysics  was both 
e x p e r i e n t i a l  and h i s t o r i c a l .  Metaphysics conceived as 
a p a r t i c u l a r  p h i lo s o p h ica l  s c i e n c e  would be the  sc ience  
o f  a b s o lu t e  mind e xpe r ienc ing  i t s e l f  as  a b s o lu t e  mind. 
Absolute  mind i s  the  u n i ty  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  mind. 
From t h i s  s t a n d p o i n t ,  Col lingwood can argue t h a t  meta­
phys ics  i s  no t  s e p a r a t e  but  i s  i d e n t i c a l  with p a r t i c u l a r  
s t a n d p o in t s  (dogmatic ) .  I t  confi rms ,  t h e n ,  t h e  rapproche­
ment between ph i losophy  and h i s t o r y  a l r e a d y  con ta ined  in 
Speculum M e n t i s . See L. Rubinof f ,  Collingwood and the  
Reform o f  Metaphys ics , pp. 207-08.
MIND — phenomenological o r  i n t e n t i o n a l .  , . consc iousness  i s  con­
cerned with thought  which i s  always p a r t i c u l a r ,  i nc lud ing  
thoughts  and t h in g s .
I d e n t i t y  o f  Minds — b a s i s  o f  t h e  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e  communi­
c a t i o n .  Two minds a r e  i d e n t i c a l  to  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  they 
have knowledge o f  the  same o b j e c t .
MORAL PHILOSOPHY — g iv ing  an "account  o f  how people  t h in k  they  
ought t o  behave . . (EPM, pp. 131-32.)
PHENOMENOLOGY — a n a l y s i s  o f  h a b i t s  o f  mind o r  s u c c e s s iv e  c a t e ­
g o r ie s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  emphasizing e x p e r i en c e .  Collingwood 
has been termed a "phenomenologis t"  because t h i s ,  
in Merleau-Ponty,  a f f i rm s  the  s u b j e c t i v e  meaning o f  
t he  world and a t t empts  to  f r e e  t h i s  t h e s i s  from the  
accusa t ion  o f  psychologism to  d r iv e  towards an ontology 
o f  n a tu r e .  See Joseph Duchene, "World and R a t i o n a l i t y  
in  M erleau-Ponty ' s  Phénoménologie de l a  P e r c e p t i o n ,"  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Ph i losoph ica l  Q u a r t e r l y . Volume XVII, 
(December, 1977),  pp. 393-414.
PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS — consc iousness  above th e  f i r s t  l eve l  
concerned wi th  a c t i o n .
PROPOSITIONAL THINKING - -  consciousness  a t  the  t h i r d  l eve l  o f  mind.
RADICAL HISTORICISM — tendency to  t r e a t  t h e  whole o f  r e a l i t y  in 
h i s t o r i c a l  t e rm s ,  i . e . ,  N ie tz sc he ,  Or tega ,  Heidegger ,  
C a s s i r e r .
RAPPROCHEMENT — r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  u n i ty  o f  l i f e  through a rapproche­
ment between th e  forms o f  experi ence .
REASON — h i s t o r i c a l  and ph i lo soph ica l  consc iousness .
REGULARIAN PRINCIPLE — r u l e  o f  ge n e ra l i z e d  purpose
SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION — a b s t r a c t i o n s  from a p p e t i t i v e  
a c t i v i t i e s .
SCIENTIFIC CONSCIOUSNESS — reason (At t im e s ,  i t  appeared t h a t  
Collingwood c a l l e d  t h i s  unders tand in g .)
SOLIPSISM — a v a r i e t y  o f  idea l ism  which main ta ins  t h a t  the  
ind iv idua l  s e l f  o f  t h e  ph i lo sopher  i s  t h e  whole of  
r e a l i t y  — a l s o  methodological when the  d o c t r in e  con­
s i d e r s  the  ind iv idua l  s e l f  and i t s  s t a t e s  as  t h e  only 
p o s s ib l e  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  f o r  ph i lo soph ica l  c o n s t r u c t i o n .
SUUM CUIQUE — a one- to -one  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p a r t i c i p a n t s  and 
sha re s .
THEORETICAL CONSCIOUSNESS — leve l  o f  consciousness  where t r u t h  
and f a l s i t y  emerge; consciousness  above the  f i r s t  l eve l  
concerned with c o g n i t i o n .  At the  fo u r th  l e v e l ,  t h i s  would 
be t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between c a p r i c io u s  and r a t i o n a l  cho ice .
TRANSEUNT RULE — t h a t  which r u l e s  something o t h e r  than i t s e l f .
UTILITARIANISM — used g e n e r i c a l l y  by Collingwood,  i . e . ,  the
m o ra l i t y  o f  an ac t i o n  i s  d e r i v a t i v e  from an a c t s '  con­
sequence.
APPENDIX A
L e v e l s  o f  C o n s c io u s n e s s S e r i e s  o f  L o g ic a l  D i a l e c t i c a l  L e v e l s O b j e c t  o f  Knowledge
Level  I 
( p a s s i o n s )
i
p u r e  f e e l i n g  — ► p u r e  I m a g i n a t i o n  — •► no s u b j e c t -  
o b j e c t  d i s t i n c t i o n  — ►  fun d am e n ta l  mode o f  e x i s ­
t e n c e  — onl y  t r u e  v iew o f  r e a l i t y  — *, 
s e n s a t i o n a l  and e m o t io n a l
A r t
i ,
Level  I I
( c o n t r o l  o f
p a s s i o n s )
------------------
Level  I I I  
( d e s i r e )
( h a p p i n e s s - u n h a p p i n e s s )
  _________
( g o b d - e v l l )
Level  IV
( w i l l )
( c a p r i c i o u s - r a t i o n a l )
may be e m o t io n a l  — moves t o  p r a c t i c a l  l e v e l  —^  
mora l  e x i s t e n c e  b a s e d  upon p u r e  f a i t h  —  assumes 
h i s t o r i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  — >  p r e s u p p o s e s  f a l s e  d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  b a s e d  upon a p p e a r a n c e  and r e a l i t y  — r e t a i n s  
e m o t io n a l  b a s i s  — ► a e s t h e t i c - l o g i c a l  (one  o f  a 
number o f  a t t i t u d e s  --•► a f f i r m s  I d e n t i t y  In  d l f f e r -  
e n c e  - - > •  g round  o f  r e a s o n  — >■ a s s e r t i o n  o f  t r u t h




a b s t r a c t  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tween  s u b j e c t - o b j e c t  - - - >  
f i n d s  knowledge a s  s p e c i e s  o f  genus  — ► a b s t r a c t  
u n i v e r s a l  I s  c o n c e i v e d  o f  as  t h e  whole  o f  r e a l i t y  — ► 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  o f  f a i t h  l e v e l  o f  r e a s o n  - - ^  
s e p a r a t e s  u n i v e r s a l  and p a r t i c u l a r  — movement  ,
f rom rea lm  o f  h o l y  t o  r ea lm  o f  a b s t r a c t  r e a l i t y  
t h e o r y  o f  h y p o t h e s i s __________________
S c i e n c e
1
( c h o i c e )
1.  U t i l i t y
2 .  R ig h t
3.  Duty
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  t r a n s c e n d s  I t s e l f  d i a l e c t i c a l  
I d e n t i t y  be tween  s u b j e c t  and o b j e c t  — ♦  r a pp roc he m e n t  
o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  s c a l e  o f  forms — communi t y o f  I n t e r -  
s u b j e c t i v i t y  - - »  n a t u r e  o f  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  a r e  e xposed  
---#< s y n t h e s i s  o f  permanence and change  - - ►  h i s t o r i c a l  
p e r c e p t i o n  = a c t  o f  judgm en t  - - ►  h i s t o r y  = s c i e n c e  o f  
mind — ► s t a t e  o f  g e n u in e  freedom _______________________
H i s t o r y  and 
P h i lo s o p h y





A e s th e t i c P r im i t i v e  form o f  
consciousness
Bodily express ion  
o f  emotion ( a c t i v i t y  
rende rs  emotion 
conscious)
P r in c i p l e s
of
Art
P r a c t i c a l
reason
to
t h e o r e t i c a l
reason
Reason (always a 
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n )  
Natural  s c iences  
Human sc iences  
( r e f l e c t i o n  upon 
da ta )
Symbols ( t h i n g s  
and t h e i r  
r e f e r e n t s )
New Leviathan
Transcendence S e l f -
r e f l e c t i v e




Idea o f  
His to ry
APPENDIX B
*Thjs i s  only a t e n t a t i v e  ske tch based upon th e  ideas  gleaned from 
th e  t h r e e  works c i t e d .
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